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Foreword
This report provides a comprehensive quantitative assessment of possible implications of an EU dairy 
policy reform, with an explicit focus on regional effects of a milk quota abolition in the EU-27 in the year 
2015.1
The report forms part of the project “Economic Impact of the Abolition of the Milk Quota Regime – 
Regional Analysis of the Milk Production in the EU” (AGRI-2007-0444), initiated by DG Agriculture and 
Rural Development (DG AGRI). The project was carried out from December 2007 until February 2009 by 
the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre - Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (JRC-
IPTS, Spain) in cooperation with EuroCARE (Bonn, Germany) and the collaboration of the Agricultural 
Economics Research Institute (LEI, the Netherlands) and the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart 
(Unicatt, Italy).
The CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy Regionalised Impact) model used in this study is an 
agricultural sector model that combines a representation of agricultural supply based on positive 
mathematical programming with a global trade model for agricultural commodities. The supply module 
of CAPRI covers the most important agricultural activities in the EU-27 at a regional level (NUTS 2). The 
market model provides market feedbacks to farm gate prices for changing farmer behaviour and allows 
simultaneously the simulation of policy changes at the market level.
By the time this study has been elaborated, the milk market has shown a high dynamic, with relatively 
high milk prices in the year 2007 declining since spring 2008. This decline in milk prices could not 
be entirely incorporated in the modelling due to its unforeseen magnitude. In November 2008 the EU 
agriculture ministers reached a political agreement on the CAP Health Check, following the European 
Commission’s originally proposed 1% milk quota increase every year between 2009 and 2013. Moreover, 
the ministers confirmed that the milk quota system will be abolished in 2015. 
We thank Wolfgang Britz and Andrea Zintl (both University of Bonn, Germany) for different types of 
technical support and Christine Möller and Bence Tóth (both DG AGRI) for their detailed and valuable 
comments. Expert information on various countries has been kindly provided by Abele Kuipers (LEI, 
Wageningen University and Research Centre in the Netherlands), Heikki Lehtonen (MTT, Finland) and 
Thia Hennessy (Teagasc, Ireland). Sole responsibility for remaining shortcomings of this report rests, of 
course, with the authors.
1 A preliminary version of this report is published on the website of the European Commission’s DG Agriculture and Rural 
Development (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis)
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Background
The dairy sector makes a substantial 
contribution to the agricultural turnover in many 
Member States (MS) of the European Union (EU) 
as well as in the EU as a whole. Nevertheless, 
within the EU-27, the size and importance of the 
dairy sector varies considerably between MS and 
across regions, basically reflecting climatic and 
other agricultural factors in the region concerned. 
The EU dairy market is regulated by the Common 
Market Organisation (CMO) for milk and milk 
products, of which the milk quota regime is one of 
the most noticeable elements. The EU milk quota 
system was originally introduced in 1984, in order 
to limit public expenditure on the sector, to control 
milk production, and to stabilize milk prices and 
the agricultural income of milk producers. Since 
the milk quota regime was introduced, milk quota 
has become a scarce production factor: on the 
one hand limiting milk production and, on the 
other hand, stabilising milk producer prices and 
maintaining dairy activities in less competitive 
regions. However, in the course of time European 
dairy policy has been continuously changing 
and has increasingly encouraged producers to 
be more market-oriented. Policy developments, 
including reductions of intervention prices and 
specific quota increases of various amounts to MS, 
together with most recent market developments, 
have provoked that quota is no more binding 
in some MS and regions of the EU. With the 
Luxembourg Agreement on the Mid-Term-Review 
(MTR) on 26 June 2003, the spotlight shifted again 
on the EU’s milk quota regime, because the MTR 
stipulated that the milk quota system will come to 
an end in 2015. Within the Health Check of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the European 
Commission endorsed the proposal of milk quota 
abolition and suggested an increase of quota by 
1% annually from 2009 to 2013 to allow a “soft 
landing” of the milk sector to the end of quotas. 
In this context it is especially important to clarify, 
which economic effects can be expected of an 
abolition of the milk quota regime.
The current report is the last report of a series 
of three reports delivered to DG Agriculture and 
Rural Development (DG AGRI) within the project 
entitled “Economic Impact of the Abolition of 
the Milk Quota Regime – Regional Analysis of 
the Milk Production in the EU” (AGRI-2007-
0444). The project aims at a thorough policy 
impact analysis of the EU dairy markets in the 
year 2020 regarding the removal of milk quotas 
within the framework of the Health Check of the 
CAP. This study has been led by the European 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre - Institute 
for Prospective Technological Studies (JRC-IPTS) 
and provides a quantitative assessment based on 
different simulation scenarios performed with the 
CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy Regionalised 
Impact) model and allows the comparison to 
results published in previous studies performed 
by the AGMEMOD, CAPSIM and EDIM consortia 
(Chantreuil et al. 2008; Witzke et al. 2008; 
Réquillart et al. 2008).
Within the project a significant amount of 
work was devoted to a rigorous update of the 
CAPRI model and database. The model updates 
were essential and comprised three objectives. 
The first one was to update the base year of 
the CAPRI system to a 2003-2005 three-year 
average. This was an important challenge due 
to the complexity of the CAPRI system and the 
problems to update world-wide supply and use 
tables from FAOSTAT. The second objective of 
the model update was the implementation of a 
formal link to an econometric framework for 
estimating marginal costs of milk producers. 
This additional module should increase the 
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validity of the analysis, as it provides price-supply 
elasticities for raw milk based on historical FADN 
(Farm Accountancy Data Network) records (data 
up to year 2005) and actual estimates of regional 
quota rents (i.e. the difference between the farm 
milk price under quota and the marginal cost 
of production). The third objective of the model 
update was to incorporate expert data and 
medium-term projections on dairy commodities 
provided by the Directorate-General Agriculture 
and Rural Development (DG AGRI).
The profound update of the CAPRI 
model provides the basis for a comprehensive 
quantitative assessment of possible implications 
of the dairy policy reform, with an explicit focus 
on regional effects in the EU-27 of a milk quota 
abolition in the year 2015. 
Specification of the Model
The CAPRI model is an agricultural sector model 
covering the whole of EU-27, Norway and Western 
Balkans at regional level (250 regions) and global 
agricultural markets at country or country block 
level. CAPRI makes use of non linear mathematical 
programming tools to maximise regional agricultural 
income with explicit consideration of the CAP 
instruments of support in an open economy. CAPRI 
consists of a supply and market module which 
interact iteratively. The supply module follows a 
‘template approach’, where optimisation models 
can be seen as representative farms maximising 
their profit by choosing the optimal composition of 
outputs and inputs at given prices. Major outputs of 
the supply module are crop acreages and animal 
numbers at regional level, with their associated 
revenues, costs and income. The market module 
consists of a constrained equation system with 
a spatial world trade model. Major outputs of the 
market module include bilateral trade flows, market 
balances and producer and consumer prices for the 
products and world country aggregates. 
The CAPRI version used for this study is 
standard comparative-static, i.e. adjustment costs 
are not considered and policy simulations reveal 
a situation where dairy farmers were given time 
to adjust their fixed factors to the new policy 
framework. By incorporating an econometric 
supply module for the most representative 
dairy farms in the EU, the update of the CAPRI 
model allows for a better representation of the 
dairy sector, as additional information on milk 
quota rents and price supply elasticities are now 
explicitly introduced for dairy products.
Scenario Description
Four scenarios are considered in the 
analysis: 
	 Scenario S1 corresponds to the ex-post base 
year scenario, which is constructed for year 
2004 (i.e. 2003-2005 three-year average). 
It includes the full implementation of the 
Agenda 2000 reform, with 2003 agreements 
on the Mid-Term Review not being yet 
effective. This means that in this scenario 
the dairy and sugar markets were slightly 
more protective than after the Luxembourg 
Agreement in 2003 and direct payments were 
still coupled to production. Market access for 
developing countries was provided for by the 
"Everything but Arms" (EBA) agreement and 
the EU-10 (10 EU MS after the enlargement 
in 2004) and EU-2 (Bulgaria and Romania) 
were not yet fully part of the single market.
	 Scenario S2 is a counterfactual simulation of 
the baseline policy applied to year 2004. It 
builds on the legislation ratified in year 2004, 
i.e. scenario S2 includes the central elements 
for the dairy sector of the Luxembourg 
Agreement in 2003, namely the decoupling 
of direct payments together with a stepwise 
reduction of intervention prices for butter 
and SMP. Furthermore it also includes further 
reforms on single markets (tobacco, olive 
oil and cotton sectors), the reform of the 
sugar quota, a 2% expansion of milk quotas 
in 2008 and the abolition of obligatory 
13
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set-aside. Scenario S2 was mainly elaborated 
to show the impact of the 2003/2004 reform 
ex-post, i.e. more for technical purposes. Due 
to its high degree of abstraction and rather 
minor direct relevance to the analysis of milk 
quota abolition, results of scenario S2 are not 
further analysed in this report.
	 Scenario S3 represents the baseline policy in 
year 2020. It assumes the same policy setting 
as scenario S2, i.e. the full implementation 
of the Luxembourg Agreement and 
further reforms mentioned in scenario S2. 
Moreover, scenario S3 includes expert-driven 
assumptions on the development of dairy 
markets and milk quota rents. For this scenario, 
DG AGRI provided statistical information on 
milk deliveries, export subsidies, intervention 
stocks for dairy products and, medium-term 
projections for dairy markets. 
	 Scenario S4 is conducted to represent 
the effects of a milk quota abolition. It is a 
counterfactual scenario to scenario S3, i.e. 
with other policy elements being equal 
to scenario S3, scenario S4 enables the 
comparison of possible differences between 
scenario S3 and a milk quota removal taking 
place in year 2015. As scenario results are 
generated for the year 2020, the dairy sector is 
assumed to have adjusted to the new market 
environment between 2015 and 2020.
Results and Conclusions of the Milk 
Quota Abolition Scenario
As an explicit focus of this report is on 
the regional effects in the EU-27 of a milk 
quota abolition in year 2015, conclusions can 
predominantly be drawn by comparing the results 
of scenario S4 and scenario S3. Results of scenario 
S1 are of a pure calibration nature (i.e. reproduction 
of statistical data) and are commented in the 
context of the baseline scenario within the report. 
As scenario S2 was mainly elaborated for technical 
purposes, results remain of a technical nature (i.e. 
ex-post behaviour of the model to policy changes 
in the baseline) and are therefore also not further 
commented in the report.
The results of scenario S4 are presented in 
relative terms to scenario S3, i.e. the baseline 
scenario in year 2020. Therefore, this analysis 
isolates the effects of the abolition of the milk 
quota system in the EU-27 on specific economic 
indicators at MS and regional level. Key results of 
scenario S4 are that milk production increases by 
about 4.4% in the EU-27, and EU raw milk prices 
decline by 10%. Production of butter, skimmed 
and whole milk powder would increase by 5-6% 
while their prices would decline by about 6-7%. 
The production of cheese and fresh milk products 
would increase by about 1% and their prices 
could decline by 4-6%.
At EU MS and regional level, the effects 
of milk quota abolition are quite diverse. MS 
like Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Spain are projected to increase their milk 
production significantly, and with the exception 
of Spain, there is little heterogeneity among their 
sub regions. Within MS, projected changes in 
milk production are especially heterogeneous in 
Germany, France, Spain and the UK. In Germany 
a significant reduction of milk production is 
expected for the Eastern part, while most of the 
remaining regions expand their production, many 
even quite significantly. On average the German 
milk production is projected to increase by 7%. In 
the United Kingdom an overall reduction of milk 
supply by around -5.7% is projected, whereas 
this decline is more considerable in the southern 
part than in the north. The projected impacts on 
regional milk production are mainly determined 
by the estimated milk quota rents in the baseline 
scenario. Especially regions with high quota rents, 
such as in Austria (all above 28%), the Netherlands 
(all above 27%), Belgium (Brabant Wallon 38%, 
the rest above 28%), Luxembourg (29%), and to 
a lesser extent Italy (Lazio, Molise and Abruzzo 
above 33%) and Germany (Saarland, Koblenz 
and Rheinhessen-Pfalz above 32%) increase 
their milk production significantly. As the overall 
14
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increase of milk production drives down dairy 
prices in the EU-27 this exerts economic pressure 
on regions with low quota rents, especially 
to be found in the United Kingdom (eastern, 
south east and south west regions), Sweden 
(Mellersta Norrland and Oevre Norrland) and 
all Finnish regions. The percentage change of 
milk production in European regions after quota 
abolition are visualised in the following map on a 
NUTS 2 level (see Map 1).
Comparing the average production 
changes in the (20%) most strongly expanding 
and receding countries in the EU-27, regional 
heterogeneity within EU MS is highest in 
Germany, Italy and Portugal; with the strongest 
heterogeneity expected in Portugal where Lisboa 
reduces milk production by -13% (in Lisboa the 
quota rent in scenario S3 was +1%) whereas the 
Algarve region increases production by 18% 
(the quota rent in scenario S3 for this region was 
+22%). In turn, regional homogeneity is highest 
within the Netherlands, Austria and Hungary, 
when comparing production changes in the 20% 
least expanding and receding countries.
The increase in cow milk production in the 
EU-27 is mainly due to a 4.2% increase in dairy 
cow herds. At MS level, increases in dairy herds 
between 11% and 20% are projected for the 
Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Spain. 
Concerning the NMS, the biggest increases in 
dairy cow herds are projected for Hungary (6.1%) 
and Poland (4.5%). The increase in dairy herds 
usually translates into a modest increase in cattle 
density, because other cattle types for fattening 
are not substantially affected and suckler cows 
will decline, as prices for calves are driven down 
by additional supply from dairy cows. In contrast, 
some MS face decreases in dairy cow herds, 
Map 1: Percentage change of milk production in European regions after quota abolition on a NUTS 2 level
15
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especially the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
France (-5.8%, -4.8% and -3.2% respectively). 
The only NMS with a mentionable decrease in 
dairy cow herds is the Slovak Republic (-2%). 
Regarding regional dairy cow herds, nearly 
70% of the European regions show an increase 
in dairy cow herds as a consequence of quota 
abolition. Strongly increasing dairy herds of 
more than +16% can be observed in about 10% 
of the regional units, as for example Saarland, 
Rheinhessen-Pfalz, Koblenz and Trier in Germany 
(above +33%), all Dutch regions (around +20%), 
Lazio, Molise and Campania in Italy (above +21%), 
Comunidad de Madrid in Spain (+18%) and Algarve 
in Portugal (+18%). On the other hand, around 
17% of the regional units face a quite significant 
decrease of dairy cow herds of more than -4%, 
as for example most of the Greek regions (-12% 
to -19%), Lorraine and Alsace in France (-17%), 
Lisboa and Norte in Portugal (-12%) and South East 
and Eastern in the UK (-11% to -13%).
The regional effects on agricultural income 
follow from price and quantity impacts on the 
input and output side. The bottom line in terms of 
agricultural income is crucially determined by the 
impacts on revenues from raw milk and meats and 
related impacts on non fodder items. While fodder 
activities are important for a detailed analysis, no 
significant effect on income can be observed since 
revenues and costs tend to cancel each other. In 
general, agricultural income losses are observed 
all across the EU-27 MS (equating to a loss of -2% 
on total utilizable agricultural area for the EU-27). 
The decrease in agricultural income can mainly be 
attributed to decreases in income from cow milk 
and meat and to rising non fodder feed costs, with 
the income losses of the dairy cattle sector (-14% 
for the EU-27) being the main driver for overall 
losses in agricultural income.
At MS level the biggest losses in agricultural 
income are projected for countries in northern 
Europe, which reflects the situation that in 
northern Europe the share of milk production 
in total production tends to be higher than in 
Mediterranean countries. The largest decreases 
in agricultural income are projected for Sweden 
(-5.2%) Finland and Ireland (both -4,5%), Lithuania 
(-3.8%) and Germany (-3,6%). Nevertheless 
within MS, mostly those regions that show high 
quota rents in the baseline see a rather favourable 
income development (but there are exceptions, 
as e.g. regions in the Netherlands and Austria 
also have to cope with small income losses). 
Agricultural incomes are most heterogeneously 
affected in Germany, Portugal and Spain. For 
example in Germany, where overall agricultural 
income decreases by -3.6%, the most benefitting 
regions, Saarland and Trier observe income gains 
of up to 4.8% and 4.4%, while the most negatively 
affected regions Schwaben, Sachsen-Anhalt, 
Thueringen and Oberbayern, face agricultural 
income losses between -6.6% and -5.5%. Hence, 
in Germany the gains in agricultural income are 
found in regions with a rather tiny dairy sector, 
while with Schwaben and Oberbayern, two 
of the biggest cow milk producing regions in 
Germany, are among the most negatively affected 
regions. In Spain, decreases in agricultural 
income are projected for all regions, with an 
overall loss in agricultural income of -0,92% on 
average. However, by far the biggest decreases in 
agricultural income are projected for the regions 
in the north west of Spain (Cantabria, Asturias and 
Galicia face losses between -8.5% and -5.3%), 
hence in regions where cow milk production 
plays a major role in agricultural income. Fairly 
homogeneous income impacts are expected 
in Finland, Sweden and in particular Hungary, 
where income losses are in the small range of 
-0.7 to -1.2%. The percentage changes of overall 
agricultural income in European regions after 
quota abolition are visualised in Map 2.
Overall welfare effects are slightly positive 
for the EU-27. Whereas total agricultural income 
would decline due to lower milk prices on average, 
the EU dairy industry would benefit as prices of 
dairy products are expected to decline less than 
raw milk prices (i.e. input costs decreasing more 
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than revenues). Impacts on the FEOGA budget 
would arise mainly from additional export 
subsidies for butter and moderate losses of tariff 
revenues. If a full transmission of lower agricultural 
raw milk prices along the downward supply chain 
to consumers is assumed, the main beneficiaries 
of milk quota abolition would be consumers, who 
benefit from various declining consumer prices, 
most notably declining prices for cheese.
The results described in this analysis 
are based on several implicit and explicit 
assumptions, hence it is important to take into 
account these limitations. The current analysis 
allows for a partially endogenous representation 
of regional cost structures for dairy producers. 
Nevertheless, it is important to remark that the 
cost estimation framework for milk producers 
applied to this study has been done separately 
from the simulation analysis with CAPRI, so 
that no exchange of information between both 
models has been attempted (due to the short-
time frame of the study and its methodological 
complexity). Although the results of scenario S4 
presented are in line with results of other studies, 
the simulations are based on certain key model 
parameters. The sensitivity analysis revealed that 
the higher the assumed elasticity of milk supply, 
the wider the variety of regional effects. While 
high supply elasticities tend to make the gap 
between winning and loosing regions broader, 
lower supply elasticities produce uniform changes 
among regions. With regard to quota rents, it has 
to be stressed that an assumption of different 
quota rents would have significant effects on 
the results of milk production as well as on milk 
prices and agricultural income.
Map 2: Percentage changes of overall agricultural income in European regions after quota abolition
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The dairy sector makes a substantial 
contribution to the agricultural turn-over in 
many EU Member States (MS) as well as in the 
EU in aggregate. Nevertheless, within the EU-
27, the size and agricultural importance of the 
dairy sector varies considerably between MS 
and across regions, basically reflecting climatic 
and other agricultural factors in the region 
concerned. The EU dairy market is regulated 
by the Common Market Organisation (CMO) 
for milk and milk products, of which the milk 
quota regime is one of the most noticeable 
elements. The EU milk quota system was 
originally introduced in 1984, in order to limit 
public expenditure on the sector, to control milk 
production, and to stabilise milk prices and the 
agricultural income of milk producers. Since 
the milk quota regime was introduced, it has 
become a scarce production factor that limits 
production on the one hand, but on the other 
hand stabilises the producer prices of raw milk 
and keeps milk production in less competitive 
regions. However, in the course of time EU’s 
dairy policy has been continuously updated 
and is increasingly targeted at encouraging 
producers to be more market-oriented. The 
policy developments, including specific quota 
increases of various amounts to MS, together 
with market developments induced that quota 
is no more binding in some MS and regions of 
the EU. With the Luxembourg Agreement on the 
Mid-Term-Review (MTR) the spotlight shifted 
again on the EU’s milk quota regime, because 
the MTR stipulated that the milk quota system 
will come to an end in 2015. Within the “Health 
Check” of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) the European Commission endorsed the 
proposal of milk quota abolition and proposed 
an increase of quota by 1% annually from 2009 
to 2013 to allow a “soft landing” of the milk 
sector until the end of quotas. In this context it 
is especially important to clarify, which effects 
can be expected of an abolition of the milk 
quota regime.
This report is the last report of a series 
of three reports delivered to the European 
Commission’s Directorate General Agriculture 
and Rural Development (DG AGRI) within 
the project entitled “Economic Impact of the 
Abolition of the Milk Quota Regime – Regional 
Analysis of the Milk Production in the EU” (AGRI-
2007-0444). The project aimed at a thorough 
policy impact analysis of the EU dairy markets 
in 2020, regarding the removal of milk quotas 
within the framework of the “Health Check” of 
the CAP. This third report provides a quantitative 
assessment based on different simulation 
scenarios performed with the CAPRI Model and 
allows the comparison of results to previous 
studies carried out by the AGMEMOD, CAPSIM 
and EDIM models (Chantreuil et al. 2008; Witzke 
et al. 2008; Réquillart et al. 2008).
In this study the analysis of milk quota abolition 
in the EU-27 is addressed at MS and regional level. 
For this purpose, an appropriate modelling tool 
able to represent the agricultural sector is needed. 
Therefore, an adaptation of the CAPRI model is 
proposed and selected (cf. Britz and Witzke 2008). 
The CAPRI version used for this study is the standard 
comparative-static, one without any adjustment 
costs. Hence the policy simulation would reveal 
a situation where farmers were given time to 
adjust their fixed factors according to the new 
circumstances. As the quota abolition is scheduled 
for 2015, adjustment to the new policy environment 
may be considered as fairly complete in the year 
2020, for which the simulation results are presented. 
The comparative static nature of CAPRI also means 
that any differences between a sudden abolition in 
2015 and a soft landing strategy, as envisaged in the 
1. Introduction
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Commission’s “Health Check” proposals, would 
have no impacts on the CAPRI simulation result for 
2020.2 
After this introductory chapter, chapter 2 
gives an overview on the production structure, 
performance and the dairy policy developments 
of the EU dairy sector. Chapter 3 describes the 
major specifications of dairy policies in CAPRI
2 Questions related to an optimal rate of quota increase 
over the phasing out period cannot be analysed in this 
study.
and the definition of scenarios. Chapter 4 is 
devoted to the analysis of the baseline and quota 
removal scenarios with special focus on changes 
on MS and regional level. Chapter 5 draws 
conclusions and highlights some limitations of the 
study. Additional information related to regional 
quota rents, validation of results, results from 
previous studies and selected technical issues are 
presented in the annexes.
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The EU dairy sector is important to the EU in 
many respects. Most notably, milk is the number 
one single product sector in terms of value of 
agricultural output, and milk is produced in every 
single EU MS without exception. However, within 
the EU-27, the size and agricultural importance 
of the dairy sector varies considerably between 
MS and across regions. A brief overview on the 
production structure and performance of EU dairy 
farming is given in section 2.1. Developments 
in the EU dairy sector have to been seen in the 
context of the development of EU dairy policies, 
thus domestic and trade support measures of the 
EU are delineated in section 2.2, with a special 
focus on the EU milk quota system.3
3 This chapter draws substantially on Bartova et al., 2009
2.1 Production structure and 
performance of EU dairy farming
Milk is one of the main agricultural 
commodities produced in the EU. Milk 
production takes place in all EU MS and at EU 
level it represented a share of about 13,7% of total 
agricultural production in 2006, amounting to a 
value of more than EUR 42,5 billion at the farm 
gate level (European Commission, 2008b). Within 
the EU-27, the size and agricultural importance 
of the dairy sector varies considerably between 
MS and across regions, basically reflecting 
climatic and other agricultural factors in the 
region concerned. In terms of value, the share of 
milk in total agricultural production ranges from 
6.7% to 33.5% between MS. In general, the share 
tends to be higher in northern Europe and lower 
in Mediterranean countries (cf. Figure 1).
2. Overview on the production structure, performance 
and policies of the EU dairy sector
Figure 1: Share of milk production in total production per MS (by value) in 2006
Source: European Commission (2008b)
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Within the EU, six MS - Germany, France, 
the United Kingdom, Poland, the Netherlands 
and Italy - together account for almost 70% of 
the cows’ milk production in the EU. Germany 
has the highest level of milk production at about 
28 million tonnes followed by France and the 
United Kingdom with a production of 24,5 
million tonnes and 14.3 million tonnes in 2006, 
respectively (European Commission, 2008b). 
Among the NMS, Poland has the highest level of 
milk production, with almost 12 million tonnes 
being the fourth biggest producer in the EU-27 
(Figure 2). 
The production of cow milk also varies 
significantly at regional level within the MS. 
In the six leading cow milk production MS, 
the NUTS 2 regions with the highest cow milk 
production are in France: Bretagne (4961,4), Pays 
de la Loire (3554,6), Basse-Normandie (2661,0) 
and Rhône-Alpes (1606,9); in Germany: Weser-
Ems (2626,8), Schleswig-Holstein (2424,6), 
Oberbayern (2211,2) and Schwaben (1916,9); 
in Italy: Lombardei (4040,6), Emilia-Romagna 
(1780,7) and Veneto (1033,5); in Poland: 
Mazowieckie (2105,0), Podlaskie (1667,0) and 
Lódzkie (1043,0); in the Netherlands: Friesland 
(1961,0), Overijssel (1757,0), Gelderland (1698,0) 
and Noord-Brabant (1581,0) and in the UK: West 
Wales and The Valleys (1335,0), Dorset and 
Somerset (1141,0), Shropshire and Staffordshire 
(1050,0), South Western Scotland (961,0) and 
Devon (940,0). Furthermore it is worthwhile 
mentioning Southern and Eastern (4078,8) in 
Ireland and Galicia (2293,4) in Spain as NUTS 2 
regions with a remarkable high level of cow milk 
production.4 
Figure 3 shows that the number of EU dairy 
farmers holding a milk quota in Poland are more 
than twice than in Germany or France. Especially 
4 All data in 1.000 tonnes, data refers to year 2004; 
source: EUROSTAT (2008)
Figure 2: Cow milk production, year 2006 (in 1.000 tonnes) 
Source: European Commission (2008b)
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when taking the production of cow milk into 
account (Figure 2), the high numbers of dairy 
farmers in Lithuania, Italy and Austria are also 
remarkable, as is the relatively small number 
of dairy farmers in the UK. Accordingly, the 
numbers shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 indicate 
differences among MS with regard to dairy cow 
productivity, cow herd size and/ or general 
structure of the farm holding.
In addition to variations between MS in the 
scale of production and the number of dairy 
farmers with milk quota, there is also a significant 
variation in the milk yield per cow. EU milk 
producers with the highest average milk yields are 
to be found in Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, 
with Denmark reaching in 2006 an average of 
8337 kg per cow and year. Milk yields increased 
throughout the EU from 1996 to 2006, with the 
biggest yield growth occurring in Estonia. Other 
MS with above-average milk yield growth rates 
are Lithuania, Spain and the Czech Republic (cf. 
Figure 4).
Due to the milk quota system, productivity 
gains in milk yields lead to continuing reduction 
in the total number of dairy cows in the EU. The 
biggest relative reduction of the dairy cow herd 
for the period 1996 to 2006 occurred in Estonia 
(36.5%), while the most pronounced reduction 
in total numbers was observed in Germany. The 
change in the number of dairy cow herds over 
the period 1996 to 2006 across the EU MS is 
summarised in Figure 5. 
Besides the differences in the number of dairy 
cows between the MS, the number of dairy cows 
also varies significantly at regional level within 
the MS. The biggest population of dairy cows 
can be found in the Bretagne (France) followed 
by Lombardia (Italy) and Mazowieckie (Poland). 
The EU regions with the highest number of dairy 
cows are listed in Table 1.
A further indication of the diversity of EU 
dairy farming is given in Table 2 by the number 
of dairy cows in different herd size categories in 
Figure 3: Number of EU dairy farmers with milk quota, year 2007 
Source: European Commission (2008a)
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Source: European Commission (2008b)
Figure 5: Change in the number of dairy cows in EU MS from 1996 - 2006
Source: European Commission (2008b)
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NUTS 2 Region MS
Number of 
dairy cows*
NUTS 2 Region MS
Number of 
dairy cows*
Bretagne France 761,3 Weser-Ems Germany 376,3
Lombardia Italy 601,5 Schleswig-Holstein Germany 357,7
Mazowieckie Poland 539,2 Schwaben Germany 318,0
Pays de la Loire France 527,6 Wielkopolskie Poland 301,3
Basse-Normandie France 473,0 Northern Ireland UK 292,0
Galicia Spain 450,4 Rhône-Alpes France 291,9
Oberbayern Germany 393,5 Emilia-Romagna Italy 287,1
Podlaskie Poland 382,3 Friesland Netherlands 273,6
* in 1.000 heads, data refers to year 2003; Source: EUROSTAT (2008)
Table 2: Number of dairy cows in each herd size category in EU MS in 2005
Number of cows in 1000 heads by herd size category Dairy cows 
total1 - 9 10 - 19 20 - 49 50 - 99 > 100
Belgium 7.23 31.23 251.82 220.77 38.29 549.34
Czech Republic 9.31 8.04 14.71 22.90 385.55 440.51
Denmark 1.94 4.71 44.01 137.76 369.44 557.86
Germany 86.67 356.72 1441.24 1267.06 1084.27 4235.96
Estonia 15.09 5.68 9.73 7.06 77.67 115.23
Greece 19.05 19.12 49.31 49.95 30.49 167.92
Spain 55.70 114.81 377.76 232.58 221.29 1002.14
France 30.53 148.81 2069.89 1461.79 172.82 3883.84
Ireland 6.55 35.18 372.22 523.40 144.62 1081.97
Italy 102.43 150.01 428.93 452.68 726.14 1860.19
Cyprus 0.02 0.00 0.59 7.94 15.66 24.21
Latvia 93.08 18.65 20.10 11.90 28.63 172.36
Lithuania 367.96 41.54 28.68 11.86 43.84 493.88
Luxembourg 0.10 0.93 22.58 12.95 2.79 39.35
Hungary 20.18 6.70 8.88 11.53 189.09 236.38
Malta 0.08 0.28 2.20 2.84 1.88 7.28
Netherlands 3.92 16.59 261.07 797.09 354.53 1433.20
Austria 143.89 215.74 158.30 15.46 2.40 535.79
Poland 1428.26 665.35 516.74 81.73 160.90 2852.98
Portugal 24.08 34.23 98.33 71.53 59.11 287.28
Slovakia 15.40 0.57 1.88 7.43 167.92 193.20
Slovenia 50.96 36.58 32.83 6.51 3.81 130.69
Finland 19.76 102.70 164.81 26.73 4.76 318.76
Sweden 2.22 19.45 143.70 131.17 96.70 393.24
United Kingdom 10.66 17.41 231.00 608.38 1197.64 2065.09
EU-15 514.73 1267.64 6114.97 6009.30 4505.29 18411.93
EU-25 2515.07 2051.03 6751.31 6181.00 5580.24 23078.65
Source: ZMP (2007)
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the year 2005. In Germany, the EU MS with the 
highest level of milk production, 64% of the dairy 
cows are held in herds of 20-99 cows, and 26% 
in herds with more than 100 cows. In France 
over 90% of the dairy cows are in herds of 20-99 
cows, with only 4.5% of the dairy cows in herds 
bigger than 100 cows. In contrast to France, in 
the UK 57% of the dairy cows are held in herds 
with more than 100 cows, whereas in Denmark 
66% and in the Czech Republic more than 87% 
belong to this category. On the other hand, in 
Austria less than 0.5% of the cows are held in 
herds larger than 100 cows and Poland, the fourth 
biggest milk producer in the EU, has 50% of dairy 
cows in herds smaller than 10 cows. 
As milk production in all MS is regulated 
by quotas, milk supply in the EU is quite stable 
and quotas have been binding in most years 
until 2004. From 2005, some MS deliveries 
have increasingly fallen short of the quota, 
following the increase in quota (in 11 MS of the 
EU-15, due to the enlargement and granting of 
restructuring reserves for the EU-10) reductions 
in the intervention prices for butter and SMP, as 
well as unfavourable exchange rates movements. 
However, such shortfalls could also be due to 
unfavourable weather conditions. Nonetheless, 
when it comes to countries such as the UK, where 
deliveries have been below quota for several 
years in succession, there may be evidence to 
confirm structural reasons for under-delivery of 
the quota. Historically, granting additional quotas 
to particular MS has led to milk production 
growth. When milk prices are relatively high in 
the previous season and forage feed is abundant, 
minor over-deliveries may take place in a given 
year. Figure 6 shows the evolution of EU milk 
production, deliveries and dairy cow numbers as 
well as EU milk prices in the period since 1991. 
When production costs are considered, 
low cost producing countries are to be found in 
the north-western and eastern regions of the EU, 
namely Ireland, the UK and Poland (Isermeyer et 
al., 2006). But variations in production costs are 
more extensive, as the production costs also vary 
within MS, e.g. due to differences in the production 
Figure 6: EU milk production, deliveries and dairy cow herd, 1991 – 2007
Source: European Commission (2007b)
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mix, factor endowment, specific geographical 
location (e.g. mountainous area), variations in the 
size of the herd, specialisation and management 
skills. Although the UK is one of the EU’s low 
cost producers, its quota has not been binding for 
several successive years. However, in this context, 
it should be kept in mind that milk prices in the UK 
have been lower in recent years compared to other 
MS in the EU-15, mainly due to the market power 
of the retail sector, which has squeezed producer 
margins, particularly for drinking milk, which 
represents a large proportion of UK milk utilisation 
(cf. Colman, 2002). Despite the fact that in principle 
the CAP has created a single price threshold across 
all MS in the form of the intervention system, the 
range of producer milk prices across the EU have 
varied considerably, e.g. in 2006 the producer 
milk price for standardised milk ranged from 176.7 
€/tonne in Lithuania to 390 €/tonne in Cyprus 
(ZMP, 2007). Such variations are associated with 
differences in the pace of price convergence after 
integration into the single market, but are also due 
to MS level differences in supply and demand, 
the level of market integration, specificities along 
the supply-chain and the types of milk products 
produced. In general, the EU-15 has experienced 
reductions in the producer milk prices, while 
the EU-12 has seen increases in production and 
processing costs. These changes have had impacts 
on the actual level of milk production. In sum, 
the production potential differs across the EU, 
and while some countries are unable to fill the 
milk quotas, the quota remains binding for other 
countries (e.g. Austria, Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Cyprus, Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
and Poland).
2.2 Development of dairy policies in 
Europe
Developments in the dairy sector have to be 
seen in the context of the evolving nature of dairy 
policy and trade policy. Although Agenda 2000 
and more particularly the MTR have brought 
about a considerable change in support to the 
dairy sector, existing CAP instruments such as 
milk quotas, super levies, intervention prices, 
dairy premiums, processing aids, export subsidies 
and import tariffs still affect the supply and 
demand for milk and milk products. In order to 
give an overview on the development of the EU 
dairy policy, the domestic support measures with 
special focus on the EU milk quota system and 
trade measures are outlined in this section.
The milk quota system
EU milk production increased steadily in the 
1970s and 1980s due to the price support policy 
within the Common Market Organisation (CMO) 
for Milk and Milk Products. By the late 1970s milk 
production outstripped overall milk consumption 
and lead to rapidly rising expenditures for the 
stocking of butter and SMP. In order to limit 
public expenditure on the sector, to control 
milk production, and to stabilise milk prices and 
the agricultural income of milk producers, EU 
MS agreed to impose milk quotas by the milk 
marketing year 1984/85. The quota was made 
effective by the imposition of a fine (superlevy) 
for milk output exceeding a guaranteed quantity 
(reference quantity or quota). 
Originally scheduled for just five years, steps 
were then taken to extend the milk quota system 
until 1992. The Reform of the CAP in 1992 
(MacSharry Reform) led to a further prolongation 
of the quota system until 2000, at which point, 
as part of Agenda 2000, the system was further 
extended until 2008. Finally with the Luxembourg 
Agreement on the MTR in 2003, MS approved 
another extension of the quota regime until 
2015. The extension under the MTR is notable 
since, in contrast to previous situations, MS must 
actively advocate a prolongation of the quota 
regime beyond 2015, otherwise it will lapse and 
milk quotas will cease to present a restriction on 
production.
The milk quota year starts on 1 April and 
ends on 31 March the following year. If national 
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quantities are exceeded, a levy will be charged 
to milk producers for the excess of deliveries. 
Originally fixed as a percentage of the target 
price, super levy rates are now specified for 
each respective quota year. Processors collect 
the levy from individual producers who have 
over-delivered, but only, if the national reference 
quantity is exceeded. Under-deliveries by 
producers not meeting their individual quota 
may be subtracted proportionally. Currently 
the fat content is fixed for individual reference 
quantities at the 2003-2004 quota year. If the 
individual’s actual milk fat content exceeds its fat 
reference level, the amount of milk delivered will 
be multiplied by 0.18% per 0.1g milk fat/kg in 
excess of the reference fat level or reduced if the 
fat is less than the reference level (the so called 
butterfat adjusted volume)5. 
Since the milk quota regime was introduced, 
it has become a scarce production factor limiting, 
on the one hand, production and the scope for 
EU exports, but on the other hand stabilising 
producer prices of raw milk. The quota regime 
allows milk prices to rise above the equilibrium 
price level of an unregulated market, where 
prices would otherwise equate with the marginal 
cost of production. In this way, quota rents are 
generated (i.e. the quota rent is the difference 
between the farm milk price and the marginal 
cost of production). As long as quota rents are 
positive, the quota quantities will be filled, and 
the quota regime is binding. Other things being 
equal, technical progress in dairy production 
would lower production costs and lead to 
an increase in the quota rents over time. On 
the other hand, declining levels of support or 
increases in the milk quota may reduce market 
milk prices, while an increase of production input 
prices, such as feed grains, may increase costs, 
thus quota rents may decrease over time. When 
declining market prices or rising production costs 
reach the equilibrium price, the quota rents will 
5 Note that this rate has been reduced to 0.09% in the 
context of the “Health Check”. 
turn to zero and the quota itself will no longer be 
binding (cf. Box 1).
A producer’s individual quotas can be 
transferred to another producer through either 
the transfer of an entire farm, the leasing or 
purchase of quota, or the allocation of quota 
from a national reserve. The transfer of milk quota 
may take place via a variety of administrative and 
market-based mechanisms including private sales 
and quota exchanges. MS are able to determine 
whether transfers take place at national, regional 
or purchaser level and whether transfers are 
continuous or periodic. Thus country-specific 
transfer rules have been set-up by each MS and 
vary considerably across countries. The tradability 
of quotas can enhance competitive milk 
production (if quota is freely tradable) or freeze 
milk production in non-competitive areas (if 
quota trade is regionally restricted). Quota trade 
might be restricted in order to maintain producers 
in less competitive regions in activity. Regionally 
restricted quota tradability can lead to a situation 
where within one country there are regions 
where farmers face binding quotas and other 
regions where quotas are non-binding. If quotas 
are tradable, efficient farmers can buy quota from 
less efficient farmers, which reduces potential 
inefficiencies generated by the quota system. 
Accordingly inefficiency plays a greater role if 
quota distribution and reallocation is restricted. 
Thus when a quota system is removed, it can be 
expected that in a system with restricted quota 
tradability the sectoral adjustments will be more 
pronounced, because a new market equilibrium 
will not be determined by the originally supply 
curve, but rather by one that takes increased 
efficiency impacts into account (cf. Box 2). 
As part of the Agenda 2000, specific quota 
increases of various amounts were awarded to five 
MS in 2000 and 2001, while additional quotas of 
1.5% were distributed in three tranches starting 
in 2006/07 to those EU-15 MS having received 
no additional special reference quantities in 2000 
and 2001 (with the UK receiving both an increase 
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In the figure below, milk quota and milk quota rent are represented at the producer level. The supply 
curve S coincides with the increasing part of the marginal cost (MC) curve which is above the 
intersection with the average cost (AC) curve, i.e. the section above A on the MC curve. The average 
cost curve is assumed to be U-shaped and the MC curve crosses the AC curve at the minimum.
The introduction of a quota creates a departure from standard competitive market pricing, where profit-
maximising agents equate marginal revenue to marginal cost. If a quota is binding, production will be 
limited compared to the unrestricted market equilibrium. The new level of production will be fixed at  
which represents the binding quota level on the left hand side of the initial production equilibrium level 
. The supply will be kinked at point B and becomes perfectly inelastic at the quota level (i.e. vertical on 
the segment ). The new supply curve will be constituted by the segment , so that it is no longer 
possible to directly observe production responses to price changes if quotas are binding. At  marginal 
revenue is greater than marginal cost and marginal cost coincides with the so-called output shadow 
price. The milk shadow price is the producer price that would induce a profit-maximising producer to 
produce the current quota level in the absence of production restrictions. The difference between the 
market price and the shadow price defines the so-called unit quota rent, which corresponds to . 
The total quota rent will be composed by the area ( ) highlighted by light yellow colour. 
In terms of implementation, milk quotas are imposed through the payment of a fine (the superlevy). 
When the superlevy is applied at producer level, it means that for excess production the producer 
receives the market price less the fine. Usually the fine is that large that net return for a kilogram of 
surplus milk will by far not cover costs. However, if the farmer has a quota rent that is larger than the 
superlevy it would be rational to produce in excess of his quota. 
In addition to the standard milk quota and milk quota rent description presented in the figure above, 
there are at least four additional cases where farmers do not respond according to the magnitude of 
the quota rent, but rather according to the difference generated by the difference between milk market 
price and the average cost at quota level (for more details see Tonini and Pérez Dominguez, 2008).
Box 1: The concept of milk quota and milk quota rent
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Following the standard theory of the effect of milk quota on asset values (see e.g. Burrell, 1989), a 
comparative static example of tradable milk quotas is presented in the figure below. 
Beginning from a situation where quotas are not in place, the quantity produced will be , generating 
the farm revenue . Farm revenue is allocated among the variable resources (i.e. the area below 
supply curve S) and fixed resources (i.e. area above supply curve S). Now consider, that a quota 
system is introduced, i.e. a limit on milk production is denoted by . In a quota regime, the reference 
quantities are attributed based on historical production levels, assuming that all producers face the 
same cost structure. Thus, if farmers are exposed to the same percentage cut on production, it is likely 
that some efficient production will be lost and some inefficient production will be maintained. This 
renders the initial supply S to shift to . The upward supply shift causes a decrease in the producer 
surplus by area (a + b + c + d). However, the total loss in producer surplus can be decomposed into 
two losses. First, due to the quota’s introduction, area (a) is lost. Second, because of the inefficient 
attribution of reference quantities (i.e. grasped on a historical basis) supply becomes steeper than the 
original supply, which causes the loss of area (b + c + d). 
When the quota system allows quota rights to be traded (i.e. leased out or sold), less efficient 
producers are expected to transfer quota rights to more efficient producers, thereby achieving more 
efficient resource allocation than in the case where quota cannot be traded. The price under which 
quota rights are exchanged is the annual rental value of the quota, given by the difference between 
market price  and marginal cost  (i.e. R in the figure). At this price, the quantity  would be 
exchanged. Revenue equals area (e + b) is generated for producers who lease out or sell the quantity 
 where area (e) acts as a compensation for the loss of income to fixed resources. At the same 
time, those producers who lease in or buy gain the area (e + b + c + d) at the cost of (e + b) (i.e. (d + 
c) is the net benefit). In a free quota trade market, supply would be restored at the equilibrium under 
quotas (see the kinked supply  in the figure) that eliminate initial distributional inefficiencies due to the 
different cost structures. The net benefits for the sellers in terms of area (b) and for the buyer in terms 
of area (d + c) will depend on the sector’s inefficiency distribution. Hence, quota mobility has twofold 
effects. First, there is an explicit incentive for sellers to eliminate their quota, gaining area (b) pushing 
for structural changes within the sector. Second, quota trade potentially push quota rights away from 
less efficient to more efficient producers (for more details see Tonini and Pérez Dominguez, 2008).
Box 2: Implications of quota value and the trading of milk quotas
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in 2000 specifically for Northern Ireland and 
the 1.5% increase). Furthermore the structural 
reserves agreed under the accession negotiations 
for the EU-12 (excluding Malta) have been 
allocated in 2006/07.
Separately, and in advance of the HC, a 2% 
milk quota increase was approved on 17 March 
2008 by the European Council for 2008/09. The 
additional 2.84 million tonnes of quota, which 
this represents, is considered to be required to 
meet growing domestic and global demand and 
to curb the then rising dairy prices within the EU. 
The increase is distributed across the EU on an 
equal basis. 
Public intervention
The major domestic support measure besides 
the milk quota system is public intervention 
(buying into storage) for butter and SMP. By 
administering the market price for butter and SMP 
through intervention purchases, the EU aims to 
put a floor on the producer milk price. If market 
demand is satisfied, minor surpluses or deficits 
will, in principle, show up through changes in 
the level of intervention stocks, but the market 
prices will not fall much below the respective 
intervention levels.
In principle, the EU Agricultural Council 
may change the reference intervention prices 
in the light of developments in production 
and the markets. Governmental purchases 
may be replaced by aids for private storage. As 
administrational cuts to intervention prices were 
difficult to achieve in the past and, as intervention 
prices above the respective equilibrium induced 
production growth and stock building, a 
tendering system for butter was implemented 
in 1987 and SMP intervention purchases were 
limited to 109000 tonnes. Since March 2004 a 
further change has meant that butter can only be 
purchased for intervention when prices are below 
92% of the intervention price, but actually, butter 
is only accepted at 90%. Butter intervention 
purchasing has become seasonal and only 
available from 1 March to 31 August, though 
it was suspended when the amount exceeded 
40000 tonnes in 2007, and will be suspended at 
30000 tonnes from 2008 onwards, being replaced 
by a tendering system without a minimum price if 
this threshold is reached. 
Supplementing aids can be paid for liquid 
skimmed milk used in the manufacture of casein 
and in feeding. They can also be approved for 
SMP employed in feedstuff, making it more 
competitive compared to vegetable proteins. 
The subsidy rate granted takes into account 
market conditions, e.g. it was reduced to zero 
in October 2006, as EU market prices for milk 
protein became exceptionally high. In general, 
comparable aids are provided for the use of 
cream, butter and concentrated butter. 
Based on tenders, a maximum rate of aid 
or a minimum selling price is set. Due to high 
international prices throughout summer 2007 
and spring 2008, market aids had been fixed at 
zero, with the exception of butter sales to non-
profit making organisations and school milk.
The dairy premium
To reflect changing dairy market conditions 
and the general political environment, the 
dairy CMO has been continually altered. Policy 
reforms such as Agenda 2000 and the MTR have 
brought about a considerable decline in the 
market price support for the dairy sector. By way 
of partly compensating for cuts in intervention 
prices, direct payments (the so-called dairy 
premium) were introduced in 2005, which 
were subsequently incorporated into the Single 
Payment Scheme (SPS). 
The dairy premium introduced as an 
additional compensation, amounting to 24.49 €/
tonnes from 2006, can be supplemented by an 
increasing national top-up to a maximum of 
11.01 €/tonne. In the EU-15, the dairy premium 
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had to be integrated in the SPS by 2007 at the 
latest. The EU-12 may only gradually introduce 
the direct payments starting with 25% of the full 
payment level in the first year of introduction and 
ending with 100% in 2013. However, they are 
allowed to provide national top-ups of a maximum 
30%, which will have to be successively reduced 
to zero. Regarding the implementation, most 
of the MS of the EU-12 opted to use the SAPS 
reflecting flat area payments. But this regime will 
have to be replaced by a regionalised SPS, at the 
latest, by the end of 2013. 
Further simplifications of the CMO
Some further simplifications concerning 
the general market organisation have been 
introduced in 2007 in the so called ‘mini milk 
package’, dealing with the standardisation of the 
protein content in preserved milk (together with 
a reduction of the intervention price for SMP), 
simplifications to the Council Regulation (EC) 
1255/1999 (e.g. elimination of aids for private 
storage, removal of the butter intervention trigger 
mechanism) and liberalisation of the drinking 
milk market by allowing marketing of milk with 
fat contents outside the current three categories.
Trade measures
Historically dairy prices within the EU were 
higher than those internationally and usually more 
stable than those on the world market. Surplus 
EU dairy production generally was exported in 
considerable volumes to lower price third country 
markets with the aid of export subsidies.
Dairy products are generally consumed in the 
market in which they are produced and the extent 
of international trade in dairy products is limited, 
representing just 7% of global dairy production 
in milk equivalent terms. Up to the year 2003, 
EU dairy production and exports had a major 
influence on the world price in the relatively 
small world market for dairy commodities. Since 
then, rapidly growing international demand and 
a slowdown in production growth in other key 
export countries, have somewhat altered this 
picture. In particular since 2005, slower growth 
in exports and rising demand for imports on 
world markets have led to an undersupply of dairy 
products on international markets and hence to 
rising international dairy commodity prices.
One of the consequences of the shortage 
of dairy products on international markets 
throughout 2007 has been that the negative effects 
on milk price of the MTR support price reductions 
have been more than counterbalanced, and so EU 
producer milk prices have increased, rather than 
decreased, since 2007 until spring 2008. Much of 
the EU’s dairy support measures, like processing 
aids and export refunds, have been suspended 
completely in 2007.
When considering trade measures, one has to 
keep in mind that the EU forms a Single Market, 
hence, all border measures are removed between 
the MS. However import tariffs are imposed on 
third country imports and are bound by the WTO 
Uruguay Agreement. In the dairy sector, specific 
tariffs or combinations of ad valorem and specific 
tariffs are applied in most cases, although many 
trading partners of the EU benefit from special 
import arrangements, whereby imports can come 
in at lower tariffs. These import arrangements are 
known as Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ) and while 
some TRQs are specific to particular exporting 
countries, others are open to all countries under 
the Most-Favoured Nations (MFN) treatment of 
the WTO. There are some regional exceptions 
to the operation of the MFN tariffs, such as for 
example the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative 
for Least Developed Countries (LDC) within the 
framework of Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP). Here, tariffs for most imports into the EU 
are zero. Exceptions were also created for African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.
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In order to better represent the dairy policies, 
the CAPRI model required an update which 
comprises additional information on milk quota 
rents, and the introduction of explicit price 
supply elasticities for dairy products. The major 
specifications of dairy policies in CAPRI are briefly 
described in subsection 3.1 and subsection 3.2 
presents the main characteristics of the scenarios 
to be analysed in this study.
3.1 Specification of dairy policies in 
CAPRI
The CAPRI model is an agricultural sector 
model covering the whole of the EU-27, Norway 
and Western Balkans at regional level (around 
250 regions) and global agricultural markets at 
country or country block level. CAPRI makes use 
of non linear mathematical programming tools 
to maximise regional agricultural income with 
explicit consideration of the CAP instruments 
of support in an open economy. CAPRI consists 
of a supply and market module which interacts 
iteratively. The supply module follows a ‘template 
approach’, where optimisation models can be 
seen as representative farms maximising their 
profit by choosing the optimal composition 
of outputs and inputs at given prices. Major 
outputs of the supply module are crop acreages 
and animal numbers at regional level, with their 
associated revenues, costs and income. The 
market module consists of a constrained equation 
system with a spatial world trade model. Major 
outputs of the market module include bilateral 
trade flows, market balances and producer and 
consumer prices for the products and world 
country aggregates. 
For a better representation of the dairy sector, 
the CAPRI model was updated by incorporating 
an econometric supply module for the most 
representative dairy farms in the EU. The update 
comprises additional information on milk quota 
rents, and the introduction of explicit price supply 
elasticities for dairy products. While a detailed 
description of dairy policy specifications in CAPRI is 
given in Tonini and Pérez Domínguez, 2008, and a 
general documentation on the CAPRI model in Britz 
and Witzke, 2008, this section briefly describes the 
major specifications of dairy policies.
3.1.1 Implementation of milk quota and milk 
quota rents
The supply model of CAPRI describes 
agricultural production at the regional farm level. 
In the calibration phase of CAPRI the number 
of dairy cows are determined by calibration 
restrictions. To avoid interference between milk 
quota constraints and calibration constraints, milk 
quota are treated like a variable input purchased 
from outside the agricultural sector (e.g. 
electricity). The cost of milk quota are included 
in the regional objective function, with the price 
of milk quota equal to the regional or national 
milk quota price and quantity equal to regional 
milk production. After the calibration phase the 
cost of milk quota is removed from the regional 
objective function. Next, regional milk quotas 
are explicitly included as a regional constraint on 
milk production. This procedure ensures that the 
shadow price of the milk quota constraint equals 
the price of milk quota in the calibration phase.
Although some MS allow almost free trade of 
milk quota at nation level and others at regional 
level, CAPRI does not allow for trade of milk 
quotas between regions. This simplified approach 
can be justified by existing transaction costs and 
differences in preferences between dairy farms. 
This also explains the existence of differences 
in milk production marginal costs at farm level, 
even in the case of free milk quota trade.
3. Specification of dairy policies in CAPRI and scenario 
definition
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between the farm milk price and the marginal cost 
of production. It is therefore an income generating 
asset for the person who holds the quota. Quota 
rent identifies the amount of surplus generated by 
a restriction on supply, with levels dependent upon 
the current milk price at farm gate level and long-
term marginal costs (cf. section 2.2). A technical 
problem of modelling milk quota rents is that actual 
milk production is not fully in line with the quota 
endowments, meaning that some Member States 
overshoot their respective quotas while others 
produce below quota level. Hence the question is 
to decide what change should be assumed for the 
baseline, given that there is some additional quota 
expansion. Furthermore, there is the question on 
whether countries with over- or under-delivery in 
the base year would move to the quota level or 
maintain their over-/under-delivery throughout the 
baseline. A return to quota is certainly appropriate 
for those countries with fluctuating over- or under 
delivery, such as the Netherlands. 
In order to simulate milk production in the 
baseline scenario, two main assumptions have 
been taken for each Member State: (a) “return 
to quota”, which indicates that quota is assumed 
to be met in the baseline period, and (b) “stable 
deviation”, which implies that quota will be 
over- or under-delivered in the baseline. Except 
for Greece these assumptions are in line with 
the EDIM model (see Réquillart et al. 2008). 
In the case of Greece, it appears that quota is 
increasingly being filled following milk quota 
expansion after 2003 such that the “return to 
quota” category would apply here as well. 
Information on the assumption taken for each MS 
with regard to quota over- or under-delivery can 
be found in the column “modelling” of Table 3.
In the future baseline scenarios, the quotas 
for deliveries are set as follows.
( , , , ) ( , )
* ( , , , ) / ( , , , )
* ( , )
   
                                
                               
QUTS c del t m PRCM bas m
QUTS o del t m QUTS o del bas m
Fac t m
=
 
(1)
where
QUTS(c,del,t,m) = Quota on deliveries in CAPRI 
in year t, Member State m
PRCM(c,bas,m) = Base year deliveries (processing) 
in CAPRI in Member State m
QUTS(o,del,t,m) = Official quota on deliveries in 
year t, Member State m
QUTS(o,del,bas,m) = Official quota on deliveries in 
base year, Member State m
Fac(t,m) = Adjustment factor for year t, Member 
State m
For MS in the group “stable deviation” 
Fac(t,m) = 1, which is the approach applied to all 
MS in past CAPRI applications. For MS in group 
“return to quota” we would set 
( , ) ( , , , ) / ( , , )   Fac t m QUTS o del bas m PRCM o bas m= (2)
where PRCM (o,bas,m) are the deliveries 
according to DG AGRI data in the base year. 
Other specification of the adjustment factor might 
be useful to capture particular circumstances but 
the two country groups mentioned will determine 
the default specification. 
CAPRI also handles quotas on direct sales, 
which are identified on position “HCOM”6 in 
the revised CAPRI database. The “subsistence” 
components are identified as “LOSM”(= human 
consumption on farm) and “FEDM” (= feed 
6 It will be noted that the CAPRI data for direct sales 
correspond directly to DG AGRI data, whereas there are 
some differences for deliveries according to DG AGRI 
data (column ‘deliveries’ in Table 3) and in the CAPRI 
database (column ‘PRCM’ in Table 3). The latter builds 
on the delivery data from Eurostat which are rendered 
consistent with the milk fat and protein balances in the 
dairy sector Therefore they cannot be adjusted easily 
whereas the incorporation of the direct sales from DG 
AGRI only required some shifting between final demand 
categories to maintain closed market balances while 
still including DG AGRI data (see Annex 7 on fat and 
protein balances). 
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use of raw milk on farm), which are projected 
according to the default trends, but with an upper 
bound declining by 2% each year. In other words 
subsistence demand is assumed to decline by 2% 
each year unless the past trends suggest an even 
stronger decline. This will complete the tight 
framework for the change in milk production 
in the baseline (as CAPRI demand components 
PRCM and HCOM will be determined by future 
quotas).
3.1.2 Market intervention
Due to the bilateral trade presentation in the 
CAPRI market model, the number of variables 
and equations will increase quadratically with 
the number of regions. Therefore, in CAPRI the 
countries in some regions (e.g. in the EU-15) are 
“clustered” to trade blocks. The model captures 
trade flows, transport costs, tariffs, export subsidies 
and import prices at the level of these trade blocks. 
Table 3: Dairy quotas and raw milk use components according to DG AGRI and CAPRI for 2005 
[thousand tonnes]
Deliveries 
quota Deliveries Modelling PRCM
Direct sales 
quota
Direct 
sales HCOM LOSM + FEDM
Belgium-Lux. 3510 3539 return to quota 3180 69.2 35.9 35.9 197.2
Denmark 4455 4452 return to quota 4454 0.5 0.4 0.4 117.2
Germany 27768 27965 stable deviation 27442 95.4 50.8 50.8 1155.7
Greece 820 776 return to quota 648 0.8 0.8 0.8 126.7
Spain 6050 6064 return to quota 6095 67.1 64.7 64.7 496.2
France 23880 23573 stable deviation 23292 355.6 287.7 287.7 1124.8
Ireland 5392 5297 return to quota 5061 4.2 3.7 3.7 91.7
Italy 10284 10891 stable deviation 10636 246.0 265.3 265.3 738.7
Netherlands 11000 10993 return to quota 10479 74.4 76.8 76.8 289.8
Austria 2636 2720 stable deviation 2711 114.3 73.5 73.5 398.9
Portugal 1912 1935 return to quota 1857 8.7 6.4 6.4 198.3
Finland 2400 2362 stable deviation 2373 7.9 1.9 1.9 70.0
Sweden 3300 3152 stable deviation 3140 3.0 2.8 2.8 41.3
United Kingdom 14486 14146 stable deviation 13734 123.7 176.2 176.2 324.3
Czech Republic 2679 2696 stable deviation 2592 3.2 2.6 2.6 93.1
Estonia 604 569 return to quota 568 20.1 8.6 8.6 87.6
Cyprus 142 144 stable deviation 133 2.8 2.8 2.8 11.5
Latvia 678 568 return to quota 494 17.8 10.7 10.7 277.3
Lithuania 1520 1249 return to quota 1195 126.7 56.1 56.1 587.4
Hungary 1835 1581 stable deviation 1538 112.4 19.3 19.3 360.1
Malta 49 41 stable deviation 40 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
Poland 8784 8932 stable deviation 8886 179.6 195.1 195.1 2838.5
Slovenia 533 509 stable deviation 519 27.2 20.1 20.1 127.9
Slovakia 1005 981 stable deviation 870 8.3 3.7 3.7 74.8
Source: DG AGRI data (C4 Unit, personal communication, 15/10/2008) for 2007.
CAPRI data (PRCM = Processing on the market = deliveries, HCOM = human consumption on market = direct sales, LOSM = 
losses and human consumption on farm, FEDM = feed use on farm) are based on Eurostat but require some balancing for overall 
consistency with model equations. Therefore there are some differences between the DG AGRI data and the CAPRI data, but these 
are taken into account when including the milk quotas in the model.
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However, a trade block can be broken down 
to individual countries with own behavioural 
equations. Accordingly, in CAPRI all market 
intervention in the dairy market takes place in the 
EU-15, and products from the EU-10 and EU-2 
(Bulgaria and Romania) are included by their 
accession to the single market (free trade with the 
EU-15). There are intervention purchases for butter, 
SMP and beef7, and export subsidies apply for the 
same set of products plus cheese. Table 4 shows 
the administrative price (PADM), observed export 
subsidy outlays (FEOE) and maximum subsidized 
export value (FEOE_MAX) for those products in 
the base year. In the baseline, however, FEOE_
MAX is unchanged due to the assumption of no 
new WTO agreement, thus the column holds for 
both base year and 2020 scenarios. Note that the 
‘intervention price’ for cheese is a hypothetical 
value derived from milk fat and protein contents 
and the intervention prices for butter and SMP. It is 
used to steer the endogenous adjustments of export 
subsidies for cheese with the same methodology 
as for butter and SMP.
3.1.3 Export subsidies
The modelling of export subsidies is based on 
the assumption that there is a monetary ceiling on 
the total amount of export subsidies (FEOE_Max), 
and that export subsidies will be paid per tonne 
of product exported if the market price drops 
below the administrative price. The total amount 
of subsidies is governed by a sigmoid function (i.e. 
7 Beef market intervention is included here, since it is 
related to the dairy market.
S-shaped function) that gives a total export subsidy 
between zero and FEOE_Max for any market price. 
The amount per tonne is calculated by dividing the 
total subsidy by the sum of export flows.8
3.1.4 Import tariffs
CAPRI features both ad-valorem and specific 
tariffs, and furthermore distinguishes preferential 
tariff rates and MFN rates. For many products, 
there is a TRQ for imports under a reduced 
tariff. In CAPRI there can be TRQs for specific 
tariffs and ad-valorem tariffs and the TRQs can 
be bilateral (applying only for a unidirectional 
trade flow between a specific pair of regions) or 
global (applying to all imports regardless of their 
regional source). Furthermore, the TRQ may be 
unlimited, allowing for constructions of free trade 
agreements. Data for the tariff rate quotas come 
directly from the relevant regulations (for the EU) 
or from the Agricultural Market Access Database9 
and expert data (for the Rest of the World).
Regarding tariffs, the main scenario 
assumptions in this analysis are that in the 
baseline but not in the base year, the EU-10 and 
EU-2 are a part of the single market of the EU-
15 and, thus, share the same tariff structure. As 
a compensation to third countries, the following 
market access changes for dairy products are 
introduced:
8 Details of the sigmoid function can be found in Britz, 
Heckelei and Kempen (2007, section 5.4.9).
9 Access under www.amad.org 
Table 4: Market intervention measures in the base year (three-year average 2003-2005) and baseline 
scenarios
PADM base year PADM baseline FEOE base year FEOE_MAX
Butter 3052 2461 376 948
SMP 2055 1747 99 276
Cheese 3509 3096 174 342
Beef meat 1560 1560 189 1254
Source: CAPRI database based on regulations and WTO notifications. PADM in Euro per tonne, INTM in thousand tonnes and 
FEOE_MAX in million Euro.
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1. The MFN tariff for butter is lowered from 
2962 (the base year) to 1896 €/tonne in the 
baseline.
2. The MFN tariff for SMP is lowered from 
1485 (the base year) to 1188 €/tonne in the 
baseline and there is an expanded global 
TRQ from 39.8 to 68 ktonne.
3. The MFN tariff for cheese is lowered from 
2630 (the base year) to 1510 €/tonne in the 
baseline and there is an expanded global 
TRQ from 34 to 102 ktonne.
4. The ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) initiative 
grants unlimited market access for the least 
developed countries in the baseline but not 
in the base year.
5. The bilateral TRQs for imports from Morocco 
to the EU are increased step by step.
3.1.5 Direct payments
The central element of the Luxembourg 
Agreement on the MTR in 2003 was the 
decoupling of direct payments (for the dairy sector 
related to a lowering of the target price for milk). 
The reform was carried out in several steps, with 
the introduction of coupled dairy payments (i.e. 
direct payments coupled to dairy farming) as an 
intermediate stage (cf. section 2.2). In the base year 
scenario of CAPRI (three-year average 2003-2005) 
the Agenda 2000 reform is fully implemented but 
the 2003 Luxemburg agreements on the MTR 
are not yet effective (slightly higher protection of 
dairy and sugar markets). In the baseline scenario 
(year 2020) the Luxemburg agreements are fully 
implemented and further reforms on single markets 
(tobacco, olive oil and cotton sectors), the reform 
of the sugar quota, a 2% expansion of milk quotas 
in 2008 and the abolition of obligatory set-aside 
are included.
Member States had the possibility of 
maintaining certain maximum shares of certain 
payments in the old coupled form, following 
a scheme published in regulation 1782/2003. 
Furthermore, article 69 of that regulation allows 
coupling of 10% of the total payment ceilings for 
sub-sectors. In CAPRI, the decoupled payments 
are modelled as payments per hectare of land, 
with the same amount per hectare applying 
regardless of the production chosen (in reality in 
some cases the eligibility of potatoes and fallow 
land is limited). The partial coupling of direct 
payments to dairy farming has been implemented 
in the baseline. The amounts of the payments are 
considered a simulation outcome, because they 
depend on production and they are thus presented 
in the section of scenario results. The core 
assumptions regarding the implementation of the 
direct payments are summarised in Table 5.
3.2 Definition of scenarios
This section presents the main characteristics 
of the scenarios to be analysed in section 4. These 
scenarios have been built in the CAPRI model 
to help the quantitative analysis of a potential 
removal of the milk quota and are summarised in 
Table 6. The acronyms S1, S2, S3 and S4 will be 
further used in this report as reference.
Table 5: Core assumptions regarding direct payments in the base year and baseline scenarios 
Instrument Base year Baseline
Direct payments EU-15 As defined in agenda 2000 2003 reform fully implemented
Direct payments EU-10 None 2003 reform fully implemented, special accession conditions recognised
Direct payments EU-2 None SAPS
Set aside EU-15 10% Abolished
Set-aside EU-10 and EU-2 None Abolished
Article 69 payments None Implemented
Modulation None EU-25: 5% minus franchise, EU-2 none; Voluntary modulation for UK and 
Portugal
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Scenario S1 “Ex-post” corresponds to the 
situation of the agricultural sector in the base year 
(i.e. 2004)10. In that year, the reforms of Agenda 
2000 were fully implemented, whereas the 2003 
agreements on the MTR were not yet effective. 
This means that in this scenario the dairy and 
sugar markets were slightly more protective than 
after the implementation of the Luxembourg 
Agreement in 2003, and direct payments were 
still coupled to production. Market access for 
developing countries was provided for by the 
EBA agreement and the EU-10 and EU-2 were not 
yet fully part of the single market. Further details 
regarding the implementation of direct payments 
into scenario S1 can be obtained in Table 5.
Scenario S2 simulates ex-post the effects of 
the introduction of the legislation ratified in year 
2004. Scenario S2 includes the central elements 
for the dairy sector of the Luxembourg Agreement 
in 2003, namely the decoupling of direct 
payments together with a stepwise reduction of 
intervention prices for butter and SMP. It also 
includes the application of the CAP to EU-2 after 
enlargement, further reforms on single markets 
(tobacco, olive oil and cotton sectors), the reform 
of the sugar quota, a 2% expansion of milk quotas 
in 2008 and the abolition of obligatory set-aside 
(see Table 5). Scenario S2 is a rather artificial 
scenario, designed mainly to separate the effect 
of the ex-ante policies from technical progress 
and other trend effects occurring over the long-
term. Due to its high degree of abstraction and 
rather minor direct relevance to the analysis of 
10 For production and economic data CAPRI works with 
a three-year average (2003-2005), whereas policies are 
defined for each single year.
milk quota abolition, results of scenario S2 will 
not be further analysed in this report.
The baseline scenario S3 corresponds to 
the simulated market situation in year 2020. 
Scenario S3 assumes the same policy setting 
used in scenario S2. Expert judgements and 
trend analysis are then combined in CAPRI to 
provide a scenario baseline that will be used 
as comparison point for policy impact analysis. 
The baseline scenario S3 may be interpreted as 
a projection in time, covering the most probable 
future development of the EU agricultural sector 
under the status quo policy and including all 
future changes already foreseen in the current 
legislation (i.e. full implementation of the 
Luxembourg Agreement. Expert data on future 
trends at EU level are obtained from the European 
Commission’s medium term projections, while 
for non-EU regions and for exogenous drivers 
data is obtained from FAO and World Bank 
(see Table 7). The obtained information together 
with own trend projections generated by using 
time series from the current CAPRI database are 
fed into an estimator which chooses the most 
likely combination of forecast values subject to 
a larger set of consistency restrictions (like for 
example closed area and market balances, feed 
requirements, production quotas, composition 
of cattle herds, etc.). This methodology ensures 
the mutual compatibility between the projected 
variables and expert knowledge11.
11 For this study, statistical information on milk deliveries, 
export subsidies, intervention stocks for dairy products 
and, most importantly, medium-term projections 
for dairy markets have been provided by DG AGRI. 
Therefore, the baseline scenario (S3) was calibrated to be 
as much in line as possible with the medium term market 
projections of DG AGRI used in their own assessment of 
milk quota abolition (European Commission, 2008).
Table 6: Definition of scenarios to be analysed 
Current policy (stand 2004)
Luxembourg Agreement, fully 
implemented
Quota abolition (in 2020)
Base year (2004) Scenario S1: “Ex-post” Scenario S2: “Policy Shift” –
Future (2020) – Scenario S3: “Baseline” Scenario S4: “Milk Quota Abolition”
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Scenario S4 is conducted to represent 
the effects of milk quota abolition. It is a 
counterfactual scenario to scenario S3, i.e. with 
other policy elements being equal to scenario S3. 
Scenario S4 enables the comparison of possible 
differences between S3 and a milk quota removal 
taking place in year 2015. As scenario results 
are generated for the year 2020, the dairy sector 
is assumed to have adjusted to the new market 
environment between 2015 and 2020.
Table 7: Exogenous drivers considered for shifting the base year to the baseline year
Exogenous drivers Value / Source
Inflation 1.9 % per annum
Growth of GDP per capita 2.0 % nominal per annum for the EU10, 5 % for India, 1.5 % for USA, 4 % for 
Russia, 1.5 % for Least Developed countries and ACPs, and 1 % for the rest.
Demographic changes EUROSTAT projections for Europe and UN projections for the rest of countries in 
the world
Technical progress 0.5% input savings per annum (affecting exogenous yield trends), with the exemption 
of N, P, K needs for crops where technical progress is trend forecasted
Domestic Policy National decisions on coupling options and premium models, with their expected 
implementation date
Common Market Organisations Supply and demand forecasts (European Commission, 2007) 
Projections for dairy markets (European Commission, 2008)
Dairy Markets Prices, supply and milk quota rent forecasts (EDIM model, Réquillart et al. 2008) 
Projections for dairy markets (European Commission, 2008)
Trade policy Final implementation of the 1994 Uruguay round plus some further elements as 
NAFTA. This raw information is found in AMAD and, after some treatment for data 
consistency, mapped into CAPRI
Supply and demand for raw products (FAOSTAT2)
Supply and demand for processed commodities (AGLINK model)
Price forecasts (FAPRI model, release 2007)
World markets
38
39
R
eg
io
na
l E
co
no
m
ic
 A
na
ly
si
s 
of
 M
ilk
 Q
uo
ta
 R
ef
or
m
 in
 t
he
 E
U
As an explicit focus of this report is on the 
regional effects in the EU-27 of a milk quota 
abolition in year 2015 (simulation results in year 
2020), conclusions can predominantly be drawn 
by comparing the results of scenario S4 and 
scenario S3. Results of scenario S1 will also be 
commented because of their calibration nature 
(i.e. reproduction of statistical data). As scenario 
S2 was mainly elaborated for technical purposes, 
results remain of a technical nature (i.e. ex-post 
behaviour of the model to policy changes) and are 
therefore not further commented in the report.
4.1 Analysis of the baseline scenario 
4.1.1 Summary
In this section two important scenarios for 
the analysis of milk quota abolition are analysed: 
scenario S1 (“base year scenario”) for a three-
year average around 2004 (i.e. the 2003-2005 
average) and scenario S3 (“baseline scenario”) 
for year 2020. Both scenarios are pure calibration 
scenarios, i.e. they are constructed to parameterise 
the economic model by reproducing a given data 
set, either an existing database for the base year 
situation (e.g. EUROSTAT) or expert projections 
for the baseline (e.g. DG AGRI expert data and 
EDIM model projections for EU dairy markets). 
Therefore, a thorough cross-checking of statistical 
data and expert estimates has been carried out12. 
12 It is important to say that the storyline behind the 
comparative analysis of these two scenarios is not 
other than the one given by the data sets to which they 
are calibrated to DG AGRI outlook for income and 
agricultural markets (European Commission 2007). With 
this objective, an intensive cross-checking of statistical 
data and simulated results has been done in order to 
achieve a baseline consistent with the underlying market 
prospects of DG AGRI. In an exercise of this magnitude, 
it is important to take into account that the expert data 
used for the generation of the baseline are at Member 
State or European level (not regional level).
Baseline simulation results show a milk 
production increase by 1.0% in the EU-27 
between 2004 and 2020, including a change 
in dairy cattle of -12.7% and yield increase of 
+15.8% (see Annex 3.2 for a comparison with 
existing baseline projections at DG AGRI).
4.1.2 Dairy cattle sector
When comparing results of S1 to S3 it can be 
seen that the combination of policy developments 
and market trends allows milk production to 
increase between 2004 and 2020 by 1.0% in the 
EU-27. This increase only partially follows the 
agreed milk quota expansion of 2% in 2008 for 
the EU-27 and also incorporates some decreases 
in production in the NMS due to a decline in 
subsistence production, mainly observed in 
Poland, Bulgaria and Romania13. In Table 8 it 
can be observed how milk yield is foreseen to 
increase by 15.8% between 2004 and 2020, due 
to technical progress14. In order to comply with 
the milk quota framework this is accompanied by 
a parallel decrease in dairy cattle herds of -12,7% 
(cf. Figure 7 for a regional perspective). 
The regional effects on dairy cattle numbers 
are derived from the heterogeneities within the 
Member States regarding animal number statistics 
(REGIO domain, EUROSTAT). We can say that 
the regionalisation of baseline results follows the 
same methodological approach as for the base 
year (see Britz 2008). In this study no expert data 
at regional level is entering the model, therefore, 
regional results are driven by historical trends on 
13 See Annex 5 for further details on the effects of milk use 
on farm and losses on overall milk delivery trends.
14 This increase in yields is based on past trends. It is 
important to take into account that a long-term scenario 
leads to greater potential increases in yields. No bound 
has been set on this variable.
4. Economic effects of milk quota abolition 
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regional herd sizes and yields, being the average 
change in the Member States (as presented in 
Table 8) held as constant.
In order to shift quota rents from the base 
year in 2004 (estimated) to the baseline in 2020, 
simulation results of the EDIM model are used 
(see Réquillart et al. 2008). Table 9 presents 
detailed information on milk prices and quota 
rents per Member State for the base year and 
baseline scenarios. Additional information on 
regional quota rents is included in the Annex 1.
In Table 9 two blocks have to be differentiated, 
the EU-15, with a longstanding quota regime, and 
the NMS, which entered the milk quota regime 
with the accession in the EU: 
– In the EU-15 quota rents vary from 2-4% in 
Finland, Sweden and the UK, as the countries 
with lowest quota rents, to more than 30% in 
the Netherlands, Greece and Austria in the base 
year. Quota rents are assumed to decrease on 
average by 2.7% in the baseline, with the main 
underlying economic reason for the decrease 
being the increases in quotas after the base year.
– In the EU-12 milk quota rents are almost zero 
in the base year situation for the EU-10 (as this 
was the immediate time after accession) and 
zero for the EU-2 (as to that date Bulgaria and 
Romania were not yet in the EU). In the 2020 
baseline, quota rents are assumed within 
a range of 5-10% for all NMS apart from 
Bulgaria and Romania, which remain with 
milk production under quota, and Poland 
and Hungary, with quota rents above average 
(15% and 13% respectively).
Table 8: Changes in dairy herds, yields, and cow milk production, 2004-2020
Base year (S1) Baseline (S3) Baseline / Base year CAPRI
Dairy herd Yield Production Dairy herd Yield Production Dairy herd Yield Production
[1000 hd] [kg/hd] [1000 t] [1000 hd] [kg/hd] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3]
Austria 552 5842 3223 445 7170 3193 -19.3 22.7 -0.9
Belgium-Lux. 610 5642 3444 524 6603 3460 -14.2 17.0 0.4
Denmark 578 7950 4599 519 9092 4715 -10.4 14.4 2.5
Finland 327 7512 2458 283 8906 2518 -13.6 18.6 2.4
France 3942 6270 24717 3473 7244 25157 -11.9 15.5 1.8
Germany 4316 6641 28664 3887 7538 29297 -10.0 13.5 2.2
Greece 150 5104 768 128 6076 776 -15.1 19.0 1.1
Ireland 1142 4635 5292 1066 5036 5369 -6.6 8.7 1.5
Italy 2069 5444 11263 1857 6110 11343 -10.3 12.2 0.7
Netherlands 1517 7200 10924 1366 8185 11179 -10.0 13.7 2.3
Portugal 328 6229 2043 286 7180 2056 -12.7 15.3 0.6
Spain 1098 6038 6628 931 7048 6563 -15.2 16.7 -1.0
Sweden 401 8028 3216 360 9198 3314 -10.0 14.6 3.1
United Kingdom 2106 6958 14657 1883 8001 15063 -10.6 15.0 2.8
EU15 19137 6370 121896 17007 7291 124003 -11.1 14.5 1.7
Cyprus 26 5951 153 24 6304 150 -7.4 5.9 -1.8
Czech Republic 412 6394 2633 326 8320 2713 -20.8 30.1 3.0
Estonia 113 5620 636 98 6840 670 -13.4 21.7 5.3
Hungary 288 6547 1887 244 7720 1882 -15.4 17.9 -0.2
Latvia 174 4369 761 171 4843 827 -2.1 10.9 8.5
Lithuania 423 4230 1790 366 5206 1903 -13.6 23.1 6.3
Malta 7 5592 40 7 6696 44 -8.4 19.7 9.5
Poland 2656 4428 11759 2030 5577 11322 -23.6 25.9 -3.7
Slovac Republic 155 6053 936 144 7194 1037 -6.8 18.9 10.8
Slovenia 128 5140 659 111 6103 676 -13.6 18.7 2.6
10 New MS 4382 4851 21254 3519 6031 21222 -19.7 24.3 -0.2
Bulgaria 363 3644 1322 342 3686 1260 -5.8 1.2 -4.7
Romania 1502 3412 5124 1289 3623 4671 -14.1 6.2 -8.8
Bulgaria/Romania 1864 3457 6446 1631 3636 5931 -12.5 5.2 -8.0
EU27 25383 5893 149596 22157 6822 151156 -12.7 15.8 1.0
Dairy herd
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Table 9: Price changes and quota rents, 2004-2020
Base year (S1) Baseline (S3) Baseline/Base year CAPRI
Milk Price Qrent Qrent Milk Price Qrent Qrent Milk Price Qrent Qrent
[€/ton output] [%] [€/ton] [€/ton output [%] [€/ton] [% to S1] [diff. to S1] [diff. to S1]
Austria 252.0 30.1 75.9 281.7 29.9 84.2 11.8 -0.2 8.4
Belgium-Lux. 256.0 28.1 71.9 285.4 27.6 78.7 11.5 -0.5 6.8
Denmark 308.4 12.5 38.7 332.8 9.3 31.1 7.9 -3.2 -7.6
Finland 341.7 2.2 7.4 379.1 3.5 13.2 11.0 1.3 5.8
France 274.3 17.1 46.8 300.0 12.6 37.7 9.4 -4.5 -9.1
Germany 281.4 16.5 46.3 313.0 17.8 55.7 11.2 1.3 9.4
Greece 324.9 35.1 114.0 357.8 11.7 41.9 10.2 -23.4 -72.1
Ireland 260.3 24.6 64.0 284.2 20.9 59.4 9.2 -3.7 -4.6
Italy 339.6 20.0 67.8 369.5 14.0 51.5 8.8 -6.0 -16.2
Netherlands 318.5 32.9 104.9 353.8 27.8 98.2 11.1 -5.2 -6.7
Portugal 297.6 17.5 52.1 334.9 10.4 34.7 12.5 -7.1 -17.3
Spain 275.6 28.0 77.0 305.9 22.3 68.1 11.0 -5.7 -8.9
Sweden 312.0 4.2 13.2 341.4 3.0 10.3 9.4 -1.2 -2.9
United Kingdom 254.0 3.9 10.0 277.6 3.2 8.8 9.3 -0.8 -1.2
EU15 286.2 18.1 51.8 315.2 15.4 48.6 10.1 -2.7 -3.3
Cyprus 387.1 1.0 3.9 460.7 5.9 27.0 19.0 4.9 23.1
Czech Republic 242.7 1.2 2.9 282.4 9.6 27.1 16.4 8.4 24.2
Estonia 201.1 1.3 2.6 245.0 6.2 15.1 21.8 4.9 12.6
Hungary 254.3 1.4 3.5 269.8 12.8 34.4 6.1 11.4 31.0
Latvia 157.4 2.1 3.3 196.3 6.9 13.6 24.7 4.8 10.3
Lithuania 151.9 5.0 7.7 182.7 9.9 18.1 20.2 4.9 10.5
Malta 334.5 1.0 3.4 365.2 5.8 21.3 9.2 4.8 17.9
Poland 175.0 2.7 4.7 212.8 14.6 31.1 21.6 11.9 26.4
Slovac Republic 242.6 1.2 2.8 276.9 6.0 16.7 14.2 4.9 13.9
Slovenia 235.3 3.3 7.7 258.8 8.1 21.1 10.0 4.8 13.3
10 New MS 195.3 2.3 4.5 231.1 11.9 27.4 18.3 9.6 23.0
Bulgaria 193.7 0.0 0.0 233.7 8.9 20.8 20.6
Romania 187.4 0.0 0.0 173.2 13.8 23.8 -7.6
Bulgaria/Romania 188.7 0.0 0.0 186.1 12.5 23.2 -1.4
EU27 269.1 15.9 42.9 298.3 15.0 44.6 10.9 -1.0 1.7
Quota rents
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Figure 8 presents the regional distribution of 
milk quota rents in the baseline scenario for the year 
2020. Whereas in the NMS the regional distribution 
is assumed fairly homogeneous within a MS, in the 
EU-15 there are large differences between regions 
inside a MS. In order to arrive to these numbers, the 
shifters calculated at MS level (as explained above) 
are used on the regionally estimated quota rents for 
the base year. The higher variability within MS of 
the EU-15 partly reflects the availability of statistical 
information which permitted more detailed 
assessments for the EU-15 than for most NMS.
4.1.3 Dairy processing sector
In this section, the development of market 
balances for the main dairy commodities between 
the base year and baseline simulation are 
presented. It is important to note that the results 
presented do not follow a rigorous economic 
reasoning based on a given model for dairies. 
Over time there will be changes in processing 
technology and costs other than raw milk, such 
that the results are coming from projections 
(either trend based or expert-driven information). 
Only once the target year 2020 is reached, the 
dairy model parameters are ‘frozen’ to allow for 
economic analysis. Within simulation scenarios 
the dairy industry is then assumed to process raw 
milk into processed dairy products based on a 
given technology such that profits are maximised. 
Important elements of this technology are the 
balances on milk fat and protein and their content 
in various products (fat and protein content of 
butter, cheese etc.).15 In equilibrium the price of 
dairy products corresponds to the value of their 
fat and protein content plus other marginal costs 
(for labour, capital, energy). If the price of raw 
15 See Annex 7 for some explanations on the balancing of 
fat and protein in the model.
Figure 8: Regional distribution of milk quota rents in percentage of milk price, baseline scenario, 
year 2020
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milk declines, dairies will find that milk fat and 
protein are cheaper such that production of dairy 
products is increased. Because the raw product 
share in the final product value is not equal for 
all dairy products (e.g. cheese requires more 
sophisticated processes than butter or SMP), the 
increase in production would not be uniform. 
Conversely if the price of a dairy product, such 
as butter, declines whereas all other prices are 
constant, the profit maximising dairy industry 
would try to shift away from butter, producing 
more cream and whole milk powder rather 
than SMP to comply with the fat balance in 
spite of reduced butter production. However, 
the starting point for any such scenarios is the 
market situation that has evolved over time and, 
therefore, in this section the market balances for 
the main dairy commodities are presented.
The European butter price is predicted to 
decrease by -5.6% following the drop in fat 
and protein prices but still remaining above 
intervention (which was also reduced in the 
baseline compared to the base year, see Table 4). 
Production of butter also decreases (-9.2%) due to 
the larger uptake of milk fat in cheese production 
(cf. Table 12). As a result of a shift in preferences 
towards cheese, consumption of butter is also 
foreseen to decrease (-4.8%) in the EU-27, with 
a larger effect on NMS (-11.2% in the EU10 and 
–12.5% in EU-2). This drop in butter consumption 
is however lower than the decrease in butter 
production, bringing the EU into a net importer 
situation (from a slightly positive net trade situation 
of 22100 tonnes16 of butter to a negative balance 
of -72500 tonnes) (cf. Table 10).
16 ZMP would give a 2003-2005 three year average for net 
trade of EU-27 of 117000 tonnes, which is nearly three 
times the base year value in CAPRI. This deviation comes 
from the CAPRI database, where missing Eurostat trade 
data are estimated with data differently than ZMP statistics. 
Nevertheless, the starting value does not affect the net 
Table 10: Market results of the baseline: butter, 2004-2020
Base year (S1) Baseline (S3) Baseline vs. Base year
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S1] [% to S1] [diff. to S1]
Austria 3477 32.0 41.5 -9.5 3282 21.6 35.5 -14.0 -32.6 -14.4 -4.5
Belgium-Lux. 2648 116.3 107.7 8.5 2499 125.4 109.6 15.8 7.8 1.7 7.3
Denmark 3122 101.2 87.3 13.8 2947 89.2 76.1 13.2 -11.8 -12.9 -0.7
Finland 2487 50.8 36.1 14.7 2348 46.1 32.5 13.6 -9.2 -10.0 -1.1
France 3721 421.6 484.7 -63.1 3512 368.4 501.7 -133.3 -12.6 3.5 -70.2
Germany 2807 439.1 525.0 -85.9 2649 388.7 479.4 -90.6 -11.5 -8.7 -4.7
Greece 4425 2.0 8.7 -6.7 4177 0.7 8.7 -7.9 -63.5 0.0 -1.3
Ireland 3045 145.5 13.0 132.5 2874 152.2 13.8 138.4 4.6 6.1 5.9
Italy 3121 121.9 166.9 -45.1 2946 137.5 169.2 -31.7 12.8 1.3 13.4
Netherlands 2407 245.4 152.8 92.7 2272 215.2 154.3 60.9 -12.3 1.0 -31.7
Portugal 3186 26.0 17.6 8.3 3007 28.4 14.5 13.9 9.4 -17.9 5.6
Spain 2292 46.5 41.9 4.6 2164 35.5 38.4 -2.9 -23.6 -8.3 -7.5
Sweden 2968 47.5 38.2 9.3 2801 36.9 32.2 4.7 -22.4 -15.9 -4.6
United Kingdom 2320 126.1 193.9 -67.7 2190 104.4 171.4 -67.0 -17.2 -11.6 0.7
EU15 2971 1921.8 1915.4 6.4 2804 1750.1 1837.0 -86.9 -8.9 -4.1 -93.3
Cyprus 4067 0.2 1.4 -1.2 3845 0.2 1.3 -1.1 -25.0 -5.7 0.0
Czech Republic 2617 53.6 42.6 11.0 2474 40.8 40.2 0.6 -23.9 -5.6 -10.4
Estonia 2019 6.0 5.3 0.7 1909 4.8 3.8 1.0 -20.5 -27.2 0.2
Hungary 2542 7.0 8.8 -1.9 2403 3.0 8.0 -5.0 -57.1 -9.8 -3.1
Latvia 1768 8.2 6.5 1.7 1671 7.0 4.7 2.3 -15.5 -27.8 0.5
Lithuania 2361 12.6 8.3 4.4 2232 9.8 6.4 3.4 -22.7 -22.8 -1.0
Malta 3331 0.2 0.5 -0.3 3149 0.2 0.4 -0.2 -5.3 -8.7 0.0
Poland 2311 119.3 117.9 1.4 2185 117.9 108.0 9.9 -1.1 -8.3 8.4
Slovac Republic 2711 10.1 10.2 -0.1 2563 9.4 7.5 1.9 -7.1 -26.7 2.0
Slovenia 2421 4.3 2.2 2.1 2289 3.8 2.1 1.8 -11.0 -6.8 -0.3
10 New MS 2391 221.5 203.6 17.9 2249 196.7 182.4 14.3 -11.2 -10.4 -3.6
Bulgaria 1891 5.5 5.0 0.5 1794 3.0 4.0 -0.9 -44.6 -20.5 -1.4
Romania 2095 8.6 11.4 -2.7 1987 9.3 8.3 1.0 7.8 -27.0 3.7
Bulgaria/Romania 2016 14.1 16.3 -2.2 1940 12.3 12.2 0.1 -12.5 -25.0 2.3
EU27 2906 2157.4 2135.3 22.1 2743 1959.2 2031.7 -72.5 -9.2 -4.8 -94.6
Butter
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For SMP, another bulk product, the analysis 
is quite similar to the case of butter but with more 
accentuated effects. Prices for SMP are assumed 
to increase in the baseline by 16% on average and 
production to decrease by -10% due to the shift 
of proteins to cheese and fresh milk products. As 
in the case of butter, demand is also reduced in 
the baseline (-10%) but to a lesser extent. The net 
exporting position of the EU-27 remains however 
much more weakened.17 (cf. Table 11).
Cheese production is assumed to increase in 
the EU-27 by 17.7% following a shift in preferences, 
trade position in the baseline, which is driven by expert 
predictions (i.e. in this case EDIM market balances).
17 It must be reminded that in CAPRI prices are mainly derived 
from Eurostat statistics and that the intervention mechanism 
is not initiated if a particular national market price ‘hits’ the 
effective intervention price. Actually it is possible to have 
national prices below effective intervention prices in the 
model, as in the baseline price for butter in the UK price 
(below 2200 Euro, see Table 10).
i.e. demand going up by +14.5% on average, with 
+35.5% in the EU-10 and +13.8 in the EU-15. 
This excess supply makes the net trade position of 
the EU-27 stronger towards the Rest of the World. 
Within the EU there is a quite heterogeneous 
picture, since most of NMS and several EU-15 MS 
are not expected to produce enough cheese to 
satisfy demand. Nevertheless, the net trade positions 
within the countries have to be considered as 
residual positions which depend on the production 
trends for each MS and the distribution of demand 
amongst them.18 (cf. Table 12).
These trends of the baseline are in line with 
the market outlook for the dairy sector (European 
Commission 2007).
18 For historical reasons, in CAPRI the EU-15, EU-10 and 
EU-2 are considered formally separate trade aggregates. 
The common market is technically achieved by dropping 
all tariff barriers between these aggregates to zero (cf. 
section 3.1.2).
Table 11: Market results of the baseline: SMP, 2004-2020
Base year (S1) Baseline (S3) Baseline vs. Base year
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S1] [% to S1] [diff. to S1]
Austria 2200 7.1 3.4 3.7 2601 5.2 3.3 1.9 -26.7 -4.4 -1.7
Belgium-Lux. 2313 88.8 55.4 33.4 2733 98.7 57.8 40.9 11.1 4.3 7.5
Denmark 2010 26.2 18.6 7.5 2376 22.5 11.3 11.1 -14.2 -39.2 3.6
Finland 2227 24.4 24.4 0.1 2632 28.3 25.6 2.7 15.9 5.1 2.6
France 2018 203.5 183.5 20.0 2385 147.0 165.4 -18.5 -27.8 -9.9 -38.5
Germany 2207 268.1 150.7 117.4 2609 192.6 124.6 68.0 -28.2 -17.3 -49.4
Greece 2190 0.0 2.7 -2.7 2588 0.0 2.0 -2.0 -26.9 0.7
Ireland 2189 69.7 30.3 39.4 2587 48.0 22.3 25.7 -31.2 -26.4 -13.7
Italy 2010 0.0 111.0 -111.0 2376 0.0 102.3 -102.3 -7.9 8.8
Netherlands 2094 67.9 164.5 -96.6 2475 50.3 142.8 -92.5 -25.8 -13.2 4.1
Portugal 2188 7.5 11.2 -3.7 2586 5.3 10.7 -5.4 -28.7 -4.1 -1.7
Spain 2169 10.6 18.9 -8.3 2564 8.7 14.5 -5.8 -18.1 -23.3 2.5
Sweden 2186 32.3 32.0 0.3 2584 29.0 29.7 -0.8 -10.2 -7.1 -1.0
United Kingdom 2282 93.0 87.3 5.7 2697 78.7 87.0 -8.3 -15.3 -0.3 -14.0
EU15 2166 898.9 893.9 5.0 2571 714.1 799.4 -85.3 -20.6 -10.6 -90.2
Cyprus 1104 0.0 0.0 0.0 1303 0.4 0.0 0.4 4300.0 0.4
Czech Republic 1840 34.8 4.3 30.5 2172 25.5 4.3 21.1 -26.9 0.7 -9.4
Estonia 1350 10.5 4.8 5.7 1593 7.7 3.2 4.5 -26.8 -33.1 -1.2
Hungary 1856 6.0 2.1 3.8 2191 7.3 1.7 5.6 22.0 -21.3 1.8
Latvia 2422 0.8 0.2 0.6 2859 0.7 0.2 0.5 -16.3 -5.0 -0.1
Lithuania 2121 9.6 0.2 9.4 2503 9.0 0.2 8.8 -5.9 -14.3 -0.5
Malta 2343 0.0 2.1 -2.1 2766 3.8 2.4 1.4 9275.0 10.3 3.5
Poland 1291 118.8 28.9 89.9 1523 147.7 26.9 120.8 24.4 -6.7 30.9
Slovac Republic 2132 8.0 7.2 0.8 2516 9.6 5.4 4.2 20.4 -25.1 3.4
Slovenia 1104 2.2 0.0 2.2 1303 1.0 0.0 1.0 -57.2 -1.3
10 New MS 1491 190.7 49.9 140.8 1719 212.5 44.3 168.3 11.5 -11.2 27.5
Bulgaria 1369 5.1 10.1 -5.0 1619 4.5 9.2 -4.8 -12.4 -8.7 0.3
Romania 2263 5.3 6.3 -1.0 2676 0.9 5.7 -4.8 -82.1 -9.0 -3.8
Bulgaria/Romania 1824 10.3 16.3 -6.0 1803 5.4 14.9 -9.5 -47.9 -8.8 -3.5
EU27 2046 1099.9 960.1 139.8 2373 932.0 858.5 73.5 -15.3 -10.6 -66.3
Skimmed Milk 
Powder
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4.1.4 Other commodity markets
The tables 13-16 give an overview of 
the effects on meat markets. The production 
of beef is projected to decrease by -17.0% 
due to the reduction in dairy cattle (-12.7%). 
This is followed by increasing beef meat net 
imports into the EU due to an increase of 1% 
in demand. For pig meat, production levels 
are expected to rise by +7.7%; and for poultry 
meat, production increases in the range of 
+25% are projected, reflecting increasing per 
capita demand. Overall, whereas beef and 
sheep and goat meat production decrease, pork 
and poultry meat heavily increase their share in 
the meat aggregate due to the observed price 
changes and a shift in preferences towards the 
latter.
4.1.5 Land use change
The main drivers on land use and their 
consequences on the baseline may be summarised 
as follows. In overall agricultural land in the EU-
27 is projected to decrease by -4.8% from year 
2004 to year 2020. In the arable crop sector, the 
recent reform of the sugar market leads to a drop 
in sugar beet area by about -39%, with a reduction 
in production of –25% as a result of yield increases 
above 20%. Cereal production is estimated to 
grow by +6%. The production increase in cereals 
is mostly fuelled by projected yield increases in 
the range of +0.7% per annum, which would be 
accompanied by a slight reduction in cereal areas of 
-6%, as presented in Figure 9. This further reduction 
of cereal area with respect to the average reduction 
in agricultural land in the baseline is partially 
compensated by an increase of +8% in fallow land 
(0.9 Mio ha) focused in the NMS (cf. Figure 9).
Table 12: Market results of the baseline: cheese, 2004-2020
Base year (S1) Baseline (S3) Baseline vs. Base year
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S1] [% to S1] [diff. to S1]
Austria 4201 147.3 160.9 -13.6 4588 145.0 197.0 -52.0 -1.6 22.5 -38.5
Belgium-Lux. 2851 58.4 206.9 -148.6 3113 66.8 287.0 -220.2 14.5 38.7 -71.6
Denmark 3930 315.9 136.8 179.1 4293 355.2 176.4 178.7 12.4 29.0 -0.4
Finland 3124 99.7 95.2 4.5 3412 125.3 107.9 17.5 25.7 13.3 13.0
France 4579 1853.2 1554.5 298.7 5001 1994.3 1784.8 209.5 7.6 14.8 -89.2
Germany 3164 1857.9 1749.4 108.5 3456 2215.3 1836.9 378.4 19.2 5.0 269.9
Greece 5174 216.3 275.0 -58.7 5651 277.5 339.8 -62.3 28.3 23.5 -3.5
Ireland 4584 116.2 39.5 76.7 5006 133.5 54.4 79.1 14.8 37.7 2.3
Italy 4806 1117.7 1256.4 -138.7 5249 1440.3 1314.4 125.9 28.9 4.6 264.5
Netherlands 3128 679.5 347.4 332.1 3416 773.3 447.7 325.6 13.8 28.9 -6.5
Portugal 4182 80.9 104.9 -24.0 4568 77.0 126.3 -49.3 -4.8 20.4 -25.3
Spain 4181 321.7 418.4 -96.7 4567 397.3 513.2 -115.9 23.5 22.7 -19.2
Sweden 3782 120.5 166.3 -45.8 4130 129.5 208.1 -78.6 7.5 25.2 -32.8
United Kingdom 3825 334.7 556.3 -221.6 4178 344.1 652.4 -308.3 2.8 17.3 -86.7
EU15 3999 7319.8 7067.7 252.1 4370 8474.3 8046.3 428.0 15.8 13.8 175.9
Cyprus 5776 11.1 10.7 0.3 6320 13.7 16.0 -2.3 23.1 48.5 -2.6
Czech Republic 3500 121.6 129.9 -8.3 3829 151.6 165.4 -13.8 24.6 27.3 -5.6
Estonia 2854 24.7 20.1 4.6 3123 30.3 24.4 5.9 22.9 21.8 1.3
Hungary 3502 70.9 63.9 7.0 3832 80.5 66.3 14.3 13.6 3.7 7.3
Latvia 2661 34.8 30.3 4.6 2912 50.1 32.0 18.2 44.0 5.6 13.6
Lithuania 2263 83.4 38.6 44.8 2476 123.1 47.8 75.3 47.5 23.9 30.5
Malta 4609 4.3 8.8 -4.5 5042 5.2 10.9 -5.7 22.0 23.5 -1.1
Poland 2491 534.4 481.0 53.5 2725 761.2 588.6 172.6 42.4 22.4 119.2
Slovac Republic 4076 39.0 33.2 5.8 4459 40.8 39.1 1.7 4.7 17.8 -4.1
Slovenia 3335 23.2 21.1 2.2 3649 27.6 25.5 2.1 18.8 20.9 0.0
10 New MS 2826 947.5 837.5 110.0 3040 1284.2 1015.9 268.3 35.5 21.3 158.3
Bulgaria 2644 85.8 73.4 12.4 2963 85.3 73.8 11.5 -0.6 0.5 -0.9
Romania 2551 56.3 54.7 1.6 2859 53.6 61.6 -8.0 -4.7 12.7 -9.6
Bulgaria/Romania 2607 142.1 128.1 14.0 2923 138.9 135.4 3.5 -2.2 5.7 -10.5
EU27 3843 8409.4 8033.3 376.1 4177 9897.5 9197.6 699.9 17.7 14.5 323.8
Cheese
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4.1.6 Income
In the baseline scenario S3, agricultural 
income for the EU-27 is also expected to increase 
by +37.6% in nominal terms and per agricultural 
hectare between 2004 and 2020 (cf. Figure 10). 
However, it is important to note that: 
– the shift between 2014 and 2020 is carried out 
through historical linear trends, since no more 
expert data is available for this period; moreover, 
the prospects do not cover development for 
permanent crops and fodder, so that the results 
for those parts of agriculture are mainly driven 
by historical trends and, in the case of fodder 
by their interaction with animal production; 
– the analysis presents income developments 
in nominal terms (by taking a 1.9% annual 
inflation rate, results would be around 35% 
lower, so that income per hectare of utilisable 
agricultural area would remain almost 
constant), and;
Table 13: Market results of the baseline: beef, 2004-2020
Base year (S1) Baseline (S3)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S1] [% to S1] [% to S1] [diff. to S1]
EU15 2901 7650 7407 268 42.3 -17.4 2.4 -1538.4
10 New MS 1633 698 611 86 40.6 -15.4 -7.4 -62.3
Bulgaria/Romania 1817 280 302 -22 78.8 -9.0 -19.9 34.7
EU27 2763 8627 8319 332 42.8 -17.0 0.9 -1566.0
Beef
Table 14: Market results of the baseline: sheep and goat meat, 2004-2020
Base year (S1) Baseline (S3)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S1] [% to S1] [% to S1] [diff. to S1]
EU15 4744 1028 1291 -263 9.2 -20.7 11.7 -363.7
10 New MS 3118 33 24 10 10.0 -4.1 36.1 -9.9
Bulgaria/Romania 2078 144 107 38 39.1 18.8 11.3 15.0
EU27 4379 1205 1421 -216 8.3 -15.6 12.0 -358.6
Sheep and Goat 
Meat
Table 15: Market results of the baseline: pork meat, 2004-2020
Base year (S1) Baseline (S3)
Price Production Demand Net trade Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S1] [% to S1] [diff. to S1]
EU15 1301 17961 16192 1769 9.4 1.7 1408.7
10 New MS 1196 3363 3313 49 4.0 4.1 0.2
Bulgaria/Romania 1611 608 744 -137 -34.6 11.7 -297.3
EU27 1293 21932 20250 1682 7.3 2.4 1111.7
Pork
Table 16: Market results of the baseline: poultry meat, 2004-2020
Base year (S1) Baseline (S3)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S1] [% to S1] [% to S1] [diff. to S1]
EU15 1205 8912 8461 451 48.4 23.8 23.5 137.9
10 New MS 1099 1781 1669 112 45.4 44.3 31.0 271.5
Bulgaria/Romania 1771 355 489 -133 -19.5 -47.4 34.8 -338.6
EU27 1206 11048 10618 430 44.9 24.8 25.2 70.8
Poultry Meat
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Fallow land: +8% ØEU-27Cereals: -6% ØEU-27
Figure 10: Income changes in the baseline scenario: total agricultural sector, 2004-2020
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– income is measured per agricultural hectare, 
so that income developments here are 
presented at the low end, since we could 
assume a further decreasing trend in labour 
input over time.
Income developments in the baseline are 
projected to be quite favourable for dairy cattle 
(+32%), due to lower increases in prices over 
time (prices increase by +26% for cereals and 
+11% for cow milk). The development of regional 
income is quite heterogeneous and depends on the 
regional production mix, which is in turn linked to 
exogenously-determined regional trends for market 
balance positions over time. It is again important to 
note here, that no economic analysis beyond the use 
of historical trends is behind these regional patterns. 
A different set of regional results consistent to the 
expert information at Member State level could be 
achieved by assuming a different development of 
the regional agricultural markets.
4.2 Regional analysis of the milk quota 
abolition 
The following sub-sections try to disentangle 
the impacts of milk quota abolition, starting at the 
aggregate level of market impacts at the EU-27 and 
MS level and then presenting some more detailed 
results on regional effects within selected MS.
4.2.1 Summary
In this section results of scenario S4 (removal 
of the milk quota in the year 2015) are compared 
with results of the baseline scenario S3. The 
results of both scenarios refer to the year 2020. 
Overall it can be expected that milk production 
will increase while milk prices will decrease. 
However the regional production effects might be 
heterogeneous. In regions where the quota rent was 
low in the reference situation the drop in milk price 
might be below marginal cost, i.e. in those regions 
production will decrease. In regions where the final 
milk price remains above marginal cost production 
will increase. This leads to a redistribution of 
production among NUTS 2 regions when there are 
no longer restrictions as implemented by different 
national quota trade regimes. 
Key results of scenario 4 are that compared to 
scenario 3, cow milk production would increase 
by about 4.4% in the EU-27, accompanied by 
a decrease in raw milk prices of about 10%. 
Production of the industrial products butter, 
skimmed and whole milk powder would increase 
by 5-6% while their prices would decline by 
about 6-7%. Production of cheese and fresh milk 
products would increase about 1% whereas their 
prices could decline by 4-6%. From a regional 
perspective, the development of milk production 
is mainly determined by the estimated milk quota 
rents in the baseline scenario. Regions with high 
quota rents, such as in Austria (all above 28%), 
Netherlands (all above 27%), Belgium (Brabant 
Wallon 38%, the rest above 28%), Luxembourg 
(29%), and to a lesser extent Italy (Lazio, 
Molise and Abruzzo above 33%) and Germany 
(Saarland, Koblenz and Rheinhessen-Pfalz above 
32%) increase their milk production significantly. 
The overall increase of milk production drives 
down dairy prices in the EU-27 and thus exerts 
economic pressure on regions with low quota 
rents (especially to be found in the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and Finland).
4.2.2 Market impacts at EU and Member State 
level 
Several recent studies have confirmed the 
key importance of estimated quota rents for the 
quantitative results obtained in quota abolition 
scenarios19. This study has therefore devoted 
19 See for example Réquillart V., Bouamra-Mechemache 
Z., Jongeneel R. (2008): Economic analysis of the effects 
of the expiry of the EU milk quota system, Institut 
d’économie industrielle, Université Toulouse 1, http://
ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/external/milk/full_
text_en.pdf and Witzke H.P., Tonini A. (2008): Dairy 
reform scenarios with CAPSIM acknowledging quota 
rent uncertainty, paper presented at the 12th EAAE 
Congress, Ghent, Belgium. 
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considerable efforts to estimate regional quota 
rents and supply elasticities, to validate the results 
against information from quota markets and to 
merge estimation results with this alternative 
information and plausibility considerations 
(Pérez Domínguez and Tonini 2008). As may be 
expected, the final specification of quota rents 
may be seen also to be a key determinant for the 
results of scenario 4 (cf. Figure 11).
Figure 11 shows the impact of quota 
abolition on production of cow milk in the EU-
27 (scenario S4 in relation to baseline scenario 
S3) and the baseline quota rent in the year 2020. 
The two lines are not perfectly matching because 
there are also other determinants than quota rent, 
including dairy industry demand elasticities, 
regional supply elasticities, but also regional 
constraints for fodder production and typical 
feeding patterns. Furthermore aggregation effects 
from regional heterogeneity also complicate 
the aggregate analysis. Nonetheless the key 
message of Figure 11 is straightforward: regional 
production impacts are crucially depending on 
the quota rent specification. 
The impacts of quota abolition on production 
are mainly attributable to changes in dairy herds 
and yield impacts, which will also be shown 
within the section on regional details later, but 
are at the same time the starting point for the 
analysis of aggregate impacts.
Table 17 indicates that the increase in cow 
milk production, on average in the EU-27 +4.4%, 
is mainly due to a change in dairy herds whereas 
milk yields are fairly stable. The increase in dairy 
herds usually translates into a modest increase 
of cattle density because other cattle types for 
fattening will not be affected a lot and suckler 
cows even decline, as calves prices are driven 
down by the additional supply from dairy cows. 
The Netherlands are a special case because cattle 
other than dairy cows have a low importance 
and suckler cows are almost missing such that 
the cattle density would increase by 12.5% 
whereas the dairy herd would increase by 20%. 
Given that environmental regulations on manure 
disposal, which are not reflected in CAPRI, could 
dampen the expansion of dairy production in the 
Netherlands the quota rent has been specified 
Figure 11: Quota abolition impacts on production of cow milk in the EU-27 and baseline quota 
rents, 2020
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to be slightly lower (28%, see Table 18) than the 
actual estimation result of UNICATT (33%). 
Table 18 reports on key drivers and 
consequences of the milk production increase 
following a quota abolition. Results indicate that 
differences of production impacts between MS 
are to a large extent driven by quota rents (see 
also Figure 11).
Increasing production exerts downward 
pressure on producer prices which are declining 
on average by 10%. As raw milk is poorly 
tradable, price formation is assumed to occur on 
the national level such that percentage changes 
in producer prices may be different between 
Member States. High production increases tend 
to trigger strong price drops but dairy markets 
are here intervening: profitability of dairies and 
hence equilibrium prices for particular delivery 
quantities also depend on changing prices 
of dairy products and on their weights in the 
national industry. Therefore a decline in raw milk 
prices can also be expected in those MS where 
production is likely to decrease. In fact declining 
dairy prices indirectly depress raw milk prices in 
the whole EU-27 and explain why production is 
declining at all in MS with zero or small positive 
rents in the baseline. 
Table 17: Changes in dairy herds, cattle density, yields, and cow milk production, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Dairy herd Cattle Yield Production Dairy herd Cattle Yield Production
[1000 hd] [LU / ha] [kg/hd] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3]
Austria 445 0.41 7170 3193 13.8 3.8 -0.3 13.5
Belgium-Lux. 524 1.19 6603 3460 11.9 2.5 0.3 12.2
Denmark 519 0.38 9092 4715 -0.3 0.4 0.2 -0.1
Finland 283 0.27 8906 2518 -3.2 -1.3 0.2 -3.0
France 3473 0.45 7244 25157 -0.3 -0.9 0.5 0.2
Germany 3887 0.47 7538 29297 6.9 3.5 0.1 7.0
Greece 128 0.09 6076 776 0.0 -1.3 0.4 0.4
Ireland 1066 1.12 5036 5369 11.1 1.4 0.4 11.6
Italy 1857 0.39 6110 11343 1.9 0.2 0.3 2.2
Netherlands 1366 1.23 8185 11179 20.0 12.5 0.5 20.5
Portugal 286 0.31 7180 2056 -0.3 -1.0 -1.1 -1.4
Spain 931 0.25 7048 6563 11.1 0.2 1.0 12.2
Sweden 360 0.31 9198 3314 -4.8 -2.2 0.2 -4.6
United Kingdom 1883 0.43 8001 15063 -5.8 -2.4 0.1 -5.7
EU15 17007 0.41 7291 124003 4.6 0.7 0.1 4.7
Cyprus 24 0.30 6304 150 -0.5 -0.4 0.1 -0.4
Czech Republic 326 0.19 8320 2713 2.7 1.0 -0.1 2.6
Estonia 98 0.20 6840 670 -0.8 0.0 0.2 -0.7
Hungary 244 0.07 7720 1882 6.1 4.0 0.1 6.2
Latvia 171 0.17 4843 827 -0.8 -0.1 0.1 -0.7
Lithuania 366 0.22 5206 1903 0.7 1.1 0.1 0.8
Malta 7 1.10 6696 44 -0.2 -0.8 0.3 0.1
Poland 2030 0.21 5577 11322 4.5 3.4 0.1 4.7
Slovac Republic 144 0.13 7194 1037 -2.0 -1.4 0.2 -1.8
Slovenia 111 0.68 6103 676 -0.4 -0.8 0.1 -0.3
10 New MS 3519 0.18 6031 21222 3.2 2.3 0.1 3.3
Bulgaria 342 0.14 3686 1260 1.4 0.9 0.5 2.0
Romania 1289 0.18 3623 4671 3.0 2.6 0.6 3.6
Bulgaria/Romania 1631 0.17 3636 5931 2.7 2.3 0.6 3.3
EU27 22157 0.35 6822 151156 4.2 1.0 0.2 4.4
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Moving to the market results for dairy 
products Table 19 shows that within each 
sub-aggregate of EU-27, that is EU-15, EU-
10 and EU-2, prices are assumed to change in 
equal percentages. This is certainly a simplifying 
assumption. However, Witzke and Tonini 
2008 (and EuroCARE 2008) also report small 
differences in price changes of dairy products 
in spite of strong differences in raw milk price 
changes because the former are well tradable 
whereas raw milk cannot be traded cheaply 
over long distances. Furthermore Réquillart et al. 
2008 report price changes between the baseline 
and their milk quota abolition scenario Q1 for 
2020, varying from -7.4% (United Kingdom) to 
-14% (Netherlands) for raw milk whereas the 
variation for butter price changes is only from 
3.4% (Sweden) to 4.8% (Netherlands) in the EU-
15. Hence the assumption of proportional price 
changes for dairy products within trading blocks is 
a simplification, but not an inadequate one. Note 
that the treatment of EU-2 as a separate modelling 
region allows prices to move a bit different from 
the EU-10 and the EU-15, but nonetheless this 
acknowledges the tariff union effect of including 
both countries in the Common Market.
Another issue that needs explanation is the 
relationship of butter prices in MS of the EU-27 
in 2020 to the effective intervention price (IP) for 
Table 18: Price changes, quota rents and cow milk production, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Quota rent Price Production
[€/t] [1000 t] [%] [% to S3] [% to S3]
Austria 282 3193 30 -12.4 13.5
Belgium-Lux. 285 3460 28 -14.3 12.2
Denmark 333 4715 9 -8.2 -0.1
Finland 379 2518 3 -4.5 -3.0
France 300 25157 13 -10.9 0.2
Germany 313 29297 18 -11.9 7.0
Greece 358 776 12 -9.5 0.4
Ireland 284 5369 21 -11.7 11.6
Italy 369 11343 14 -9.6 2.2
Netherlands 354 11179 28 -12.7 20.5
Portugal 335 2056 10 -7.1 -1.4
Spain 306 6563 22 -13.2 12.2
Sweden 341 3314 3 -5.0 -4.6
United Kingdom 278 15063 3 -4.7 -5.7
EU15 315 124003 15 -10.3 4.7
Cyprus 461 150 6 -4.4 -0.4
Czech Republic 282 2713 10 -7.3 2.6
Estonia 245 670 6 -5.4 -0.7
Hungary 270 1882 13 -8.6 6.2
Latvia 196 827 7 -5.3 -0.7
Lithuania 183 1903 10 -7.2 0.8
Malta 365 44 6 -2.6 0.1
Poland 213 11322 15 -9.3 4.7
Slovac Republic 277 1037 6 -5.6 -1.8
Slovenia 259 676 8 -6.9 -0.3
10 New MS 231 21222 12 -8.2 3.3
Bulgaria 234 1260 9 -2.5 2.0
Romania 173 4671 14 -2.2 3.6
Bulgaria/Romania 186 5931 12 -2.3 3.3
EU27 298 151156 15 -9.8 4.4
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
P ice r duction Quota rent Price Production
€/t] [1000 t] [%] [% to S3] [% to S3]
Austria 28 3193 30 -12.4 13.5
Belgium-L x. 285 3460 28 -14.3 12.2
Denmark 333 4715 9 -8.2 -0.1
Finland 379 2518 3 -4.5 -3.0
France 30 25157 13 -10.9 0.2
Germany 313 29297 18 -11.9 7.0
Greece 358 776 12 -9.5 0.4
Ireland 284 5369 21 -11.7 11.6
Italy 36 11343 14 -9.6 2.2
Netherlands 354 11179 28 -12.7 20.5
Portugal 335 2056 10 -7.1 -1.4
Spain 306 6563 22 -13.2 12.2
Sweden 341 3314 3 -5.0 -4.6
United Ki gd m 278 15063 3 -4.7 -5.7
EU15 315 124003 15 -10.3 4.7
Cyprus 461 150 6 -4.4 -0.4
Czech Republ c 282 2713 10 -7.3 2.6
Estonia 24 670 6 -5.4 -0.7
Hungary 270 1882 13 -8.6 6.2
Latvia 196 827 7 -5.3 -0.7
Lithuania 183 1903 10 -7.2 0.8
Malta 365 44 6 -2.6 0.1
Poland 213 11322 15 -9.3 4.7
Slovac Repub ic 277 1037 6 -5.6 -1.8
Slovenia 259 676 8 -6.9 -0.3
10 New MS 231 21222 12 -8.2 3.3
Bulgaria 234 1260 9 -2.5 2.0
Romania 173 4671 14 -2.2 3.6
Bulgaria/Rom nia 186 5931 12 -2.3 3.3
EU27 298 151156 15 -9.8 4.4
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Pric Production Quota rent Price Production
[€/t] [1000 t] [%] [% o S3] [% to S3]
Austria 282 3193 30 -12.4 13.5
Belgium-Lux. 285 460 28 -14.3 12.2
Denmark 3 3 4715 9 -8.2 -0.1
Finland 379 2518 3 -4.5 -3.0
France 300 25157 13 -10.9 0.2
Germany 313 2 297 18 -11.9 7.0
Greece 358 776 12 -9.5 0.4
Ireland 284 5369 21 -11.7 11.6
Italy 369 11343 14 -9.6 2.2
Netherlands 354 11179 28 -12.7 20.5
Portugal 3 5 2056 10 -7.1 -1.4
Spain 306 6563 22 -13.2 12.2
Sweden 341 3314 3 -5.0 -4.6
United Kingdom 278 15063 3 -4.7 -5.7
EU15 315 124003 15 -10. 4.7
Cyprus 461 150 6 -4.4 -0.4
Czech Republic 282 2713 10 -7. 2.6
Estonia 245 670 6 -5.4 -0.7
Hungary 270 1882 13 -8.6 6.2
Latvia 196 827 7 -5.3 -0.7
Lithuania 183 1903 10 -7.2 0.8
Malta 365 44 6 -2.6 0.1
Poland 213 11322 15 -9.3 4.7
Slovac Republic 277 1037 6 -5.6 -1.8
Slovenia 259 676 8 -6.9 -0.3
10 New MS 231 21222 12 -8. 3.3
Bulgaria 234 1260 9 -2.5 2.0
Romania 173 4671 14 -2.2 3.6
Bulgaria/Romania 186 5931 12 -2.3 3.3
EU27 298 151156 15 -9.8 4.4
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butter, which would be at 2218 €/tonne (90% of 
official IP) for the baseline. Nonetheless, Table 
19 gives market prices for Spain, UK and several 
NMS in 2020 of slightly less than 2200 €/tonne 
in the baseline which should even decline further 
by 7-9% as a consequence of the quota abolition. 
However, these baseline prices for butter are not 
strictly comparable since the effective intervention 
price holds for qualities meeting the intervention 
criteria whereas the national butter prices in CAPRI 
are mainly derived from Eurostat price time series 
(PRAG domain) and their exact definition is only 
implicit in the statistical data collection processes 
of each MS. Hence intervention for butter is 
currently not triggered if a particular national 
market price ‘hits’ the effective intervention price. 
It is, therefore, possible to have national prices 
below effective intervention prices in the model 
and this does not affect the correct representation 
of the intervention mechanism.
Instead, changes in intervention stocks are 
triggered in the EU-15 in line with developments 
in the difference between the EU-15 market 
price and the effective intervention price. This 
implies first that (in the current CAPRI version) 
intervention only responds to the EU-15 market 
prices (rather than national prices). Secondly it 
Table 19: Market results of quota abolition: butter, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [  to S3]
Austria 3282 22 36 -14 -6.7 1.1 2.2 -0.6
Belgium-Lux. 2499 125 110 16 -6.7 11.6 6.5  +7.3
Denmark 2947 89 76 13 -6.7 -0.9 11.2 -9.3
Finland 2348 46 32 14 -6.7 -5.1 1.4 -2.8
France 3512 368 502 -133 -6.7 -2.0 0.8 -11.4
Germany 2649 389 479 -91 -6.7 8.4 2.0  +22.9
Greece 4177 1 9 -8 -6.7 4.9 1.3 -0.1
Ireland 2874 152 14 138 -6.7 10.7 3.9  +15.8
Italy 2946 137 169 -32 -6.7 0.1 0.8 -1.2
Netherlands 2272 215 154 61 -6.7 18.7 1.1  +38.5
Portugal 3007 28 14 14 -6.7 -5.1 1.4 -1.7
Spain 2164 35 38 -3 -6.7 5.3 1.4  +1.3
Sweden 2801 37 32 5 -6.7 -12.7 1.2 -5.1
United Kingdom 2190 104 171 -67 -6.7 -4.3 1.3 -6.7
EU15 2804 1750 1837 -87 -7.3 4.9 2.1  +47.0
Cyprus 3845 0 1 -1 -8.7 0.0 0.8 -0.0
Czech Republic 2474 41 40 1 -8.7 2.8 1.0  +0.7
Estonia 1909 5 4 1 -8.7 2.3 1.1  +0.1
Hungary 2403 3 8 -5 -8.7 -0.2 1.0 -0.1
Latvia 1671 7 5 2 -8.7 0.2 1.0 -0.0
Lithuania 2232 10 6 3 -8.7 -12.7 0.9 -1.3
Malta 3149 0 0 0 -8.7 0.0 0.1 -0.0
Poland 2185 118 108 10 -8.7 3.3 1.0  +2.8
Slovac Republic 2563 9 8 2 -8.7 2.7 1.0  +0.2
Slovenia 2289 4 2 2 -8.7 6.4 1.0  +0.2
10 New MS 2249 197 182 14 -8.7 2.3 1.0  +2.6
Bulgaria 1794 3 4 -1 0.0 1.8 0.0  +0.1
Romania 1987 9 8 1 0.0 -0.9 0.0 -0.1
Bulgaria/Romania 1940 12 12 0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.0
EU27 2743 1959 2032 -73 -7.3 4.6 2.0  +49.6
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implies that the reference point for the change in 
intervention activity is a relative one rather than an 
absolute one. The relative reference point permits 
to accommodate differences in definitions of EU 
market prices and effective intervention prices. 
In the base period 2004 (three-year average) the 
EU-15 market price for butter was 2970 €/tonne 
whereas the effective intervention price was at 
2747 €/tonne (difference = 223 €/tonne) and 
intervention stocks were at 190 000 tonnes. In 
the baseline this difference improves to 2729 – 
2218 = 511 €/tonne, giving a strongly reduced 
intervention stock of 11000 tonnes. The price 
drop under abolition of quotas decreases the 
difference to 2559 – 2218 = 341 €/tonne which 
causes intervention stocks to slightly increase to 
16000 tonnes. Intervention stocks would have 
increased stronger (in a nonlinear way) had the 
price change been stronger. They would approach 
the base year value if the simulated difference 
of the EU-15 market prices and the effective 
intervention price had been similar to the base 
year value (223 €/tonne). 
Whereas intervention activity thus remains 
quite unimportant after the quota abolition, this 
does not apply to export subsidies for butter. 
Export subsidies at 376 m € in the base year, 
would drop to 10 m € in the baseline but increase 
again to 75 m € after the abolition of milk quotas, 
in order to limit the decline in EU butter prices. 
Export subsidies are represented in the model 
similarly than intervention stocks. Once the model 
is calibrated to the export subsidies observed in 
the base year, per unit export subsidies hence 
increase in the baseline if market prices increase 
or export unit values drop, or if the share of 
subsidised exports on total exports increase.
In contrast to price changes there are 
remarkable differences in dairy production 
impacts between various MS. One of the drivers 
for differences in the production of dairy products 
is of course the different production increase 
at the level of raw milk. Dairy outputs have to 
increase in such an amount that milk fat and 
protein balances are maintained in equilibrium. 
In this framework some changes in specialisation 
are possible and partly needed to close the (linear) 
balances. As can be seen in Table 19 to Table 23, 
price changes differ between dairy products such 
that dairies will try to shift the product mix. This 
may not be entirely surprising, given that milk fat 
and protein balances also reflect the differences 
in initial composition and some differences in 
contents of raw milk and dairy products across 
MS which renders the comparison of equilibrium 
outcomes across countries quite complex. 
Changes in dairy output quantities may differ 
therefore from the percentage change in raw 
milk processing. As an example it may be seen in 
Table 19 that butter production increases more in 
Belgium-Luxembourg than in Spain even though 
the increase in raw milk production is nearly the 
same in both countries. On the EU average butter 
production is increasing slightly stronger (+4.6%) 
than the increase in raw milk production (+4.4%)
Table 19 further indicates that butter prices are 
declining by about 7% in the EU-1520 and 9% in 
the NMS. This stimulates some increase in demand 
which is typically about 1.5% in the EU-15, as 
demand elasticities for butter are low (around 0.3 
in the EU-15 MS) and consumer prices decline by 
2-3 percentage points less due to fixed margins. 
There are however some particular cases (especially 
Denmark) where non-negligible quantities of butter 
are reused in dairies which are assumed to respond 
more elastically to price changes and increase the 
average response in the EU-15. Production and 
demand changes are predicted to be smaller in 
the NMS, with +2.3% in the EU-12 and +1.8% in 
Bulgaria but -0,9% in Rumania. 
20 Readers may wonder why the EU-15 average price is 
declining by 7.3% whereas prices in each MS of the 
EU-15 are only declining by 6.7%. This occurs when 
aggregating prices, since high production increases 
occur in Belgium-Luxembourg, Germany and the 
Netherlands, all countries with clearly below average 
prices in the EU-15. Their implicit weights in the EU-15 
average are thus increasing which drives down the EU-
15 average by more than 6.7%. 
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Net imports of butter would strongly decrease 
to (-73 000 + 50 000) -23 000 tonnes in the EU-27 
as a consequence of the abolition of quotas. This 
effect is almost exclusively originating in the EU-
15 whereas net trade of EU-10 and EU-2 would be 
hardly affected with the exception of Poland. 
Production of SMP increases by 6.2% according 
to the CAPRI simulations in the EU-27 which is 
the total from a stronger increase in the EU-15, a 
moderate increase in the NMS and small changes 
in the EU-2. In line with the stronger production 
increase in the EU-15 prices would decrease there 
by about 6% whereas prices would only decline 
by about 4% in the NMS. Demand is increasing 
moderately in response to these price changes in 
the EU-15, but demand would grow more sizeably 
in Denmark and Italy. In both countries SMP is 
nearly completely used in the feed sector which 
is furthermore more responsive to price changes 
than in other countries. On the EU-27 average the 
increase in demand (4.4%) is smaller than the 
increase in supply. Net exports would moderately 
increase therefore by about 20000 tonnes compared 
to the baseline (cf. Table 20).
As for the other bulk products WMP 
production would increase slightly more (+4.7% 
Table 20: Market results of quota abolition: SMP, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [  to S3]
Austria 2601 5 3 2 -6.3 8.5 5.1  +0.3
Belgium-Lux. 2733 99 58 41 -6.3 18.5 3.3  +16.3
Denmark 2376 22 11 11 -6.3 4.1 13.4 -0.6
Finland 2632 28 26 3 -6.3 -6.2 2.2 -2.3
France 2385 147 165 -18 -6.3 9.7 3.8  +7.9
Germany 2609 193 125 68 -6.3 7.8 3.0  +11.3
Greece 2588 0 2 -2 -6.3 1.6 -0.0
Ireland 2587 48 22 26 -6.3 10.8 4.7  +4.1
Italy 2376 0 102 -102 -6.3 0.0 11.2 -11.5
Netherlands 2475 50 143 -92 -6.3 6.6 5.8 -4.9
Portugal 2586 5 11 -5 -6.3 1.5 2.5 -0.2
Spain 2564 9 14 -6 -6.3 29.5 1.8  +2.3
Sweden 2584 29 30 -1 -6.3 -9.7 1.6 -3.3
United Kingdom 2697 79 87 -8 -6.3 -9.4 1.2 -8.5
EU15 2571 714 799 -85 -6.3 6.7 4.6  +11.0
Cyprus 1303 0 0 0 -3.5 0.0  +0.0
Czech Republic 2172 25 4 21 -3.5 3.7 1.0  +0.9
Estonia 1593 8 3 4 -3.5 1.9 1.1  +0.1
Hungary 2191 7 2 6 -3.5 8.8 1.0  +0.6
Latvia 2859 1 0 0 -3.5 -9.1 2.1 -0.1
Lithuania 2503 9 0 9 -3.5 -10.0 8.0 -0.9
Malta 2766 4 2 1 -3.5 0.0 2.3 -0.1
Poland 1523 148 27 121 -3.5 6.2 1.1  +8.9
Slovac Republic 2516 10 5 4 -3.5 -0.7 2.2 -0.2
Slovenia 1303 1 0 1 -3.5 18.9  +0.2
10 New MS 1719 213 44 168 -4.0 4.7 1.3  +9.5
Bulgaria 1619 4 9 -5 -3.1 2.6 2.0 -0.1
Romania 2676 1 6 -5 -3.1 -7.1 3.8 -0.3
Bulgaria/Romania 1803 5 15 -10 -3.9 0.9 2.7 -0.3
EU27 2373 932 859 74 -5.8 6.2 4.4  +20.2
55
R
eg
io
na
l E
co
no
m
ic
 A
na
ly
si
s 
of
 M
ilk
 Q
uo
ta
 R
ef
or
m
 in
 t
he
 E
U
in the EU-27) than the increase in raw milk 
production (+4.4%). The total effect is the net 
effect of a stronger increase in the EU-15, a 
moderate expansion in the EU-10 and a decline 
in Romania. Prices are projected to decline 
by 6.7% in the EU-15 which is similar to the 
changes projected for butter and SMP. In the EU-
10 they also decline by about 6% whereas the 
EU-2 is projected to see a more moderate price 
drop. Demand is increasing by 2.5% in the EU-
27 as elasticities are only around 0.4 in the EU-
15 MS. With production increase exceeding the 
growth in demand, net trade may be projected to 
increase giving additional net exports of 24300 
tonnes according to the CAPRI simulation on the 
EU-27 level (cf. Table 21.
Cheese production is increasing less than 
the production of bulk products, i.e. only 1.3% 
in the EU-27 and slightly more in the EU-15. The 
difference to the bulk products may be explained 
by a greater importance of raw product costs 
for the former. A certain decline in the price of 
milk fat and protein will trigger a large increase 
in production if the share of milk fat and protein 
value in the product price is high but, for cheese 
a greater part of the cost is due to other costs. 
In spite of a small change in production, cheese 
Table 21: Market results of quota abolition: whole milk powder, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [  to S3]
Austria 2937 1 2 -1 -6.7 4.6 9.0 -0.1
Belgium-Lux. 3236 94 49 45 -6.7 2.4 2.3  +1.1
Denmark 2848 90 16 74 -6.7 3.5 2.1  +2.8
Finland 2917 2 2 0 -6.7 -3.2 1.5 -0.1
France 2869 189 48 141 -6.7 7.1 3.1  +12.0
Germany 3089 111 104 7 -6.7 8.2 2.6  +6.4
Greece 2874 0 21 -21 -6.7 2.3 -0.5
Ireland 2925 41 12 29 -6.7 13.2 1.1  +5.3
Italy 3057 0 38 -38 -6.7 2.6 -1.0
Netherlands 2895 83 23 60 -6.7 6.3 4.3  +4.2
Portugal 2866 12 10 3 -6.7 1.1 2.5 -0.1
Spain 2888 10 14 -4 -6.7 21.6 2.5  +1.8
Sweden 2842 17 21 -4 -6.7 -8.2 2.2 -1.9
United Kingdom 2880 65 84 -19 -6.7 -7.1 2.7 -6.9
EU15 2956 715 443 272 -6.7 4.9 2.7  +23.0
Cyprus 3973 0 1 -1 -5.8 5.0 -0.1
Czech Republic 2573 14 4 10 -5.8 3.1 1.4  +0.4
Estonia 1688 8 2 6 -5.8 1.3 1.4  +0.1
Hungary 2659 1 2 -1 -5.8 -4.1 1.6 -0.1
Latvia 2044 0 0 0 -5.8 0.0 1.9 -0.0
Lithuania 2347 0 1 0 -5.8 0.0 2.2 -0.0
Malta 3017 3 1 2 -5.8 0.0 1.4 -0.0
Poland 1725 40 43 -3 -5.8 6.5 1.6  +1.9
Slovac Republic 3200 6 7 -1 -5.8 -7.3 1.5 -0.5
Slovenia 2265 0 0 0 -5.8 0.0 0.0  +0.0
10 New MS 2032 72 60 11 -6.6 3.7 1.6  +1.7
Bulgaria 1897 0 3 -3 -2.3 0.0 1.6 -0.0
Romania 2772 9 10 -1 -2.3 -2.8 1.7 -0.4
Bulgaria/Romania 2771 9 13 -4 -2.3 -2.8 1.6 -0.4
EU27 2874 795 516 279 -6.7 4.7 2.5  +24.3
56
4.
  E
co
no
m
ic
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
m
ilk
 q
uo
ta
 a
bo
lit
io
n
prices would decline by about 5% in MS of the 
EU-15 and 3% in the EU-12 which stimulates a 
moderate increase in demand for cheese. Net 
exports of the EU-27 would increase by about 
33000 tonnes as the small increase in demand 
falls short of the growth in supply (cf. Table 22).
Fresh milk products are affected in a quite 
similar way as cheese by the abolition of milk 
quotas. Production would increase modestly 
(+0.8 for the EU-27), whereas prices would drop 
more sizably (-4% in the EU-27). As demand 
changes are clearly smaller than the growth in 
supply, net imports of fresh milk products would 
decline (by about 25300 tonnes) (cf. Table 23).
Dairy markets are related to meat markets 
over several channels. In the cattle sector an 
expansion of the dairy herd will directly give 
some meat from old cows and render young 
animals cheaper but it also means increased 
competition for fodder. On the demand side 
substitution with dairy products, benefiting from 
a decline of consumer prices, may be expected to 
reduce demand for meats. 
The net impact of increased availability of 
calves and reinforced competition for fodder 
seems to have a very small expansionary effect 
on supply, except for the Netherlands where it is 
sizeable. In Table 17 it is shown that the increase 
Table 22: Market results of quota abolition: cheese, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [  to S3]
Austria 4588 145 197 -52 -5.0 4.0 1.4  +3.1
Belgium-Lux. 3113 67 287 -220 -5.0 15.1 1.5  +5.7
Denmark 4293 355 176 179 -5.0 -4.4 0.6 -16.6
Finland 3412 125 108 17 -5.0 -2.9 1.0 -4.7
France 5001 1994 1785 209 -5.0 -8.0 1.4 -185.5
Germany 3456 2215 1837 378 -5.0 3.4 1.1  +56.4
Greece 5651 278 340 -62 -5.0 -2.6 0.8 -9.8
Ireland 5006 133 54 79 -5.0 5.7 0.5  +7.4
Italy 5249 1440 1314 126 -5.0 0.2 0.9 -8.2
Netherlands 3416 773 448 326 -5.0 26.5 1.0  +200.8
Portugal 4568 77 126 -49 -5.0 -0.8 0.9 -1.8
Spain 4567 397 513 -116 -5.0 8.6 0.9  +29.2
Sweden 4130 130 208 -79 -5.0 -7.8 0.6 -11.4
United Kingdom 4178 344 652 -308 -5.0 -7.1 1.1 -31.9
EU15 4368 8474 8046 428 -6.0 1.4 1.1  +32.7
Cyprus 6320 14 16 -2 -3.1 1.2 0.3  +0.1
Czech Republic 3829 152 165 -14 -3.1 2.5 0.4  +3.1
Estonia 3123 30 24 6 -3.1 -3.6 0.6 -1.2
Hungary 3832 81 66 14 -3.1 10.4 0.8  +7.9
Latvia 2912 50 32 18 -3.1 -2.2 0.9 -1.4
Lithuania 2476 123 48 75 -3.1 -0.1 0.5 -0.3
Malta 5042 5 11 -6 -3.1 1.2 0.4  +0.0
Poland 2725 761 589 173 -3.1 -0.2 0.8 -6.7
Slovac Republic 4459 41 39 2 -3.1 -2.6 1.1 -1.5
Slovenia 3649 28 25 2 -3.1 2.5 0.3  +0.6
10 New MS 3038 1284 1016 268 -2.8 0.6 0.7  +0.6
Bulgaria 2963 85 74 12 -1.7 0.1 0.6 -0.3
Romania 2859 54 62 -8 -1.7 1.1 0.4  +0.3
Bulgaria/Romania 2923 139 135 4 -1.7 0.5 0.5  +0.0
EU27 4176 9897 9198 700 -5.6 1.3 1.0  +33.3
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in the dairy herd in the Netherlands (+20%) is 
the strongest in the EU-15. At the same time the 
suckler cow herd would only be 7% of dairy cows 
in the Netherlands whereas in Austria (where the 
dairy herd size is increasing by 14%) there are 
about as many suckler cows as dairy cows such 
that a decline in suckler cows may compensate 
the expansionary effects from the dairy cow herd 
to a large extent. Nonetheless there would be a 
decline of beef prices of about 2.8% in the EU-15 
MS which stimulates demand. In those NMS with 
a declining dairy herd, supply side effects would 
be negative whereas in others, most importantly 
Poland, there would be an increase in supply 
giving a total increase for the EU-10 of 0.6% 
(Table 17). Prices in NMS are declining similar to 
the EU-15. Net imports of the EU-27, dominated 
by the EU-15, are likely to decline to a small 
extent (by 27000 tonnes), as production growth 
would exceed the aggregate growth in demand 
on the EU-27 level.
Sheep and goat production is linked to the 
cattle sector over some competition for fodder 
which tends to decline production if the cattle 
sector is expanding. Demand is also declining 
due to substitution effects from beef meat as 
a consequence of the decline in beef prices. 
Table 23: Market results of quota abolition: fresh milk products, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [  to S3]
Austria 620 966 762 204 -3.6 18.1 0.4  +171.5
Belgium-Lux. 673 1388 1002 386 -3.6 3.5 0.5  +44.1
Denmark 695 641 765 -124 -3.6 -1.7 0.4 -14.0
Finland 718 826 713 113 -3.6 -6.8 0.5 -59.5
France 821 6638 6418 220 -3.6 1.0 1.1 -3.7
Germany 621 10528 7665 2863 -3.6 5.8 0.7  +552.9
Greece 961 612 829 -217 -3.6 -2.1 0.4 -16.6
Ireland 758 569 939 -370 -3.6 7.3 0.7  +35.0
Italy 1063 2777 3661 -884 -3.6 -6.4 0.8 -207.5
Netherlands 695 1558 2167 -609 -3.6 -5.6 0.5 -97.7
Portugal 802 1014 1265 -251 -3.6 -5.4 0.6 -63.2
Spain 749 4809 5592 -782 -3.6 6.8 0.6  +292.1
Sweden 738 1284 1406 -122 -3.6 -4.0 0.4 -57.1
United Kingdom 851 6535 7660 -1125 -3.6 -7.9 0.6 -558.3
EU15 761 40143 40843 -701 -4.2 0.7 0.7  +18.0
Cyprus 845 93 104 -11 -3.8 -8.8 0.5 -8.7
Czech Republic 589 629 717 -88 -3.8 -1.9 0.6 -16.5
Estonia 517 241 179 62 -3.8 -3.2 0.7 -9.1
Hungary 577 826 793 32 -3.8 -0.4 0.7 -8.3
Latvia 451 109 92 17 -3.8 -4.2 0.7 -5.2
Lithuania 695 356 321 35 -3.8 -7.1 1.1 -29.0
Malta 524 32 38 -6 -3.8 -10.8 0.6 -3.7
Poland 313 3524 3634 -110 -3.8 4.9 0.7  +144.3
Slovac Republic 584 430 292 138 -3.8 -6.0 0.6 -27.7
Slovenia 538 363 266 97 -3.8 -7.4 0.7 -28.8
10 New MS 441 6602 6436 166 -5.1 0.8 0.7  +7.3
Bulgaria 589 161 154 7 -0.9 0.0 0.0  +0.0
Romania 637 226 233 -6 -0.9 0.1 0.1 -0.0
Bulgaria/Romania 617 387 387 0 -0.9 0.1 0.1  +0.0
EU27 715 47132 47666 -534 -4.3 0.8 0.7  +25.3
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As supply side impacts seem to be somewhat 
stronger, prices of sheep and goat meat may be 
expected to slightly increase when comparing 
scenario S4 with S3 (cf. Table 25).
Supply side impacts of the quota abolition 
are expected to be very small for pork and poultry. 
Substitution effects on the demand side are not 
much larger either. The net effect on prices is 
slightly negative for pork and poultry meat. 
As impacts on supply and demand are very 
small net trade would not be affected significantly 
either, with net exports of pork and poultry meat 
each growing by some 10000 tonnes.
An expansion of the cattle sector will have an 
impact on fodder demand which was mentioned 
above as channel for interrelationships among 
animal activities. These impacts on fodder 
production are shown in Table 28.
First of all it may be seen that net trade in 
fodder is usually equal to zero because this is quite 
bulky material. The exceptions visible in Table 28 
are trade of straw which is of little economic and 
nutritional value. Higher value fodder items include 
some fodder from arable land but also grass which 
is exogenous in total area. It may be seen that 
production is increasing by 1% or more in those 
EU-15 MS with strongly increasing milk production 
Table 24: Market results of quota abolition: beef, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [  to S3]
Austria 3998 170 146 24 -2.8 2.1 0.5  +3.0
Belgium-Lux. 4163 246 189 57 -2.8 2.3 0.5  +4.9
Denmark 2644 107 161 -54 -2.8 1.3 0.4  +0.7
Finland 3228 64 89 -25 -2.8 -0.3 0.3 -0.5
France 4881 1466 1638 -172 -2.8 -0.3 0.2 -7.6
Germany 3069 1017 858 159 -2.8 2.8 0.3  +25.8
Greece 6323 39 182 -143 -2.8 0.4 0.8 -1.3
Ireland 3296 514 85 429 -2.8 0.7 0.6  +3.3
Italy 4592 865 1332 -467 -2.8 -0.1 0.4 -5.5
Netherlands 4711 272 379 -107 -2.8 8.9 0.4  +22.5
Portugal 4982 94 195 -101 -2.8 0.1 0.4 -0.7
Spain 4073 618 741 -122 -2.8 0.8 0.7 -0.5
Sweden 3654 120 240 -121 -2.8 -1.2 0.4 -2.4
United Kingdom 4123 725 1354 -628 -2.8 -1.0 0.8 -18.1
EU15 4128 6316 7588 -1271 -2.9 0.9 0.5  +23.6
Cyprus 3541 4 7 -3 -2.7 -0.6 0.2 -0.0
Czech Republic 2007 76 77 -1 -2.7 -0.1 0.5 -0.5
Estonia 1460 15 13 2 -2.7 0.1 0.6 -0.1
Hungary 2814 37 37 0 -2.7 3.1 1.7  +0.5
Latvia 1873 16 15 1 -2.7 0.6 0.4  +0.0
Lithuania 1687 37 37 0 -2.7 0.9 0.2  +0.3
Malta 3737 1 13 -12 -2.7 -2.3 0.2 -0.1
Poland 2166 319 269 50 -2.7 1.1 0.2  +3.0
Slovac Republic 3649 36 43 -6 -2.7 -2.4 1.4 -1.4
Slovenia 2895 50 56 -6 -2.7 -1.4 0.6 -1.0
10 New MS 2296 590 566 24 -2.9 0.6 0.5  +0.7
Bulgaria 4231 49 55 -6 -2.1 0.5 1.6 -0.6
Romania 2982 205 187 19 -2.1 2.4 0.8  +3.3
Bulgaria/Romania 3220 255 242 13 -2.1 2.0 1.0  +2.7
EU27 3945 7161 8396 -1234 -2.8 0.9 0.5  +27.0
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which drives up demand for fodder. Spain is an 
exception to this rule, as the whole cattle density 
only increases by 0.2% in this country (cf. Table 
17), mainly because the important suckler cow 
herd declines sizeably in Spain. Conversely fodder 
production is stagnating or slightly declining where 
the cattle density would decrease sizeably (by 1 % 
at least, as in Finland, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, 
UK, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, cf. Table 17). If 
the change in the cattle density resulting from the 
quota abolition is very small (less than 0.5%) other 
drivers other than fodder demand may modify the 
direction of change. In particular it can be seen 
in Table 29 that demand and prices of cereals are 
also increasing which compete with fodder on 
arable land. 
Greece and Cyprus are especially interesting 
cases to comment on. In Greece we see the 
strongest decline in fodder production (-0.6%) 
even though the decline in the cattle density is 
moderate only (-1.1%) and milk production is 
even increasing (+0.4%). However, whereas cow 
milk production and fodder production declines 
in several regions, the dominating producer region 
is slightly expanding both in cow milk production 
and fodder production. This is, thus, an example 
with exceptional regional heterogeneity which 
may give surprising changes at the national level. 
Cyprus is the country with the strongest increase 
in fodder production but it is also the country with 
the lowest importance for fodder in feed ratios 
(5% of feed energy from fodder vs. 44% in the 
EU-27) and in total area use (16% vs. 45% in the 
EU-27). The large impact on fodder production 
thus has only limited importance for total 
agriculture in Cyprus. A more detailed analysis is 
given in the section on regional impacts. In line 
Table 25: Market results of quota abolition: sheep and goat meat, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [  to S3]
EU15 5182 814 1441 -627 0.3 -0.8 -0.4 -0.3
10 New MS 3429 32 32 0 1.1 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1
Bulgaria/Romania 2891 171 119 53 0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4
EU27 4741 1018 1592 -574 0.3 -0.8 -0.4 -0.8
Table 27: Market results of quota abolition: poultry, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [  to S3]
EU15 1787 11034 10445 589 -0.5 0.0 -0.1  +13.3
10 New MS 1597 2570 2186 384 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -5.0
Bulgaria/Romania 1422 187 659 -472 0.3 -0.6 -0.4  +1.8
EU27 1747 13791 13290 501 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2  +10.1
Table 26: Market results of quota abolition: pork, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [  to S3]
EU15 1788 19642 16464 3178 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3  +9.0
10 New MS 1648 3498 3448 50 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -1.0
Bulgaria/Romania 1446 397 831 -434 0.7 -0.6 -0.5  +1.5
EU27 1761 23538 20744 2794 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3  +9.6
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with the increase in fodder, demand fodder prices 
are usually increasing.
If production of fodder is increasing, this 
will usually also involve an increase of fodder 
on arable land at the expense of other uses of 
land. Among those other uses, cereals are most 
frequently occupying the largest part of arable 
land such that indirect impacts from scarce 
area are best visible here. On the other hand 
cereals are the most important tradable feedstuff 
which may be expected to increase in demand 
if production of milk and beef is dominating the 
decline in pork and poultry production. 
Negative impacts on cereal production 
through competition with arable fodder for scarce 
land appear to be quite small except in Belgium-
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ireland. Demand 
changes are quite heterogeneous and depend on the 
importance of different types of animal production. 
On average demand is increasing slightly which 
tends to increase market prices (cf. Table 29)21.
21 Note that the differences in price changes among 
different MS are not due to the specific market situation 
simulated for these MS. As was the case for dairy 
products it is assumed that prices change proportionally 
within trade blocks (EU-15, EU-10, EU-2). But the price 
change of ‘cereals’ in each country is the weighted 
average of changes for each particular cereal (soft 
wheat, durum, barley etc.) which would see somewhat 
different price changes each.
Table 28: Market results of quota abolition: fodder, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [  to S3]
Austria 11 49081 49081 0 0.6 0.7 0.7
Belgium-Lux. 18 35455 35455 0 0.2 1.3 1.3
Denmark 16 31556 24860 6696 0.3 0.5 0.5  +27.2
Finland 45 14286 14286 0 0.6 0.0 0.0
France 13 377326 377326 0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Germany 16 273290 273290 0 0.6 0.6 0.6
Greece 18 18310 18310 0 0.1 -0.6 -0.6
Ireland 5 151557 151557 0 0.6 1.1 1.1
Italy 17 98334 98334 0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Netherlands 11 57116 57116 0 1.1 5.5 5.5
Portugal 8 30707 30707 0 -0.6 0.3 0.3
Spain 4 157968 157968 0 0.5 0.1 0.1
Sweden 15 43985 43985 0 0.4 0.1 0.1
United Kingdom 1 349865 349865 0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
EU15 10 1688836 1682140 6696 0.5 0.5 0.5  +27.2
Cyprus 65 313 229 84 6.0 7.6 10.4  +0.1
Czech Republic 10 26006 26006 0 0.4 0.4 0.4
Estonia 6 9367 8778 589 1.0 1.6 1.6  +4.9
Hungary 5 28146 28146 0 0.9 0.7 0.7
Latvia 4 15782 14763 1019 0.8 0.4 0.4  +3.0
Lithuania 5 27287 24884 2403 0.6 1.3 1.3  +41.2
Malta 57 58 58 1 3.0 0.4 0.4 -0.0
Poland 8 97367 97367 0 0.9 0.7 0.7
Slovac Republic 4 13982 13982 0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Slovenia 28 6580 6421 159 0.3 0.0 0.0  +0.1
10 New MS 8 224887 220633 4255 0.8 0.7 0.7  +49.3
Bulgaria 3 28416 28416 0 1.8 0.3 0.3
Romania 16 112497 112497 0 3.8 0.2 0.2
Bulgaria/Romania 14 140913 140913 0 3.7 0.2 0.2
EU27 10 2054636 2043686 10951 0.7 0.5 0.5  +76.5
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4.2.3 Regional effects from a European 
perspective
In this section regional differences on MS 
level will be investigated in more detail. Since 
milk quota abolition will immediately affect milk 
production this will be analysed first, followed by 
an analysis of impacts regarding the beef sector. 
Finally changes in the land allocation caused by 
adjustments in the fodder production area will be 
discussed.
The results presented in the following 
figures refer to percentage changes of regional 
milk production comparing the quota abolition 
scenario S4 against the baseline scenario S3. In 
order to evaluate the bandwidth of effects, the 
frequency of regions with dairy cow herd changes 
is calculated within certain clusters. Figure 12 
shows that most of the European regions would 
expand their dairy herds as a consequence of 
quota abolition. Almost 70% of the regions 
show an increase in dairy cow herds. Strongly 
increasing dairy herds of more then 16% can 
be observed in about 10% of the regional units. 
Around 17% of the regional units decrease their 
dairy cow herds quite significantly by more than 
-4% in this simulation. 
Table 29: Market results of quota abolition: cereals, 2020
Baseline (S3) Abolition (S4)
Price Production Demand Net trade Price Production Demand Net trade
[€/t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [  to S3]
Austria 107 5176 5110 50 0.3 0.1 3.3 -162.1
Belgium-Lux. 131 3054 5943 -2913 0.1 -1.2 1.1 -97.9
Denmark 124 8216 8813 -623 0.3 0.4 -0.4  +62.4
Finland 102 3958 3294 662 0.4 0.1 -1.5  +53.9
France 132 69989 33630 35979 0.2 0.1 -0.5  +236.0
Germany 123 54465 45717 8493 0.3 0.1 1.3 -540.9
Greece 192 3885 5937 -2065 0.2 1.5 -1.1  +121.1
Ireland 105 2444 3230 -799 0.3 -0.8 4.5 -165.2
Italy 171 19787 27639 -7920 0.2 0.2 -0.1  +63.0
Netherlands 136 2082 8832 -6767 0.3 -1.7 5.6 -526.6
Portugal 159 1331 4631 -3301 0.2 0.3 -0.6  +34.2
Spain 146 20890 29827 -8981 0.3 0.2 0.0  +48.1
Sweden 118 5007 4520 462 0.3 0.5 -1.1  +70.7
United Kingdom 139 26859 22604 4066 0.2 0.1 -1.6  +387.1
EU15 134 227142 209727 16342 0.3 0.1 0.3 -416.4
Cyprus 220 104 896 -793 0.4 0.1 -1.9  +17.3
Czech Republic 126 4136 4546 -414 0.2 0.3 0.3 -1.1
Estonia 92 696 671 24 0.2 0.8 -1.7  +16.7
Hungary 119 14306 10433 3872 0.2 0.1 0.3 -14.1
Latvia 99 1216 943 273 0.1 0.2 -1.0  +12.6
Lithuania 105 2894 1906 988 -0.2 1.6 0.3  +39.3
Malta 111 1 180 -180 -0.1 -0.3 -1.0  +1.8
Poland 96 31900 29842 2058 0.2 0.1 0.6 -136.5
Slovac Republic 114 3449 2648 801 0.2 0.5 -0.4  +27.7
Slovenia 123 650 887 -237 0.2 0.1 -1.0  +9.1
10 New MS 106 59351 52953 6391 0.2 0.2 0.3 -27.1
Bulgaria 101 6232 6082 150 1.4 0.3 -1.7  +122.7
Romania 154 20612 17543 3070 2.4 0.7 0.7  +25.8
Bulgaria/Romania 142 26844 23624 3220 2.1 0.6 0.1  +148.5
EU27 130 313338 286304 25953 0.4 0.2 0.3 -295.0
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Figure 13 visualises the regional effects, i.e. 
the percentage change in milk production in the 
quota abolition scenario on a NUTS 2 level. As 
mentioned in earlier sections some countries 
like Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands 
and Spain increase their milk production 
significantly, and as can be seen in Figure 13 
that overall there is little heterogeneity among 
their sub regions. It becomes also visible that 
several countries of the EU-12 would decrease 
Figure 12: Frequency of changes in dairy cow herds 
Figure 13: Percentage change of milk production in European regions
㰀 ⴀ㔀─                        ⴀ㔀─ ⴀ 　─                  　─ ⴀ ⬀㔀─               ⬀㔀─ ⴀ ⬀㄀㔀─                㸀 ⬀㄀㔀─    
搢ⴀ㠀─ ⴀ㠀─ ⴀ 　─                 　─ ⴀ 㠀─                 㠀─ ⴀ ㄀㘀─                  攢㄀㘀─
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their milk production slightly (compare Table 
18). Again there is only moderate heterogeneity 
among the sub regions in the EU-12. On 
the other hand, in bigger MS like Germany, 
France and the UK there are quite significant 
differences within the countries. In Germany 
a significant reduction of milk production is 
expected for the eastern part, while most of the 
remaining regions expand their production, for 
most parts quite significantly. On average the 
German milk production moderately increases. 
In the UK an overall reduction of milk supply 
can be observed, whereas this decline is more 
considerable in the southern part than in the 
north. Finally it may be seen that the increase 
in the Netherlands is quite exceptional on 
the MS level but that some other regions are 
responding in a similar way.
Figure 14 visualises the percentage changes 
in beef supply per region. It is evident that the 
overall change in beef production is closely 
correlated to the change in milk supply, although 
the magnitude of effects is smaller and it also 
depends on conditions such as the size of the 
suckler cow herd.
The whole cattle sector is affected by 
changes in dairy herds in many ways: 
– Beef price: Dairy cows themselves produce 
beef. Hence, changes in dairy herds can 
directly affect the supply and price of beef. 
– Supply and value of calves: Calves are “by 
products” of dairy production. Increasing 
dairy herds could lead to declining prices 
for calves which reduces the profitability of 
suckler cows but at the same time fattening 
activities become more profitable.
– Competition for fodder: Beef meat activities – 
fattening of bulls, heifers and calves as well 
as suckler cows – compete with dairy cows 
for regional feed resources. This would result 
in opposite effects in beef and dairy sectors. 
When dairy cow herds increase, the value of 
fodder produced in the regions increase and 
beef production lose in profitability. This effect 
is moderated when tradable feedstuff can be 
adopted or fodder areas can be adjusted.
The previous considerations reveal that the 
interdependencies among cattle activities can lead 
to parallel as well as antagonistic changes in dairy 
Figure 14: Percentage change in regional beef meat production (including beef from dairy cows)
搢ⴀ㈀─ ⴀ㈀─ ⴀ 　─                   　─ ⴀ ㈀─               ㈀⸀─ ⴀ 㔀─                    㸀㔀─ 
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and beef meat activities. Looking at herd sizes of 
dairy and beef producing activities (see Figure 
15) there appears to be a negative correlation, 
suggestion that competition for fodder is often 
the dominating relationship. Again effects on the 
production level of beef meat activities may be 
seen to be smaller compared to the dairy herds.
Calculating the frequency of regions 
changing their beef meat herds within a certain 
Figure 15: Development of dairy and beef meat herds 
Note: the left map shows dairy cow herds (Ø change for the EU-27 +4.2%) and the right map shows suckler cows (Ø change for the 
EU-27 -4.4%)
Figure 16: Frequency of changes in beef producing activities (herd size)
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cluster reveals that in most European regions 
there is almost no change (cf. Figure 16)
It can be concluded from this subsection that 
the effects of the milk quota abolition on the beef 
sector are usually small. The effects are moderated 
by opposite changes in the suckler cow herd (pure 
beef meat activities) but the overall beef supply 
tends to increase due to the increasing number of 
slaughtered dairy cows and cheaper calves.
Milk quota abolition can also influence land 
allocation, i.e. the production level of crops on 
arable land, since fodder production activities 
compete with other crops for the fixed resource 
land. However the model results show almost no 
changes at the aggregated level of cereal and total 
fodder production level (cf. Figure 17)
The aggregate “fodder activities” includes 
permanent grassland which is fixed in CAPRI 
simulations. Hence changes in land allocation 
become visible when analysis is focused on 
specific production activities. Looking at 
percentage changes of the two most important 
activities ‘fodder maize’ and ‘other fodder 
Figure 17: Percentage change in area of major land use categories
㰀 ⴀ㔀─                        ⴀ㔀─ ⴀ 　─                  　─ ⴀ ⬀㔀─               ⬀㔀─ ⴀ ⬀㄀㔀─                㸀 ⬀㄀㔀─    
搢ⴀ㔀─ ⴀ㔀─ ⴀ ㄀─               ⴀ㄀─ ⴀ ㄀─               ㄀─ ⴀ 㔀─                    攢㔀─
伀椀氀猀 攀攀搀猀                                                 匀 攀琀 愀猀 椀搀攀 愀渀搀 昀愀氀氀漀眀  氀愀渀搀
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from arable land’22 more sizable effects can 
be observed. However these effects are often 
antagonistic, i.e. when fodder maize increases 
‘other fodder’ goes down and vice versa. This 
observation is in line with the almost unchanged 
aggregated fodder production level. It can be 
explained since fodder maize has generally 
higher yields than other fodder from arable land. 
Hence a shift from other fodder on arable land 
to fodder maize can increase the overall fodder 
supply at almost unchanged fodder area.
CAPRI simulation results reveal that the 
changing feed demand caused by the quota 
abolition is mainly influencing the intensity of 
fodder production activities, i.e. the intensity 
of a single activity and shifts among fodder 
activities. Hence other crop activities are almost 
not affected. Furthermore the model tends to 
adjust the feeding of tradable fodder components 
– mainly cereals and cakes – in order to achieve 
22 Mainly temporary grazing and glover
a balanced supply of nutrition for the animals in 
the simulation.
4.2.4 Regional effects in selected Member 
States
In this section a selection of six Member 
States (France, Germany, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, Poland and Romania) are analysed in 
their regional dimension. This selection has been 
done since these MS show the most regional 
heterogeneity in the scenario results. Further 
maps on the rest of countries that have been 
regionalised in CAPRI (14 Member States: the 
Netherlands, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Belgium 
and Luxemburg, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Finland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and 
Bulgaria) can be found in Annex 2.23
23 It is important to note, that seven Member States 
(Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Malta, 
Cyprus) do not have a NUTS 2 division and are therefore 
not regionalised in CAPRI.
Figure 18: Percentage change in area of fodder maize and other fodder production activities 
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France
The regional effects within France are rather 
heterogeneous. As the regional distribution 
of quota rents in the baseline and percentage 
changes in dairy herds are almost identical 
it appears that the estimated quota rents are 
driving the impacts on dairy herds in line with 
Figure 11. High rents and abolition impacts 
seem to be related to the density of dairy cows 
measured in livestock units per ha. Regions 
increasing their milk production significantly 
also tend to have high animal densities. The only 
obvious exemption from this general observation 
is the region “Rhone-Alpes” in the south west. 
Here quite low quota rents are observed albeit 
the density of dairy cows is quite high. A high 
share of fodder production in UAA (Utilisable 
Agricultural Area) indicates both a high 
economic importance of the ruminant sector and 
a lack of economic alternatives. Combined with 
low quota rents and the assumption of uniform 
price changes within countries a significant 
drop in agricultural income in “Rhone-Alpes” 
may be expected. On the contrary, in the 
intensively dairy producing and expanding 
regions in the north west the drop in prices 
would be partially offset by an increase in milk 
production. The intensive arable regions in the 
centre of the country are almost not affected 
by income losses (and hence are in the group 
of highest or least negative income changes). 
This is due to the fact that the economic weight 
of cattle, approximated by fodder area, is low 
and, furthermore, cereal prices slightly increase 
(cf. Table 29). Looking at the large share of 
fodder production in Mediterranean regions 
(Languedoc, Provence) one might expect a high 
drop in income but the intensive permanent 
crops (e.g. vineyards) account for a large share 
of agricultural income although their share in 
area is small. Consequently income losses are 
negligible in these areas. 
Germany
Germany is also a large European country 
with significant heterogeneity among regions. 
Again quota rents emerge as a major driving 
force for changes in dairy herds. The regional 
pattern of income effects is matching less with 
quota rents than in France. In general German 
regions are more homogeneous regarding 
cropping pattern and animal density than 
regions in France. It appears that the economic 
importance of the cattle sector as indicated by 
the fodder area share is just as important for 
the income effects as the initial quota rents 
and changes in dairy cow herds. While overall 
agricultural income decreases in Germany on 
average by -3.6%, the most benefitting regions 
Saarland and Trier observe income gains 
of up to 4.8% and 4.4%. Hence, the gains 
in agricultural income are found in regions 
with a rather tiny dairy sector. On the other 
hand, the most negatively affected regions 
Schwaben, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thueringen and 
Oberbayern face agricultural income losses 
between -6.6 and -5.5%. Thus, with Schwaben 
and Oberbayern two of the biggest cow milk 
producing regions in Germany are among the 
most negatively affected regions.
Spain
The estimated quota rents in Spain are 
more homogeneous (compared to France and 
Germany) than the classification of regions into 
‘high-medium-low‘ in Figure 21 (cf. Table 32). 
Consequently other determinants than quota 
rents influence regional developments of dairy 
herds (like regional competition for fodder) and 
the match of the corresponding maps for rents 
and dairy cow impacts is quite poor. The dairy 
production in Spain is concentrated in the north 
west where also the highest expansion in dairy 
herds after quota abolition is expected. The area 
share of fodder production and the animal density 
of dairy cows are closely correlated. A counter-
example is “Extremadura” where ‘beef cattle’ is 
dominant. In the central and eastern regions of 
Spain the dairy density per ha is below average 
such that income losses are also quite low and 
these regions are in the more favourable group 
for the income effects.
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Table 30: Selected regional results for France
Figure 19: Selected regional results for France
䄀最爀椀挀甀氀琀甀爀愀氀 䤀渀挀漀洀攀
⠀─搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
儀甀漀琀愀 爀攀渀琀
⠀─漀昀 瀀爀椀挀攀 椀渀 匀 ㌀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
⠀─ 搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
䘀 漀搀搀攀爀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀椀漀渀
⠀─ 漀昀 唀䄀 䄀 椀渀 匀 ㌀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
⠀䰀 唀⼀栀愀 椀渀 匀 㐀⤀
氀漀眀                    洀攀搀椀甀洀                  栀椀最栀
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䄀最爀椀挀甀氀琀甀爀愀氀 䤀渀挀漀洀攀
⠀─搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
儀甀漀琀愀 爀攀渀琀
⠀─漀昀 瀀爀椀挀攀 椀渀 匀 ㌀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
⠀─ 搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
䘀 漀搀搀攀爀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀椀漀渀
⠀─ 漀昀 唀䄀 䄀 椀渀 匀 ㌀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
⠀䰀 唀⼀栀愀 椀渀 匀 㐀⤀
氀漀眀                    洀攀搀椀甀洀                  栀椀最栀
Figure 21: Selected regional results for Spain
䄀最爀椀挀甀氀琀甀爀愀氀 䤀渀挀漀洀攀
⠀─搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
儀甀漀琀愀 爀攀渀琀
⠀─漀昀 瀀爀椀挀攀 椀渀 匀 ㌀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
⠀─ 搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
䘀 漀搀搀攀爀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀椀漀渀
⠀─ 漀昀 唀䄀 䄀 椀渀 匀 ㌀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
⠀䰀 唀⼀栀愀 椀渀 匀 㐀⤀
氀漀眀                    洀攀搀椀甀洀                  栀椀最栀
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n Table 31: Selected regional results for Germany
Table 32: Selected regional results for Spain
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United Kingdom
Quota rents in the UK are rather low 
compared to other countries. However, there 
are regional differences which drive mainly the 
overall UK changes in dairy herds after abolition 
of the milk quota. Similar to Germany conditions 
for dairy farming are fairly homogenous in the UK. 
A particularity in the UK is that the highest quota 
rents are estimated in the northern regions, where 
the density of dairy cows is low (except Northern 
Ireland), i.e. the extensive regions appear to be 
more competitive than the intensive regions in 
the south. South western regions would face a 
sharper decline in agricultural income than other 
regions since dairy production is an important 
sector but not competitive on the EU level. As 
a consequence both a drop in prices and in 
production contribute to income losses. Income 
effects in the south east are more moderate since 
dairy production is of relatively low importance 
compared to other agricultural sectors.
Poland
Highest quota rents are reported for regions 
in the south west and central Poland which 
also increase significantly their milk production 
(by around 10%) after quota abolition. The 
differences between the other regions regarding 
quota rent and changes in milk production (+3-
4%) are almost negligible. Milk and fodder 
production is important in regions in the eastern 
part, where the density of dairy cows and the 
share of fodder production in total area use are 
quite high compared to the rest of the country. 
However the increase in milk production is 
low in the east and cannot compensate for the 
decline in milk prices. Consequently those 
regions would see a loss in income from 3% to 
5%. On the other hand the income loss is almost 
zero in more competitive regions where milk 
production is increasing and in regions with a 
low importance of milk production.
Figure 22: Selected regional results for the United Kingdom
䄀最爀椀挀甀氀琀甀爀愀氀 䤀渀挀漀洀攀
⠀─搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
儀甀漀琀愀 爀攀渀琀
⠀─漀昀 瀀爀椀挀攀 椀渀 匀 ㌀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
⠀─ 搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
䘀 漀搀搀攀爀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀椀漀渀
⠀─ 漀昀 唀䄀 䄀 椀渀 匀 ㌀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
⠀䰀 唀⼀栀愀 椀渀 匀 㐀⤀
氀漀眀                    洀攀搀椀甀洀                  栀椀最栀
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Romania
Due to lack of data for Romania it was 
not possible to estimate regional quota rents 
in the base year. However the development of 
positive rents according to Réquillart et al. (2008) 
suggests that Romania, as a whole, would have 
quota rents around 14% of milk price in 2020. 
This was translated into uniform assumptions for 
quota rents, except for numerical deviations in 
the calibration process (cf. table 35). Nonetheless 
model results for Romania show some differences 
in changes of dairy herds which are a result of 
other determinants like milk yield or fodder 
availability. The strongest drop in income is 
evident in central and north eastern regions. 
These regions are also characterised by low milk 
yields and high numbers of dairy cows per ha. 
The latter points both to a high importance of 
Table 33: Selected regional results for the United Kingdom
Figure 23: Selected regional results for Poland
䄀最爀椀挀甀氀琀甀爀愀氀 䤀渀挀漀洀攀
⠀─搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
儀甀漀琀愀 爀攀渀琀
⠀─漀昀 瀀爀椀挀攀 椀渀 匀 ㌀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
⠀─ 搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
䘀 漀搀搀攀爀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀椀漀渀
⠀─ 漀昀 唀䄀 䄀 椀渀 匀 ㌀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
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milk production. Regions in the south, where 
fodder production and dairy cows are of relatively 
low importance, would even see some gains 
in income (table 35). Note that the ordering of 
regions into the low – medium – high classes does 
not express that the size of regional differences 
is far lower in Romania than in the other large 
countries selected for a more detailed exposition 
of results. 
Table 34: Selected regional results for Poland
Figure 24: Selected regional results for Romania
䄀最爀椀挀甀氀琀甀爀愀氀 䤀渀挀漀洀攀
⠀─搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
䴀椀氀欀 夀 椀攀氀搀
⠀欀最⼀栀攀愀搀 椀渀 匀 㐀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
⠀─ 搀椀昀昀 琀漀 匀 ㌀⤀
䘀 漀搀搀攀爀 瀀爀漀搀甀挀琀椀漀渀
⠀─ 漀昀 唀䄀 䄀 椀渀 匀 ㌀⤀
䐀愀椀爀礀 栀攀爀搀猀
⠀䰀 唀⼀栀愀 椀渀 匀 㐀⤀
氀漀眀                    洀攀搀椀甀洀                  栀椀最栀
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4.2.5 Income and welfare effects
The regional income effects follow from price 
and quantity impacts on the input and output 
side. The bottom line in terms of agricultural 
income is crucially determined by the impacts 
on revenues from raw milk and meats and related 
impacts on non fodder items. Fodder items are 
important for a detailed analysis but revenue and 
cost of fodder tend to cancel each other, so that 
the overall change is negligible.
The overall loss of agricultural income due 
to milk quota abolition is projected to be almost 
4.7 billion € or 2.0%. Income changes may be 
attributed to a large extent to the components 
indicated in the table (i.e. changes in income from 
cow milk and meat and non fodder feed costs). 
In some MS, such as the Netherlands, there is a 
higher use of non-feed inputs, related to a high 
intensity of production, which are also increasing 
if production is expanding as projected. Hence, in 
contrast to many other MS, for the Netherlands the 
three components selected only explain a smaller 
part of the overall income effect. In general, the 
biggest losses in agricultural income are projected 
for countries in northern Europe, which reflects 
the situation that in northern Europe the share of 
milk production in total production tends to be 
higher than in Mediterranean countries. The largest 
decreases in agricultural income are projected for 
Sweden (-5.2%) Finland and Ireland (both -4,5%), 
Lithuania (-3.8%) and Germany (-3,6%).
A full welfare analysis of the quota abolition 
for the year 2020 can be drawn by adding the 
income effects on dairies and other producers, 
on the EU budget and on consumer welfare. 
Because market intervention in the current 
specification of CAPRI occurs at the aggregate 
EU-15 level, a complete welfare analysis is also 
only appropriate for the aggregates within the 
EU-27 (Table 37).
Whereas agricultural income would decline, 
the dairy industry would benefit in the EU-
27, as prices of dairy products are expected 
to decline somewhat less than raw milk prices 
(cf. table 18 to table 23). However in the EU-2, 
with very moderately declining raw milk prices 
of on average 2.3% (cf. Table 18), the dairy 
industry would see declining profits given that 
market prices of derived products would come 
under pressure from additional supply. FEOGA 
impacts are mainly additional export subsidies 
for butter (+48 m €) plus some changes in export 
subsidies and premiums elsewhere. Increasing 
net exports usually imply a decline of imports 
and thus moderate losses of tariff revenues. The 
main beneficiaries are consumers who would 
benefit from various declining prices, the largest 
effect coming from cheese. Overall the welfare 
analysis gives a small overall gain to the EU-
27 with losses for the EU-10 and the EU-2. The 
differences between the EU aggregates are mainly 
due to a different ratio of agricultural income 
relative to food expenditure, as this ratio is clearly 
Table 35: Selected regional results for Romania
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increasing from the EU-15 (22%) to the EU-10 
(28%) and the EU-2 (39%). A similar increase 
may be observed for the ratio of agricultural 
revenue from milk to consumer expenditure for 
dairy products. This observation means that the 
loss in agricultural income (about 2% both in the 
EU-15 and in the EU-10) weights more heavily in 
the NMS than in the EU-15 such that the welfare 
gains are dominating in the EU-15 but not in the 
EU-10 and EU-2. 
Table 36: Income effects of quota abolition in agriculture, 2020
Baseline Quota abolition (Δ to baseline)
agricultural 
income
from          
cow milk
from          
meat
non fodder 
feed cost
agricultural 
income
from cow 
milk
from          
meat
non fodder 
feed cost
Austria 3752 899 1884 737 -78 -5 -11 45
Belgium-Lux. 4463 987 3636 1714 -127.0 -37.7 -16.8 41.4
Denmark 4492 1569 3974 2312 -152.7 -130.7 -15.2 5.9
Finland 1543 955 828 586 -69.0 -69.5 -9.5 -9.8
France 37921 7548 16868 8509 -1070.0 -803.3 -255.1 -76.9
Germany 24004 9170 13788 6981 -870.2 -530.0 -42.9 227.4
Greece 11175 278 1440 1089 -130.0 -25.3 -17.1 -14.8
Ireland 3483 1526 2600 1076 -157.3 -22.9 -40.3 54.8
Italy 38678 4191 10594 6072 -538.9 -317.5 -136.5 10.7
Netherlands 12565 3955 4974 3012 -107.2 207.0 67.8 203.1
Portugal 3843 688 1726 1397 -71.0 -57.7 -19.9 -15.4
Spain 42087 2008 12706 7310 -386.3 -52.9 -105.7 50.1
Sweden 2114 1132 1103 380 -109.7 -105.7 -21.2 -8.1
United Kingdom 13585 4182 9032 4545 -358.3 -422.3 -160.0 -140.6
EU15 203705 39087 85152 45720 -4225.4 -2373.6 -783.7 372.4
Cyprus 459 69 267 194 -10.5 -3.3 -3.2 -1.7
Czech Republic 2201 766 1067 741 -56.4 -37.1 -7.0 10.3
Estonia 318 164 163 127 -10.6 -10.0 -1.1 -2.9
Hungary 4044 508 2065 1388 -40.1 -14.5 -9.0 19.4
Latvia 344 162 128 96 -12.3 -9.6 -0.8 -1.1
Lithuania 945 348 405 231 -36.2 -22.7 -1.4 0.1
Malta 56 16 41 48 -1.3 -0.4 -1.0 -0.3
Poland 10765 2409 6246 3254 -220.8 -122.7 -23.7 66.3
Slovac Republic 887 287 627 367 -24.9 -21.0 -7.7 -1.1
Slovenia 564 175 326 172 -16.3 -12.6 -6.8 -1.6
10 New MS 20584 4903 11334 6618 -429.4 -253.9 -61.7 87.5
Bulgaria 1949 295 609 313 -16.6 -1.6 -4.5 8.8
Romania 7163 809 1558 1294 1.8 11.1 -4.0 60.6
Bulgaria/Romania 9112 1103 2167 1607 -14.8 9.5 -8.5 69.4
EU27 233400 45094 98653 53945 -4669.6 -2618.0 -853.8 529.3
Note: income is expressed in this table in million Euro
Table 37: Welfare effects of a quota abolition in the EU-15, EU-10 and EU-2, 2020
Agriculture
Processing 
industry FEOGA Tariffs Consumers Welfare
EU15 -4225.4 249.6 62.4 -23.4 4300.0 238.4
10 New MS -429.3 32.0 0.0 -0.3 335.6 -62.1
Bulgaria/Romania -14.8 -3.5 0.0 0.1 14.3 -4.0
EU27 -4669.6 278.1 62.4 -23.6 4650.0 172.5
Note: figures are in million Euro
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The regional distribution of percentage 
changes in agricultural income after milk quota 
abolition is shown in Figure 25. 
Regional percentage effects on agricultural 
incomes may be seen to be distributed 
heterogeneously within countries. Mostly those 
regions that show high quota rents in the baseline 
see a rather favourable income development 
(but there are exceptions, as e.g. regions in the 
Netherlands and Austria also have to cope with 
small income losses). Agricultural incomes are 
most heterogeneously affected in Germany, 
Portugal and Spain. For example in Germany, 
where overall agricultural income decreases by 
3.6%, the most benefitting regions, Saarland 
and Trier observe income gains of up to 4.8% 
and 4.4%, while the most negatively affected 
regions Schwaben, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thueringen 
and Oberbayern, face agricultural income losses 
between -6.6% and -5.5%. Fairly homogeneous 
income impacts are expected in Finland, Sweden 
and in particular Hungary, where income losses 
are in the small range of -0.7 to -1.2%. Evidently 
the projected losses would be more serious if 
income of specialised dairy farmers would be 
considered.
Figure 25: Percentage change in agricultural income after the abolition of the milk quota regime 
 
㰀 ⴀ㌀─                 ⴀ㌀─ ⴀ ⴀ㄀─             ⴀ㄀─ ⴀ 　─                 㸀 　─    
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The dairy sector makes a substantial 
contribution to the agricultural turn-over in many 
EU Member States (MS) as well as in the EU in 
aggregate. Nevertheless, within the EU-27, the 
size and agricultural importance of the dairy 
sector varies considerably between MS and across 
regions, basically reflecting climatic and other 
agricultural factors in the region concerned. The 
Common Market Organisation (CMO) for milk 
and milk products helped to create stable market 
conditions for EU dairy producers, but the EU’s 
dairy policy has been continuously updated and 
is increasingly targeted at encouraging producers 
to be more market-oriented. With the Luxembourg 
Agreement on the Mid-Term-Review (MTR) the 
spotlight shifted especially on the EU’s milk quota 
regime, because the MTR stipulated that the milk 
quota system, originally introduced in 1984, 
will come to an end in 2015. In this context it is 
especially important to clarify, which effects can be 
expected of an abolition of the milk quota regime.
For this report a significant amount of work 
of the CAPRI consortium has been devoted 
to a rigorous update of the CAPRI model. The 
profound update of the CAPRI model provides the 
basis for a comprehensive quantitative assessment 
of possible implications of a dairy policy reform, 
with an explicit focus on regional effects in the 
EU-27 of a milk quota abolition in year 2015. 
As an explicit focus of this report is on 
the regional effects in the EU-27 of a milk 
quota abolition in year 2015, conclusions can 
predominantly be drawn by comparing the 
results of scenario S4 (year 2020 following quota 
abolition) and scenario S3 (2020 with quotas in 
place). Results of scenario S4 indicate, that by 
2020 abolition of the milk quota regime provokes 
milk production increases by about 4.4% in the 
EU-27, and EU raw milk prices decline by 10%. 
Production of butter, skimmed and whole milk 
powder would increase by 5-6% while their prices 
would decline by about 6-7%. The production of 
cheese and fresh milk products would increase by 
about 1% and their prices could decline by 4-6%.
Scenario results indicate, that the projected 
impacts of milk quota abolition on regional 
milk production are mainly determined by 
the estimated milk quota rents in the baseline 
scenario. Hence, regions with high quota rents, 
such as in Austria (all above 28%), Netherlands 
(all above 27%), Belgium (Brabant Wallon 38%, 
the rest of regions above 28%), Luxembourg 
(29%), and to a lesser extent Italy (Lazio, 
Molise and Abruzzo above 33%) and Germany 
(Saarland, Koblenz and Rheinhessen-Pfalz 
above 32%), display a significant increase in 
milk production. The overall increase in milk 
production drives down dairy prices in the EU-27 
and thus exerts economic pressure particularly 
on those regions with low quota rents (especially 
to be found in the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Finland) to partially retreat from the market. 
Highly competitive regions tend to expand 
their milk production and thus may be able 
to increase their revenues. Less competitive 
regions will loose revenues both from price and 
quantity sides. Incomes within EU MS are most 
heterogeneously affected in Germany, Portugal 
and Spain. In Germany income gains up to 4.8% 
are observed in benefiting regions, with income 
losses of up to -6.6% in most negatively affected 
regions. Fairly homogeneous income impacts are 
expected in Finland, Sweden and in particular 
Hungary, where income losses are in the small 
range of -0.7 to -1.2%.
Overall welfare effects are slightly positive for 
the EU-27. Whereas agricultural income would 
5. Conclusions
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EU dairy industry would benefit as prices of dairy 
products are expected to decline less than raw 
milk prices (i.e. input costs decreasing more than 
revenues). Impacts on the FEOGA budget would 
arise mainly from additional export subsidies for 
butter and moderate losses of tariff revenues. If 
a full transmission of lower agricultural raw 
milk prices along the downward supply chain to 
consumers is assumed, the main beneficiaries of 
milk quota abolition would be consumers, who 
benefit from various declining consumer prices, 
most notably declining prices for cheese.
It is important to take into account in this 
analysis some limitations of the CAPRI model as 
well as with regard to some assumptions:
The current analysis allows for a partially 
endogenous representation of regional cost 
structures for dairy producers. Nevertheless, it 
is important to remark that the cost estimation 
framework for milk producers applied to this study 
has been done separately from the simulation 
analysis with CAPRI, so that no exchange of 
information between both models has been 
attempted (due to the short-time frame of the study 
and its methodological complexity). Further on, 
there are some limitations inherent to the CAPRI 
model, for instance markets for primary factors 
(labour and capital) are not represented, there is 
limited endogenous adjustments in technology 
and it only focuses on agriculture, with a limited 
representation of processing activities (dairies and 
oils). 
Although the results of scenario S4 presented 
are in line with results of other studies, the 
simulations are based on model parameters 
that might be biased. The sensitivity analysis 
presented in Annex 3.3 reveals that the higher 
the assumed elasticity of milk supply, the wider 
is the variety of regional effects. While high 
supply elasticities tend to make the gap between 
winning and loosing regions broader, lower 
supply elasticities produce uniform changes 
among regions. With regard to quota rents, it 
has to be stressed that an assumption of different 
quota rents would have significant effects on 
the results of milk production as well as on milk 
prices and agricultural income. 
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Annex 1: Regional quota rents
Table 38: Quota rents and milk prices at regional level [2004-2020]
Pre Model estimates based 
on FADN data
CAPRI Model Base year 
(S1)
CAPRI Model Baseline (S3)
milk price quota rent milk price quota rent milk price quota rent
[€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price]
Belgium and Lux. 285 80 28 256 72 28 285 79 28
Danmark 304 38 13 308 39 13 333 31 9
Germany 289 46 16 281 46 16 313 56 18
Austria 287 86 30 252 76 30 282 84 30
Netherlands 307 101 33 319 105 33 354 98 28
France 295 49 17 274 47 17 300 38 13
Portugal 275 46 18 298 52 17 335 35 10
Spain 302 84 28 276 77 28 306 68 22
Greece 368 133 35 325 114 35 358 42 12
Italy 365 73 20 340 68 20 369 52 14
Ireland 261 64 25 260 64 25 284 59 21
Finland 329 7 2 342 7 2 379 13 3
Sweden 328 14 4 312 13 4 341 10 3
United Kingdom 263 10 4 254 10 4 278 9 3
Czech Republic 279 3 1 243 3 1 282 27 10
Estonia 239 3 1 201 3 1 245 15 6
Hungary 259 4 1 254 3 1 270 34 13
Lithuania 180 9 5 152 8 5 183 18 10
Latvia 213 5 2 157 3 2 196 14 7
Poland 200 5 3 175 5 3 213 31 15
Slovenia 250 8 3 235 8 3 259 21 8
Slovak Republic 244 3 1 243 3 1 277 17 6
Cyprus 1 387 4 1 461 27 6
Malta 1 335 3 1 365 21 6
Bulgaria 194 234 21 9
Romania 187 173 24 14
Antwerpen 279 76 27 256 69 27 285 75 26
Limburg (B) 280 74 26 256 67 26 285 73 26
Oost-Vlaanderen 284 81 28 256 72 28 285 79 28
Vlaams Brabant 277 73 26 256 68 26 285 73 26
West-Vlaanderen 283 83 29 256 74 29 285 81 28
Brabant Wallon 281 88 31 256 65 26 285 109 38
82
A
nn
ex
es Pre Model estimates based 
on FADN data
CAPRI Model Base year 
(S1)
CAPRI Model Baseline (S3)
milk price quota rent milk price quota rent milk price quota rent
[€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price]
Hainaut 285 83 29 256 75 29 285 81 28
Liege 287 84 29 256 75 29 285 81 29
Luxembourg (B) 286 87 30 256 78 30 285 85 30
Namur 285 85 30 256 77 30 285 83 29
Luxembourg (Grand-Duche) 304 68 22 256 57 22 285 62 22
Stuttgart 295 46 16 281 45 16 313 55 17
Karlsruhe 294 40 14 281 39 14 313 48 15
Freiburg 295 60 20 281 58 21 313 69 22
Tuebingen 294 56 19 281 54 19 313 65 21
Oberbayern 299 55 18 281 53 19 313 63 20
Niederbayern 298 48 16 281 46 16 313 56 18
Oberpfalz 299 64 22 281 61 22 313 73 23
Oberfranken 299 50 17 281 47 17 313 58 18
Mittelfranken 298 47 16 281 42 15 313 55 18
Unterfranken 298 38 13 281 36 13 313 45 14
Schwaben 298 48 16 281 46 16 313 56 18
Brandenburg 283 34 12 281 34 12 313 43 14
Darmstadt 285 43 15 281 44 16 313 53 17
Giessen 287 43 15 281 45 16 313 53 17
Kassel 287 43 15 281 43 15 313 53 17
Mecklenburgvorp. 283 33 12 281 33 12 313 42 13
Braunschweig 281 42 15 281 43 15 313 53 17
Hannover 282 42 15 281 43 15 313 52 17
Lueneburg 283 41 15 281 43 15 313 51 16
Weser-Ems 283 40 14 281 43 15 313 50 16
Duesseldorf 288 55 19 281 59 21 313 65 21
Koeln 290 56 19 281 55 20 313 66 21
Muenster 289 56 19 281 57 20 313 66 21
Detmold 289 55 19 281 56 20 313 66 21
Arnsberg 289 56 19 281 55 19 313 66 21
Koblenz 296 96 33 281 92 33 313 107 34
Trier 296 94 32 281 90 32 313 105 34
Rheinhessen-Pfalz 296 92 31 281 88 31 313 103 33
Saarland 296 98 33 281 93 33 313 109 35
Sachsen 284 30 11 281 30 11 313 39 12
Dessau 285 27 9 281 36 13 313 35 11
Halle 285 27 9 281 35 13 313 35 11
Magdeburg 284 27 9 281 38 14 313 35 11
Schleswig-Holstein 274 47 17 281 49 17 313 59 19
Thueringen 284 26 9 281 26 9 313 35 11
Anatoliki mak., Thraki 376 120 32 325 102 32 358 27 8
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CAPRI Model Base year 
(S1)
CAPRI Model Baseline (S3)
milk price quota rent milk price quota rent milk price quota rent
[€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price]
Kentriki makedonia 390 143 37 325 119 37 358 45 13
Dytiki makedonia 387 139 36 325 116 36 358 42 12
Thessalia 393 149 38 325 123 38 358 49 14
Ipeiros 570 189 49 325 160 49 358 90 25
Ionia nisia 15 325 49 15 358 4 1
Dytiki ellada 15 325 49 15 358 4 1
Sterea ellada 15 325 49 15 358 4 1
Peloponnisos 372 114 30 325 98 30 358 22 6
Attiki 15 325 49 15 358 4 1
Voreio aigaio 15 325 48 15 358 4 1
Notio aigaio 15 325 49 15 358 4 1
Kriti 15 325 49 15 358 4 1
Galicia 301 87 29 276 80 29 306 71 23
Asturias 303 88 29 276 80 29 306 72 23
Cantabria 309 70 23 276 62 23 306 52 17
Pais vasco 312 75 24 276 66 24 306 56 18
Navarra 314 78 25 276 68 25 306 59 19
Rioja 315 79 25 276 69 25 306 59 19
Aragon 314 76 24 276 67 24 306 57 19
Communidad de Madrid 311 93 30 276 83 30 306 75 24
Castilla-Leon 308 93 30 276 84 30 306 75 25
Castilla-la Mancha 309 93 30 276 83 30 306 75 25
Extremadura 300 93 31 276 85 31 306 77 25
Cataluna 314 76 24 276 67 24 306 57 19
Comunidad Valenciana 28 276 77 28 306 68 22
Baleares 299 93 31 276 86 31 306 78 26
Andalucia 299 93 31 276 86 31 306 78 26
Murcia 28 276 77 28 306 68 22
Canarias 15 276 41 15 306 28 9
Ile de france 15 274 41 15 300 32 11
Champagne-Ardenne 290 48 17 274 46 17 300 37 12
Picardie 288 18 6 274 18 7 300 7 2
Haute-Normandie 306 53 18 274 49 18 300 40 13
Centre 290 29 10 274 28 10 300 17 6
Basse-Normandie 306 61 20 274 56 20 300 47 16
Bourgogne 291 42 14 274 39 14 300 30 10
Nord-Pas-De-Calais 288 19 7 274 19 7 300 7 2
Lorraine 295 10 4 274 11 4 300 3 1
Alsace 296 10 3 274 10 4 300 3 1
Franche-Comte 323 78 24 274 67 24 300 60 20
Pays de la loire 294 68 23 274 66 24 300 57 19
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CAPRI Model Base year 
(S1)
CAPRI Model Baseline (S3)
milk price quota rent milk price quota rent milk price quota rent
[€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price]
Bretagne 288 57 20 274 55 20 300 46 15
Poitou-Charentes 288 42 15 274 41 15 300 31 10
Aquitaine 288 41 14 274 40 14 300 30 10
Midi-Pyrenees 288 54 19 274 52 19 300 44 15
Limousin 288 56 19 274 53 19 300 46 15
Rhone-Alpes 313 43 14 274 38 14 300 29 10
Auvergne 288 41 14 274 39 14 300 29 10
Languedoc-Roussillon 286 47 16 274 45 16 300 36 12
Prov.-Alpes-Cote d’Azur 287 49 17 274 47 17 300 39 13
Corse 17 274 46 17 300 37 12
Border, Midlands, West. 260 66 26 260 67 26 284 62 22
Southern and Eastern 261 63 24 260 63 24 284 58 21
Piemonte 337 71 21 340 71 21 369 55 15
Valle d’Aosta 397 48 12 340 42 12 369 23 6
Liguria 400 43 11 340 36 11 369 17 5
Lombardia 353 67 19 340 65 19 369 48 13
Trentino-Alto Adige 455 50 12 340 42 12 369 23 6
Veneto 339 21 6 340 20 6 369 4 1
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 353 62 18 340 59 17 369 42 11
Emilia-Romagna 393 74 19 340 64 19 369 47 13
Toscana 358 102 28 340 96 28 369 82 22
Umbria 357 101 28 340 96 28 369 82 22
Marche 358 102 28 340 97 29 369 82 22
Lazio 374 165 44 340 149 44 369 140 38
Abruzzo 369 148 40 340 135 40 369 124 34
Molise 369 148 40 340 136 40 369 125 34
Campania 402 130 32 340 109 32 369 96 26
Puglia 401 123 31 340 104 31 369 90 24
Basilicata 401 124 31 340 104 31 369 91 25
Calabria 393 83 21 340 71 21 369 55 15
Sicilia 374 119 32 340 108 32 369 95 26
Sardegna 374 116 31 340 105 31 369 91 25
Groningen 307 101 33 319 104 33 354 98 28
Friesland 307 101 33 319 105 33 354 98 28
Drenthe 307 101 33 319 104 33 354 98 28
Overijssel 307 101 33 319 105 33 354 98 28
Gelderland 307 102 33 319 105 33 354 99 28
Flevoland 307 100 33 319 103 32 354 97 27
Utrecht 306 102 33 319 106 33 354 99 28
Noord-Holland 307 101 33 319 105 33 354 99 28
Zuid-Holland 306 102 33 319 106 33 354 99 28
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CAPRI Model Base year 
(S1)
CAPRI Model Baseline (S3)
milk price quota rent milk price quota rent milk price quota rent
[€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price]
Zeeland 307 100 33 319 104 33 354 97 27
Noord-Brabant 307 100 33 319 104 33 354 97 27
Limburg (NL) 307 101 33 319 104 33 354 98 28
Burgenland 39 252 98 39 282 109 39
Niederoesterreich 363 111 39 252 75 30 282 83 29
Kaernten 287 85 30 252 79 31 282 88 31
Steiermark 283 89 31 252 77 31 282 86 30
Oberoesterreich 285 87 31 252 74 29 282 83 29
Salzburg 287 84 30 252 77 31 282 85 30
Tirol 285 87 31 252 77 31 282 85 30
Vorarlberg 285 87 31 252 72 29 282 80 28
Norte 296 31 10 298 31 10 335 5 2
Algarve 241 74 31 298 92 31 335 74 22
Centro 296 31 10 298 30 10 335 5 2
Lisboa 310 31 10 298 29 10 335 4 1
Alentejo 241 74 31 298 91 31 335 74 22
Acores 234 71 30 298 90 30 335 72 21
Madeira 234 71 30 298 90 30 335 72 21
Itae-Suomi 329 7 2 342 8 2 379 13 4
Etelae-Suomi 328 7 2 342 7 2 379 13 3
Laensi-Suomi 328 7 2 342 7 2 379 13 3
Pohjois-Suomi 328 7 2 342 8 2 379 13 4
Ahvenanmaa/Aaland 427 8 3 342 9 3 379 15 4
Stockholm 328 22 7 312 21 7 341 19 5
Oestra mellansverige 329 18 6 312 17 6 341 15 4
Sydsverige 329 18 5 312 17 5 341 14 4
Norra mellansverige 327 10 3 312 10 3 341 7 2
Mellersta norrland 327 8 3 312 8 2 341 4 1
Oevre norrland 327 8 2 312 9 3 341 4 1
Smaaland med Oearna 326 9 3 312 9 3 341 6 2
Vaestsverige 329 17 5 312 16 5 341 14 4
North East 263 16 6 254 16 6 278 14 5
North W. (incl. Merseyside) 263 16 6 254 16 6 278 14 5
Yorkshire and The Humber 263 16 6 254 16 6 278 14 5
East Midlands 266 9 4 254 9 3 278 6 2
West Midlands 263 3 1 254 2 1 278 3 1
Eastern 280 5 2 254 5 2 278 3 1
South East 270 4 1 254 3 1 278 3 1
South West 263 3 1 254 3 1 278 3 1
Wales 256 7 3 254 7 3 278 5 2
Scotland 263 14 5 254 13 5 278 11 4
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CAPRI Model Base year 
(S1)
CAPRI Model Baseline (S3)
milk price quota rent milk price quota rent milk price quota rent
[€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price]
Northern Ireland 261 23 9 254 23 9 278 21 8
Praha 292 5 2 243 4 2 282 29 10
Strední Cechy 294 3 1 243 3 1 282 27 10
Jihozápad 273 3 1 243 3 1 282 27 9
Severozápad 272 4 1 243 3 1 282 28 10
Severovýchod 273 3 1 243 3 1 282 27 9
Jihovýchod 273 3 1 243 3 1 282 27 10
Strední Morava 273 3 1 243 3 1 282 27 9
Moravskoslezko 295 3 1 243 3 1 282 27 10
Közép-Magyarország 259 3 1 254 3 1 270 34 13
Közép-Dunántúl 257 3 1 254 3 1 270 33 12
Nyugat-Dunántúl 260 4 1 254 3 1 270 34 13
Dél-Dunántúl 257 3 1 254 3 1 270 34 13
Észak-Magyarország 261 6 2 254 6 2 270 37 14
Észak-Alföld 260 4 2 254 4 1 270 35 13
Dél-Alföld 258 3 1 254 3 1 270 34 13
Lódzkie 192 2 1 175 2 1 213 27 13
Mazowieckie 193 2 1 175 2 1 213 27 13
Malopolskie 203 2 1 175 2 1 213 27 13
Slaskie 203 2 1 175 2 1 213 27 13
Lubelskie 192 2 1 175 2 1 213 27 13
Podkarpackie 203 2 1 175 2 1 213 27 13
Swietokrzyskie 203 2 1 175 2 1 213 27 13
Podlaskie 193 2 1 175 2 1 213 27 13
Wielkopolskie 208 20 10 175 17 10 213 46 22
Zachodniopomorskie 234 2 1 175 2 1 213 28 13
Lubuskie 209 2 1 175 2 1 213 27 13
Dolnoslaskie 209 7 3 175 6 3 213 32 15
Opolskie 212 10 5 175 8 5 213 35 17
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 208 20 10 175 17 10 213 46 21
Warminsko-Mazurskie 210 2 1 175 2 1 213 27 13
Pomorskie 209 2 1 175 2 1 213 27 13
Bratislavský 266 3 1 243 3 1 277 17 6
Západné Slovensko 243 3 1 243 3 1 277 17 6
Stredné Slovensko 243 3 1 243 3 1 277 17 6
Východné Slovensko 243 3 1 243 3 1 277 17 6
Severozapaden 194 234 21 9
Severen tsentralen 194 234 21 9
Severoiztochen 194 234 21 9
Yugozapaden 194 234 21 9
Yuzhen tsentralen 194 234 21 9
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CAPRI Model Base year 
(S1)
CAPRI Model Baseline (S3)
milk price quota rent milk price quota rent milk price quota rent
[€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price] [€/t] [€/t] [% price]
Yugoiztochen 194 234 21 9
Nord-Est 187 173 24 14
Sud-Est 187 173 25 15
Sud 187 173 24 14
Sud-Vest 187 173 24 14
Vest 187 173 24 14
Nord-Vest 187 173 24 14
Centru 187 173 24 14
Bucuresti 187 173 24 14
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Figure 26: Selected regional results for the Netherlands
Figure 27: Selected regional results for Greece
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Figure 29: Selected regional results for Portugal
90
A
nn
ex
es Figure 30: Selected regional results for Belgium
Figure 31: Selected regional results for Italy
R
eg
io
na
l E
co
no
m
ic
 A
na
ly
si
s 
of
 M
ilk
 Q
uo
ta
 R
ef
or
m
 in
 t
he
 E
U
91
Figure 32: Selected regional results for Austria
Figure 33: Selected regional results for Sweden
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Figure 34: Selected regional results for Finland
Figure 35: Selected regional results for Hungary
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Figure 36: Selected regional results for the Czech Republic
Figure 37: Selected regional results for the Slovak Republic
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Figure 38: Selected regional results for Bulgaria
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Annex 3.1: Data validation of ex-post results
In Table 39 the base year data of CAPRI are 
compared to specific data provided by DG AGRI 
for this study. Differences for the EU-27 are in 
the range of +0.2% for dairy cattle herds and 
milk production, being the differences in yields 
deemed negligible. This excludes misbehaviour 
by the model in the calibration process, being the 
remaining differences due to 
a) the effect of the “averaging” of the base year 
(years 2003, 2004 and 2005 in CAPRI) and 
Table 39: Base year comparison between CAPRI and DG AGRI data for dairy herds, milk yields and 
cow milk production, 2004
Base year (S1) Base year AGRI (2004) Diff CAPRI/AGRI (2004)
Dairy herd Yield Production Dairy herd Yield Production Dairy herd Yield Production
[1000 hd] [kg/hd] [1000 t] [1000 hd] [kg/hd] [1000 t] [%] [%] [%]
Austria 552 5842 3223 543 5816 3160 1.51 0.46 1.98
Belgium-Lux. 610 5642 3444 605 5586 3378 0.94 1.01 1.96
Denmark 578 7950 4599 572 8050 4604 1.13 -1.24 -0.12
Finland 327 7512 2458 320 7670 2451 2.39 -2.06 0.28
France 3942 6270 24717 3956 6218 24598 -0.36 0.85 0.48
Germany 4316 6641 28664 4263 6665 28410 1.26 -0.36 0.89
Greece 150 5104 768 150 5035 757 -0.04 1.37 1.33
Ireland 1142 4635 5292 1120 4706 5268 1.98 -1.50 0.45
Italy 2069 5444 11263 1864 5802 10818 10.98 -6.18 4.12
Netherlands 1517 7200 10924 1513 7231 10942 0.28 -0.44 -0.16
Portugal 328 6229 2043 330 6084 2008 -0.61 2.39 1.76
Spain 1098 6038 6628 1064 6194 6591 3.15 -2.51 0.56
Sweden 401 8028 3216 399 8142 3245 0.52 -1.40 -0.89
United Kingdom 2106 6958 14657 2091 7053 14746 0.75 -1.34 -0.60
EU15 19137 6370 121896 18789 6439 120977 1.85 -1.07 0.76
Cyprus 26 5951 153 26 5961 154 -0.35 -0.17 -0.54
Czech Republic 412 6394 2633 438 6244 2738 -6.09 2.40 -3.84
Estonia 113 5620 636 115 5580 644 -2.00 0.72 -1.29
Hungary 288 6547 1887 300 6512 1951 -3.84 0.54 -3.32
Latvia 174 4369 761 186 4257 791 -6.25 2.64 -3.77
Lithuania 423 4230 1790 433 4223 1828 -2.22 0.16 -2.06
Malta 7 5592 40 8 5321 41 -7.96 5.09 -3.23
Poland 2656 4428 11759 2767 4293 11879 -4.03 3.15 -1.01
Slovac Republic 155 6053 936 205 5402 1107 -24.53 12.06 -15.43
Slovenia 128 5140 659 128 5127 658 -0.10 0.26 0.16
10 New MS 4382 4851 21254 4606 4731 21791 -4.87 2.53 -2.47
Bulgaria 363 3644 1322 359 3655 1314 0.97 -0.31 0.66
Romania 1502 3412 5124 1567 3322 5206 -4.17 2.71 -1.57
Bulgaria/Romania 1864 3457 6446 1926 3384 6519 -3.21 2.16 -1.12
EU27 25383 5893 149596 25322 5896 149288 0.24 -0.04 0.21
Dairy herd
Source: Information provided by DG AGRI, L2 Unit, personal communication, 13/10/2008.
b) distributional effects between dairy cattle 
numbers and yield positions when holding 
milk production constant24. 
Within the EU-27 aggregate, specific 
attention was put on the ‘big’ milk producers, like 
Germany (deviation +0.9%), France (deviation 
+0.5%), United Kingdom (deviation -0.6%) and 
Poland (-1%). Higher deviations are found in the 
24 In principle, DG AGRI uses ESTAT data, as CAPRI. 
Nevertheless, differences between these two data sets 
could appear due to database updates and consistency 
restrictions (before entering the economic model, 
data in CAPRI are subject to a consistency check and 
differences to raw data might appear).
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deviation of -15%, due to inconsistencies in the 
data sets.
Annex 3.2: Data validation of baseline results
Milk production
Similarly to the case of the base year in 
Annex 3.1, the calibrated baseline is cross-
checked with official projections for milk 
production and dairy cattle numbers at 
DG AGRI. Here disaggregated projection data 
for comparison are only available at EU-15 and 
EU-27 level, as reported in Table 40. Measured 
in differences of 2004-2020 trends (section (b) of 
Table 40), deviations for the EU-27 are +1.3% for 
milk production, +3% for dairy cow herds and 
-2.6% for milk yields.
Development of quota rents
The base year and baseline quota rents at 
MS level have been explicitly estimated within 
this study (see Pérez Domínguez et al. 2008) 
and subject to several ‘plausibility’ checks 
together with adjustments reflecting ongoing 
market developments. In order to calculate 
the shifters from 2004 to the 2020 baseline, 
available information from the EDIM model was 
used. In order to merge this information in the 
CAPRI model a simple rule for homogenisation 
of estimates was chosen. Basically, the changes 
in quota rents per Member State between 2005 
and 2020 were taken from the EDIM model and 
weighted according to production in two blocks, 
the EU-15 and the EU-12 (i.e. MS base line rents 
= MS base year rents + 0.5* EDIM change in MS + 
0.5 * EDIM change in the EU-15/EU-10). By doing 
this, some safeguard against particularities of 
specific MS in the database has been applied and 
a more homogeneous set of shifters was achieved.
The difference between the first two 
columns in Table 41 reflects the imposition of 
bounds on regional quota rents derived from 
plausibility and information on sale prices for 
quotas. Negative rents were thus transformed 
into small positive rents (in particular in the 
NMS) but huge deviations from statistical 
information on sale prices were also taken as 
evidence that the econometrics suffered from 
data base or other problems. As the projection 
has been aligned with the earlier EDIM study 
on other aspects, it was straightforward to 
adopt the information on the shifts of quota 
rents from EDIM as well, albeit in the form of 
the above 0.5/0.5 rule. Nevertheless, some 
exceptions from this rule had to be considered. 
The first exception to this rule is Greece where 
Table 40: Baseline comparison between CAPRI and DG AGRI data for dairy herds, milk yields and 
cow milk production, 2020
(a) diff. of absolute 2020 values
Baseline (S3) Baseline AGRI (2020) Diff CAPRI/AGRI (2020)
Dairy herd Yield Production Dairy herd Yield Production Dairy herd Yield Production
[1000 hd] [kg/hd] [1000 t] [1000 hd] [kg/hd] [1000 t] [%] [%] [%]
EU15 17007 7291 124003 16773 7252 121643 1.39 0.54 1.94
EU27 22157 6822 151156 21325 6979 148821 3.90 -2.24 1.57
Dairy herd
(b) diff. of 2004-2020 trends
Baseline / Base year CAPRI Baseline / Base year AGRI Diff CAPRI/AGRI (2004-2020)
Dairy herd Yield Production Dairy herd Yield Production Dairy herd Yield Production
[% to S3] [% to S3] [% to S3] [% to 2004][% to 2004][% to 2004] [diff] [diff] [diff]
EU15 -11.1 14.5 1.7 -10.7 12.6 0.6 -0.40 1.83 1.18
EU27 -12.7 15.8 1.0 -15.8 18.4 -0.3 3.07 -2.61 1.36
Dairy herd
Source: Information provided by DG AGRI, L2 Unit, personal communication, 13/10/2008.
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the recent increase in quotas has not been 
reflected in the database for the econometric 
estimation. As a consequence an exceptional 
downward correction has been applied. 
Another exception was the EU-2 where the 
EDIM estimates have been maintained at the 
MS level (rather than averaging). The final 2020 
rents used in the simulations then follow simply 
as base year CAPRI rents + CAPRI change. 
Annex 3.3: Sensitivity Analysis 
This section aims to asses the uncertainty 
of the quota abolition scenario S4. Although the 
results of scenario S4 presented in the previous 
chapters are in line with results of other studies 
the simulations are based on model parameters 
that might be biased. The milk supply elasticity 
and the quota rents used to calibrate the CAPRI 
supply part are influencing the simulation results 
largely. Hence we calculated various quota 
abolition scenarios where those exogenous model 
parameters were varied.
Another source of uncertainty might be future 
development of international trade. An increasing 
worldwide demand for agricultural products 
might also increase potential EU dairy exports. 
This could naturally influence producer prices 
and milk supply. Additionally trade liberalization 
within the WTO negotiations might change 
market intervention in the European Union.
Table 41: Comparison between CAPRI and EDIM shifts for quota rents, 2004-2020
UNICATT 
estimate CAPRI Model EDIM change CAPRI change CAPRI
Belgium and Lux. 28.1 28.1 1.0 -0.7 * 27.6
Danmark 12.5 12.5 -4.0 -3.2 * 9.3
Germany 16.0 16.5 6.0 1.8 * 17.8
Austria 30.1 30.1 2.0 -0.2 * 29.9
Netherlands 32.9 32.9 -8.0 -5.2 * 27.8
France 16.6 17.1 -6.0 -4.2 * 12.6
Portugal 17.5 17.5 -15.0 -8.7 * 10.4
Spain 27.8 28.0 -9.0 -5.7 * 22.3
Greece 35.0 35.1 -24.0 ** 11.7
Italy 20.0 20.0 -10.0 -6.2 * 14.0
Ireland 24.6 24.6 -5.0 -3.7 * 20.9
Finland 2.2 2.2 5.0 1.3 * 3.5
Sweden 4.2 4.2 0.0 -1.2 * 3.0
United Kingdom 3.9 3.9 0.0 -1.2 * 3.2
Czech Republic 1.2 1.2 7.0 8.4 * 9.6
Estonia 1.3 1.3 0.0 4.9 * 6.2
Hungary 1.4 1.4 13.0 11.4 * 12.8
Lithuania 5.0 5.0 0.0 4.9 * 9.9
Latvia 2.1 2.1 0.0 4.9 * 6.9
Poland 2.7 2.7 14.0 11.9 * 14.6
Slovenia 3.2 3.3 0.0 4.9 * 8.1
Slovak Republic 1.2 1.2 0.0 4.9 * 6.0
Cyprus 1.0 1.0 0.0 4.9 * 5.9
Malta 1.0 1.0 0.0 4.9 * 5.8
Bulgaria 9.0 9.0 *** 8.9
Romania 14.0 14.0 *** 13.8
Change [2004-2020] Quota rent [2020]Quota rent [2004]
* Average of EDIM shift and weighted EU-15/EU-10 average
** Own estimate accounting for significant quota increase in Greece after end of MC estimation period
*** EDIM shift factor
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In the following subsections the effects of 
varying supply elasticities, quota rents, producer 
prices of milk and export subsidies will be 
investigated in more detail. 
a) Elasticity of milk supply
The supply elasticity derived from econometric 
estimation enters the CAPRI model as an exogenous 
parameter used to determine the slope of the marginal 
cost function underlying the PMP based supply 
modules. The supply models can be successively 
calibrated to different supply elasticities before 
the quota abolition scenario S4 is simulated. We 
calculated 4 scenarios where we refer to as follows:
(1) ELAS_150: milk supply elasticity increased by 50%
(2) ELAS_125: milk supply elasticity increased by 25%
(3) ELAS_75: milk supply elasticity reduced by 25%
(4) ELAS_50: milk supply elasticity reduced by 50%
Compared to the standard quota abolition 
scenario the effect of elasticity variation on 
overall milk supply is quite small. Looking at 
prices it becomes clear that lower elasticities 
of milk production would lead to a lower price 
decline (ie. higher prices) for milk. The effect on 
the overall agricultural income is negligible.
As done in previous analysis of scenario S4 we 
calculated the frequency of European regions per 
clusters of percentage milk output change. While 
the effect on the overall European milk supply is 
small the pattern among regions changes. 
The higher the elasticity underlying the 
simulation the wider the variety of regional 
effects. High elasticities tend to make the gap 
between “winning” and “loosing” regions bigger 
while lower elasticities produce more uniform 
changes among regions (cf. Figure 40)
b) Quota rents
Similar to supply elasticities, quota rents 
enter the calibration of the CAPRI supply models 
as exogenous parameters. In order to assess the 
effects of different quota rents the following 
alternative scenarios were calculated:
(1) Quota rent increased by 5ct/kg milk
(2) Quota rent increased by 2ct/kg milk
(3) Quota rent decreased by 2ct/kg milk
(4) Quota rent decreased by 5ct/kg milk
Figure 39: Percentage change of milk production: scenarios S3 versus S4
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The quota rents were shifted in absolute 
terms since a percentage variation would not 
affect all those regions where the quota rent is 
assumed to be 0. Given that reference quota rents 
differ among countries from 0 – 40 ct/kg milk an 
error of +/- 5 ct/kg is quite possible.
Figure 40: Frequency of percentage changes based on different elasticity sets
Table 42: Summary of simulation results with respect to different quota rents*
*Note: for this sensitivity analysis quota rents are considered positive or negative variations in variable costs of the corresponding regional 
supply model (e.g. an increase of quota rent by +5ct/kg milk means a corresponding reduction of 5ct/kg milk in production costs).
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presented for European country blocks. A more 
detailed discussion of effects would be beyond 
the scope of this section. The major finding is 
that different quota rents have significant effects 
on the overall increase in milk production, milk 
prices and agricultural income.
The change in milk supply can range from 
almost 0% to +14% in the European Union. At 
the same time milk prices vary from about -20% 
to 0%. The rather inelastic demand for milk 
products leads to declining agricultural income 
when quota rents are assumed to be higher, 
i.e. the increase in milk production cannot 
compensate the drastic drop in prices. Prices 
decrease although budgets for export subsidies of 
dairy products rise significantly.
c) Price development
Several market outlooks expect increasing 
worldwide demand for agricultural products. 
An argument for more market orientation in the 
dairy sector is that European farmers and dairy 
processors could benefit from this increasing 
demand only if there was no quota regime. 
As previous analysis of S4 pointed at losses of 
agricultural income, simulations were carried out 
where the producer prices for milk were fixed 
during simulation. Fixing prices in simulation 
means that the supply and market part cannot 
converge to equilibrium. Results of these 
scenarios can only be analysed with respect to 
supply model indicators.
The sensitivity of model results against 
variation of prices can be tested by varying milk 
prices in scenario S4 without the market model 
(i.e. only supply model working, so that prices 
remain as exogenous variables). 
Milk prices in different MS were fixed 
depending on the final equilibrium price of S4. 
The scenario results can be understood in the 
way that they show effects on the supply side in 
case the market model over or underestimated 
milk prices.
In order to assess the effects of different 
producer prices for milk the following alternative 
scenarios were calculated:
(1) Milk price fixed at S4 price -10€/kg milk
(2) Milk price fixed at S4 price +10€/kg milk
(3) Milk price fixed at S4 price +30€/kg milk
An increase in milk price of 10€/tonne would 
lead to agricultural income at the baseline level. 
However milk supply increases significantly at 
the same time so that processed products from 
about 8 mio. tonnes of milk would have to be 
placed on the market (cf. Table 43).
d) Export subsidies
Export subsidies are likely to expire with 
the conclusion of the ongoing DDA round. 
Since export subsidies increase in our standard 
implementation of S4 there might be a significant 
impact on model results. However simulation 
results show only limited effects of no export 
subsidies (cf. Table 44). 
Significant export subsidies are only paid for 
butter. Consequently production and market price 
for butter are considerably affected after an expiry 
of export subsidies. However production and 
prices of fresh milk products and cheese, which 
account for most of the production amount and 
value are more or less stable, i.e. the calculated 
change is within the range of the error term and 
cannot be avoided in an aggregated economic 
model. In the simulations the producer price 
for milk and dairy herds are not considerably 
affected.
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Annex 4: Review of results from 
previous studies
Annex 4.1: Introduction
This section describes the underlying 
baseline assumptions and compares results of 
three model based assessments of the removal of 
milk quotas within the framework of the “Health 
Check” of the CAP. The three partial equilibrium 
models considered are: 
•	 Agricultural	 Member	 States	 MODeling	
(AGMEMOD), (for further details see 
Chantreuil et al. 2008);
•	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 SIMulation	
(CAPSIM), (for further details see Witzke and 
Tonini 2008);
•	 European	Dairy	Industry	Model	(EDIM),	(for	
further details see Réquillart et al. 2008).
Table 43: Summary of simulation results with respect to different milk prices
Table 44: Effects of expiry of export subsidies on dairy markets
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The main characteristics of these three models 
compared in this section are presented in Table 45.
Annex 4.2: Description and comparison of 
baseline scenarios
a) Baseline description: AGMEMOD
The Baseline runs over the period 2000-
2020 and it reflects agreed agricultural policy at 
the time that the analysis was completed in May 
2008. It includes:
•	 The	Luxembourg	agreement	of	2003;
•	 Milk	 quotas	 remain	 in	 place	 at	 the	 2008/09	
level throughout the projection period;
•	 2008/09	quota	expansion	by	2%	as	agreed	in	
March 2008;
•	 Butter	and	SMP	 intervention	 remain	 in	place	
throughout the projection period;
•	 In	 view	 of	 the	 elevated	 price	 of	 cereals,	 the	
suspension of the set-aside regime agreed in 
2007 is carried forward through the projection 
period by 2020;
•	 No	further	WTO	reform	occurs	and	the	URAA	
conditions hold;
•	 Export	subsidies	and	import	tariffs	remain	'on	
the	 books'	 and	 are	 used	 when	 required	 to	
support the producer milk price.
b) Baseline description: CAPSIM
CAPSIM is not intended to be a projection 
tool given its comparative static nature and the 
parameterisation mainly based on calibration to a 
base period. The baseline is carried out through the 
so-called reference run only for 2004, 2014 and 2020 
and it reflects agreed agricultural policy at the time that 
the analysis was completed in July 2008. It includes:
•	 The	Luxembourg	agreement	of	2003;
•	 2008/09	quota	expansion	by	2%	as	agreed	in	
March 2008;
Table 45: Comparison of model characteristics
Criteria AGMEMOD CAPSIM EDIM
General 
characteristics
Econometric, dynamic, multi-
product, detailed Member State 
information
Calibrated, multi-periodic, rigorous 
microeconomic framework
Partly econometric, multi-
periodic and recursive in 
supply, detailed dairy product 
coverage
Country coverage EU-15 and EU-12 Member States
EU-27 Member States (and 
Western Balkan)
EU-15 and EU-10 Member 
States
Dairy product 
coverage
Butter, SMP, WMP, drinking milk, 
cream, other fresh products, 
cheese
Butter, SMP, WMP, fresh milk 
products, cheese, concentrated 
milk, whey powder and casein
Butter, SMP, WMP, casein, 
condensed milk, liquid milk, 
cream, fresh products and 6 
categories of cheese
Data sources
EUROSTAT, FAO, USDA and 
national sources
EUROSTAT, supplementary sources 
(and national sources for Western 
Balkans)
Various sources
Simulation period 2000 - 2020 2004 - 2020 2005 - 2020
Policy instruments
Milk quotas, intervention, 
subsidies in processing and 
consumption, SPS, SAPS, TRQs, 
export subsidies
Various premium activities, set-
aside, intervention, quotas (sugar 
and milk), domestic subsidies, 
tariffs, flexible levies/export 
refunds, WTO limits
Milk quotas, intervention, 
consumption and production 
subsidies, SFP, SAPS, TRQs, 
tariffs and export subsidies, 
WTO agreements
Quota rents
Calculated from EUROSTAT 
milk prices and marginal costs 
estimated by EDIM
Long run estimates for the EU-15 
based on EDIM
Long run estimates for the EU-
15 based on FADN micro data
Output
Supply, imports, exports, 
consumptions, stocks and prices
Market balances, agricultural 
production and income, consumer 
welfare and taxpayers impacts
Prices, production, 
consumption and trade for milk 
and the 14 dairy products
Source: Own table
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•	 Mini	 milk	 reform	 package	 on	 the	
standardization of the protein content of SMP;
•	 Recent	CAP	reform	(e.g.	2004	Mediterranean	
reform) and forecasts on policy driven 
variables (e.g. set-aside);
•	 In	 terms	 of	 direct	 support	 scheme	 the	
following are included: total payment 
amounts for coupled and decoupled support; 
sugar payments; specific support to tobacco, 
cotton, olives, hops; amounts exempted from 
modulation due to franchise.
c) Baseline description: EDIM
The Baseline runs over the period 2005-2015. 
In order to provide insights for the very long run 
the baseline is extended to 2020.It reflects agreed 
agricultural policy as defined by the Luxembourg 
agreement of 2003 including 1995 Uruguay 
Round trade agreement. It includes:
•	 A	 stepwise	 reduction	 of	 SMP	 and	 butter	
intervention prices by 15 and 25 percent 
respectively;
•	 A	 gradual	 increase	 of	 milk	 quotas	 between	
2006 and 2009;
•	 A	progressive	introduction	of	direct	payments	
reaching 35.5 €/tonne in the EU-15 Member 
States and 24.85 €/tonne in the EU-10 
Member States in 2010-2011.
d) Comparison of baseline scenarios
In this Section price and production results 
for two reference situations (i.e. 2014 and 2020) 
are compared across the three different models 
as well as within each model over time. A strict 
comparison of baselines was not possible since 
base year starting data were not completely 
Table 46: Comparison of baseline scenarios: cow milk, butter and SMP
EU27               
Cow milk Unit Year AGMEMOD CAPSIM EDIM AGMEMOD/EDIM CAPSIM/EDIM 
Price euro/1000 kg 2014 305 253 289 5.52% -12.43% 
Production 1,000 ton 2014 152736 154499 139815 9.24% 10.50% 
Price euro/1000 kg 2020 315 280 294 7.28% -4.69% 
Production 1,000 ton 2020 151795 153773 140040 8.39% 9.81% 
Price Change 2014-20 3.43% 10.72% 1.73%   
Production Change 2014-20 -0.62% -0.47% 0.16%   
Price Change annual 0.56% 1.71% 0.29%   
Production Change annual -0.10% -0.08% 0.03%     
Butter Unit Year AGMEMOD CAPSIM EDIM AGMEMOD/ESIM CAPSIM/ESIM 
Price euro/1000 kg 2014 3527 2959 2323 51.82% 27.39% 
Production 1,000 ton 2014 2086 1933 1762 18.38% 9.69% 
Price euro/1000 kg 2020 3704 2944 2315 60.00% 27.17% 
Production 1,000 ton 2020 2039 1907 1736 17.45% 9.87% 
Price Change 2014-20 5.03% -0.51% -0.34%   
Production Change 2014-20 -2.25% -1.32% -1.48%   
Price Change annual 0.82% -0.09% -0.06%   
Production Change annual -0.38% -0.22% -0.25%     
SMP Unit Year AGMEMOD CAPSIM EDIM AGMEMOD/ESIM CAPSIM/ESIM 
Price euro/1000 kg 2014 2333 1913 2171 7.44% -11.90% 
Production 1,000 ton 2014 1221 858 820 48.94% 4.63% 
Price euro/1000 kg 2020 2241 2069 2220 0.94% -6.82% 
Production 1,000 ton 2020 1121 801 774 44.78% 3.55% 
Price Change 2014-20 -3.93% 8.15% 2.26%   
Production Change 2014-20 -8.24% -6.59% -5.61%   
Price Change annual -0.67% 1.31% 0.37%   
Production Change annual -1.42% -1.13% -0.96%    
 
Source: Own table.
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express changes from 2014 to 2020 for each 
model for the main dairy commodities. In Table 
46 and Table 47 a comparison is established for 
the reference situations 2014 and 2020.
The two reference situations across the 
three different models highlight relatively high 
cream absolute prices for CAPSIM relatively to 
AGMEMOD and EDIM. This probably depends 
from the data sources used. However for policy 
impact analysis price changes and not absolute 
prices are important. The reference situations 
within each model over time highlight that price 
changes over the period 2014-2020 are large for 
CAPSIM relatively to AGMEMOD and EDIM with 
the exception of butter and cheese. Production 
changes are large for AGMEMOD relative to 
CAPSIM and EDIM. The largest absolute price 
changes are encountered in AGMEMOD for 
cheese, in CAPSIM for WMP, and in EDIM for 
SMP. The largest absolute production changes are 
large in AGMEMOD for SMP, in CAPSIM for SMP, 
and in EIM for WMP.
Annex 4.3: Comparison of scenarios on milk 
quota abolition
a) Scenario description: AGMEMOD
Four types of scenarios were performed in 
AGMEMOD:
•	 Milk	1:	Expansion	of	the	quota	by	1%	per	year	
from 2009/10 to 2013/14; quota removal in 
2015;
•	 Milk	2:	Expansion	of	the	quota	by	2%	per	year	
from 2009/10 to 2013/14; quota removal in 
2015;
Table 47: Comparison of baseline scenarios: WMP, cheese and cream
EU27               
WMP Unit Year AGMEMOD CAPSIM EDIM AGMEMOD/ESIM CAPSIM/ESIM 
Price euro/1000 kg 2014 2708 2576 2310 17.24% 11.53% 
Production 1,000 ton 2014 808 558 875 -7.61% -36.18% 
Price euro/1000 kg 2020 2722 2916 2340 16.33% 24.61% 
Production 1,000 ton 2020 744 532 823 -9.64% -35.36% 
Price Change 2014-20 0.51% 13.18% 1.30%   
Production Change 2014-20 -8.01% -4.74% -5.94%   
Price Change annual 0.08% 2.08% 0.22%   
Production Change annual -1.38% -0.81% -1.02%     
Cheese Unit Year AGMEMOD CAPSIM EDIM AGMEMOD/ESIM CAPSIM/ESIM 
Price euro/1000 kg 2014 4903 4605 n.a.   
Production 1,000 ton 2014 9605 9275 8989 6.86% 3.18% 
Price euro/1000 kg 2020 5253 4679 n.a.   
Production 1,000 ton 2020 9774 9630 9146 6.87% 5.29% 
Price Change 2014-20 7.14% 1.61%    
Production Change 2014-20 1.76% 3.83% 1.75%   
Price Change annual 1.16% 0.27%    
Production Change annual 0.29% 0.63% 0.29%     
Cream Unit Year AGMEMOD CAPSIM EDIM AGMEMOD/ESIM CAPSIM/ESIM 
Price euro/1000 kg 2014 1530 3290 1493 2.48% 120.34% 
Production 1,000 ton 2014 2743 2635 2511 9.23% 4.96% 
Price euro/1000 kg 2020 1601 3515 1494 7.17% 135.25% 
Production 1,000 ton 2020 2873 2635 2549 12.71% 3.39% 
Price Change 2014-20 4.64% 6.84% 0.07%   
Production Change 2014-20 4.75% 0.00% 1.51%   
Price Change annual 0.76% 1.11% 0.01%   
Production Change annual 0.78% 0.00% 0.25%     
 
Source: Own table.
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•	 Milk	 3:	 as	 Milk	 1,	 but	 intervention	 price	 of	
butter is cut by -2% per year starting in 2009;
•	 Milk	4:	as	Milk	2,	but	 intervention	prices	 for	
butter and SMP are cut by -2% per year, added 
by additional cuts of the subsidised export 
limits by -5% per year, all reductions starting 
in 2009.
b) Scenario description: CAPSIM
Three types of scenarios were performed in 
CAPSIM:
•	 Quota	 expiry	 scenario	 (EXPIRY,	 year	 2020)	
where the year 2020, 5 years after the scheduled 
expiry in 2015, corresponds to the magnitude 
of medium run elasticities (about 0.3 for milk) 
and it is comparable with the long run EDIM 
2008 results given for 2020 as well;
•	 A	 part	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 quota	 expiry	
strategy is a soft landing policy involving a 
series of quota expansion steps. The situation 
after the last of these steps will be simulated 
as	well	(EXPIRY-SOFT,	year	2014)	and	may	be	
compared with the reference run results given 
for the same year;
•	 Early	quota	expiry	scenario	 in	2009	(EXPIRY-
FAST, simulation year 2014) to identify the 
impact of soft landing relative to early full 
quota expiry we will also simulate quota 
expiry results for 2014 which would follow 
from a hypothetical expiry some years earlier 
(in 2009). This is not politically relevant but 
may be interesting for a technical analysis and 
understanding of CAPSIM results.
c) Scenario description: EDIM
Four types of scenarios were performed in 
EDIM:
•	 Phasing	out	quotas:	1%	annual	quota	increase	
from 2009-10 to 2014-15; quota removal in 
2015-16; this scenario is named Q1;
•	 Phasing	out	quotas:	2%	annual	quota	increase	
from 2009-10 to 2014-15; quota removal in 
2015-16; this scenario is named Q2;
•	 Quota	 Removal	 in	 2009-10;	 this	 scenario	 is	
named QR-09;
•	 Quota	 Removal	 in	 2015-16;	 this	 scenario	 is	
named QR-15.
Baseline and the 4 scenarios only differ by 
the level of quota or the existence of the quota 
system. All the other elements of the policy mix 
are identical. In particular:
•	 The	intervention	prices	are	identical;
•	 When	needed,	domestic	subsidies	and	export	
subsidies are used to maintain the domestic 
price of butter and SMP higher (or equal) to 
their respective intervention price;
•	 The	trade	policy	is	identical,	that	is	the	general	
rules are not modified.
d) Scenario comparison
The following scenarios (see Table 48) are 
compared: Milk 2 (AGMEMOD), Expiry (CAPSIM), 
and Q2 (EDIM).
By comparing scenario results of the 
AGMEMOD, CAPSIM and EDIM model based 
assessments of the removal of milk quotas with 
the reference run situations for 2020 it appears 
that:
•	 The	three	models	produce	closer	results	when	
focusing on production changes as compared 
to price changes, with the exception made for 
SMP and WMP;
•	 The	three	models	produce	the	same	direction	
of change, with a contraction in dairy prices 
and an increase in dairy production;
•	 AGMEMOD	 and	 CAPSIM	 tend	 to	 produce	
very similar results in terms of price changes 
for cow raw milk and SMP;
•	 AGMEMOD	and	EDIM	tend	 to	produce	very	
similar results in terms of production changes 
for cow raw milk;
•	 CAPSIM	 and	 EDIM	 tend	 to	 produce	 very	
similar results in terms of production changes 
for cheese;
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•	 AGMEMOD	 and	 CAPSIM	 tend	 to	 produce	
very similar results in terms of production 
changes for butter;
•	 EDIM	 produces	 the	 largest	 production	
changes for cow raw milk, butter, SMP and 
WMP.
Annex 5: Milk production trends
The demand side of cow milk in the CAPRI 
projection engine is disaggregated to 
•	 Deliveries	to	dairy	processing
Table 48: Scenario comparison for 2020
Product Unit Reference 2020 Scenarios 2020 % Difference 
  AGMEMOD CAPSIM EDIM AGMEMOD CAPSIM EDIM AGMEMOD CAPSIM EDIM 
Cow raw milk           
price euro/1000 kg 315 280 294 293 260 262 -7.19% -7.21% -10.88% 
prod 1,000 ton 151795 153773 140040 159293 158585 147317 4.94% 3.13% 5.20% 
Butter           
price euro/1000 kg 3704 2944 2315 3339 2926 2216 -9.87% -0.61% -4.28% 
prod 1,000 ton 2039 1907 1736 2191 2038 1942 7.44% 6.85% 11.87% 
SMP           
price euro/1000 kg 2241 2069 2220 2112 1961 1980 -5.75% -5.20% -10.81% 
prod 1,000 ton 1121 801 774 1275 873 987 13.78% 8.92% 27.52% 
WMP           
price euro/1000 kg 2722 2916 2340 2539 2786 2144 -6.71% -4.46% -8.38% 
prod 1,000 ton 744 532 823 791 553 1046 6.41% 3.95% 27.10% 
Cheese           
price euro/1000 kg 5253 4679 n.a. 4775 4550 n.a. -9.09% -2.75% n.a. 
prod 1,000 ton 9774 9630 9146 10267 9860 9351 5.04% 2.39% 2.24% 
Cream           
price euro/1000 kg 1601 3515 1494 1452 3506 1445 -9.30% -0.25% -3.28% 
prod 1,000 ton 2873 2635 2549 2936 2640 2569 2.20% 0.17% 0.78% 
Source: Own table.
Table 49: Changes cow milk production - detailed, 2004-2020
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es •	 Direct	sales
•	 Feed	use	on	farm
•	 Losses
Future deliveries to dairy processing and 
direct sales depend on the planned changes in 
allocated quota and our assumptions on quota 
fulfilment tendencies. For most MS this results 
in an increase of milk production about 2-4% 
within the quota regime. Some countries, e.g. 
Greece, show higher increases due to MS specific 
agreements. 
Own projections suggest that use of milk 
on farm and losses decline over time rather 
significantly (see Figure 41 for illustration). 
Depending on the relative importance of that 
alternative milk consumption in each country 
the overall change in milk production can even 
become negative.
Annex 6: Data consolidation in the 
dairy sector: the examples of 
Italy and the Slovak Republic 
It is often the case that national and ESTAT 
data, but also different ESTAT domains and 
sometimes even the numbers in a single market 
balance are not fully consistent with each other. 
The CAPRI modelling database is established 
in a routine called Complete and Consistent 
Data Base (COCO) based on various types of 
official data (see Britz 2008, section 2.3). This 
routine allows for conversion of units, trend 
based completions, mechanical corrections 
of presumed data errors while imposing some 
minimal technical consistency in terms of 
adding up constraints for areas and so forth in 
two steps:
1. Include and combine input data according 
to some overlay hierarchy;
2. Calculate complete and consistent time 
series while remaining close to the raw data.
The second step implies that the modelling 
database may deviate from raw data from 
ESTAT, sometimes in a non-negligible way, if 
the inconsistencies were significant. It should 
be acknowledged that these inconsistencies are 
not always visible in the original ESTAT tables 
because we are often collecting data from 
different tables and sometimes domains. The 
examples of Italy and the Slovak Republic are 
interesting because the CAPRI data shown in 
Table 39 deviate significantly from the DG AGRI 
data (close to ESTAT) on an important variable 
such as the number of dairy cows (cf. Table 50)
Table 50: Adjustments of raw data from ESTAT in the data consolidation procedure COCO in Italy, 
1000 heads 
Raw data Consolidated data
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
dairy cows 1988 2001 2063 2142 2156 2208
output coefficient male calves 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.59 0.64 0.64
output coefficient female calves 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.54 0.59 0.59
suckler cows 583 505 492 622 585 540
output coefficient male calves 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.56 0.61 0.64
output coefficient female calves 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.52 0.56 0.59
total supply calves 2313 2255 2299 3101 3328 3371
heifers slaughtered or net exported 522 489 556 519 495 538
heifers raised = cows slaughtered + stock change cows in t+1 519 344 558 518 489 484
sum heifers used 1041 833 1114 1036 984 1022
raising of female calves 833 1114 1023 984 1022 1062
bulls slaughtered or net exported 1404 2080 1996 1404 1613 1730
raising of male calves 2080 1996 1781 1613 1730 1724
total raising of calves 2913 3110 2804 2597 2752 2786
slaughtering of calves 1109 1104 1075 505 575 585
total demand calves 4021 4214 3879 3101 3328 3371
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On the supply side of calves the raw data 
include information on the herd size of dairy 
cows and suckler cows. The output coefficients 
of male and female calves are unobserved, but 
orders of magnitude are well known: an output 
coefficient of 0.45 per cow for calves of each 
sex acknowledges a small percentage of twins, 
a variable interruption between pregnancies as 
well as some moderate losses25. Multiplication 
of output coefficients with numbers of cows 
gives an estimated supply of calves of about 
2.3 million heads in 2001-2003. Of course the 
output coefficients need not be 0.45 exactly but 
an output coefficient of more than 0.65 or less 
than 0.3 will be considered very unusual.
Demand for calves is ultimately derived from 
slaughtering data (including net exports of live 
animals) of various animal categories as well as 
changes in the herd size of cows. In particular we 
may infer the number of heifers raised in a given 
year from the sum of slaughterings of cows and 
increase in the cow herd next year. In turn the 
heifers used next year must have been raised this 
year. This permits to infer the number of female 
calves needed for raising in this year. Raising of 
male calves in a given year equals next years 
25 COCO recognises that the split is commonly estimated 
to be 51:49 in favour of males which is ignored in the 
example for simplicity.
slaughterings of male adult cattle (including net 
exports of live animals). The final component 
of demand for calves is for slaughtering for 
production of veal which is directly given in 
the raw data. Adding up all calves raised and 
slaughtered in a given year yields about 4 million 
heads in terms of demand for calves in Italy in 
recent years. 
Hence there is a huge inconsistency of 
supply and demand of calves which needs to be 
closed in some fashion. The right part of the table 
shows that the main adjustment occurs through a 
significant increase in the output coefficients, up 
to the technical limits which is conceivable under 
fortunate circumstances (0.65). However, this 
adjustment is not sufficient to close the original 
gap such that some key numbers like the dairy 
cow herd size and total slaughterings have to be 
adjusted as well. 
The situation is similar in the Slovak Republic 
but with a change in sign: The raw data imply a 
huge excess supply of calves which needs to be 
eliminated. Again the adjustment occurs mainly 
through an adjustment of output coefficients. If 
technical bounds against implausible coefficients 
Table 51: Adjustments of raw data from ESTAT in the data consolidation procedure COCO in the 
Slovak Republic, 1000 heads 
Raw data Consolidated data
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
dairy cows 247 239 234 188 197 180
output coefficient male calves 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.29 0.28 0.28
output coefficient female calves 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.29 0.28 0.28
suckler cows 26 29 30 0 0 11
output coefficient male calves 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.43
output coefficient female calves 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.43
total supply calves 245 241 238 108 111 111
heifers slaughtered or net exported 18 12 12 24 19 12
heifers raised = cows slaughtered + stock change cows in t+1 37 29 44 40 34 44
sum heifers used 56 41 56 64 53 56
raising of female calves 41 56 57 53 56 55
bulls slaughtered or net exported 49 44 39 56 48 47
raising of male calves 44 39 36 48 47 43
total raising of calves 85 95 93 101 102 98
slaughtering of calves 3 3 3 7 9 13
total demand calves 87 97 96 108 111 111
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ex
es are hit other variables including the dairy herds 
have to adjust as well. 
Note that the downward corrected aggregate 
output coefficient for both sexes is 0.56 calves 
born per cow in 2002 in the Slovak Republic. 
On the contrary this coefficient is estimated to 
be 1.23 in Italy. These large differences (certainly 
close to the limit of acceptable values) may be 
partly statistical artefacts but more uniform output 
coefficients would have required to deviate even 
stronger from the statistical raw data. These are 
partly in conflict with each other in these two 
countries. We may summarise that there is a large 
consolidation requirement because the dairy herd 
size data and slaughtering data are partly at odds 
with each other in Italy and the Slovak Republic. In 
other countries these conflicts are less severe such 
that a moderate adjustment of output coefficients 
is sufficient for consolidation together with much 
smaller adjustments in dairy cow herd size and 
slaughtering data. In general these adjustments are 
less than 5% in most cases but in Italy dairy herds 
were increased by about 10% and in the Slovak 
Republic decreased by about 25%.
Annex 7: Detailed illustration of fat 
and protein balancing in the 
baseline: the example of Austria 
As the fat and protein balances relate to all 
nine dairy products and the two raw milk types 
all these have to be considered for a full account 
of changes in dairy product mix. Furthermore 
it is necessary to acknowledge small quantities 
of dairy products which are processed again 
in the dairy industry. Based on the information 
in the main report Austria may be a puzzling 
example because butter and skimmed milk 
production are strongly declining (by 34% 
and 28% respectively) whereas production 
of cow milk and cheese only decline by 0.9% 
and 1.6% respectively. Table 52 shows that the 
main compensation for the decline in demand 
for milk fat from butter comes from additional 
production of fresh milk products and cream as 
well as some increase in fat contents over time.
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UTable 52: Detailed changes in fat and protein balancing in the baseline: the example of Austria 
Fat 
content
Protein 
content Processing Production
Fat supply    
-demand
Protein supply    
-demand
Base year 2004 (S1)
Raw milk 4.3 3.4 2691.9 +11483 +9139
Cow milk 2672.8
Sheep milk 19.1
Butter 84.4 0.0 3.5 32.3 -2428 +0
Skimmed milk powder 1.4 34.9 1.4 7.1 -8 -199
Cheese 22.3 33.5 14.9 147.2 -2956 -4431
Fresh milk products 4.8 4.4 0.0 903.7 -4355 -3940
Cream 26.7 3.1 0.0 60.6 -1617 -187
Concentrated milk 6.3 8.4 0.0 12.7 -80 -106
Whole milk powder 26.2 31.1 0.1 1.2 -30 -35
Whey powder 0.9 10.6 0.0 10.1 -9 -107
Casein 0.7 89.3 0.1 1.6 -1 -133
Balance +0 +0
Baseline 2020 (S3)
Raw milk 4.3 3.4 2668.9 +11385 +9060
Cow milk 2647.8
Sheep milk 21.1
Butter 84.8 0.0 3.5 21.4 -1519 +0
Skimmed milk powder 1.4 34.1 1.4 5.1 -5 -127
Cheese 23.4 34.1 14.9 144.9 -3037 -4438
Fresh milk products 5.1 4.1 0.0 966.5 -4894 -3951
Cream 27.0 3.1 0.0 67.4 -1820 -209
Concentrated milk 6.3 8.4 0.0 11.9 -76 -100
Whole milk powder 25.7 30.0 0.1 1.0 -24 -28
Whey powder 0.9 11.2 0.0 10.9 -9 -122
Casein 0.7 85.0 0.1 1.1 -1 -86
Balance +0 -0
% Change 2004 to 2020
Raw milk 0.0% 0.0% -0.9%
Cow milk -0.9%
Sheep milk 10.4%
Butter 0.5% 0.0% -33.6%
Skimmed milk powder -0.1% -2.3% 0.0% -27.6%
Cheese 4.6% 2.0% 0.0% -1.6%
Fresh milk products 5.1% -6.2% 6.9%
Cream 1.1% 0.3% 11.4%
Concentrated milk 0.2% 0.2% -6.0%
Whole milk powder -2.2% -3.4% 0.0% -17.1%
Whey powder 0.6% 5.2% 8.1%
Casein -0.1% -4.8% 0.0% -31.1%
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